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PREFACE
In the course of this century a great many books,
articles, and studies have been written about the Mexican
American in the United States.

Equally important, among

these inquiries, various topics have dealt with the
historical and sociological realities shared by two
countries, Mexic·o and the United States.
However, few serious inquiries can be found dealing
with the repatriation of Mexican Americans from the United
States.

This event, a tragic part of American history,

resulted in the repatriation of approximately half a
million Mexicans, including native-born Americans who
left the country either by their own volition or by
coercion.
This case deals with federal and local policies
responsible for the expulsion of Mexican Americans during
the Great Depression.

While the study limits its

investigation to the Southwest section of the United
States, in particular the Los Angeles area, it does take
into account that this repatriation movement was a national
phenomenon.

Also, the overwhelming repercussions that

repatriation had on both sides of the United States-Mexican
border and inner cities of Mexico are included in the
investigation.
vi

On the whole, very few writers have critically written
about this historical event.

Among these writers,

historian Abraham Hoffman is the major contributor to this
field of American history.

Also, Carey Mcwilliams, another

historian, wrote valuable pioneering works dealing with
repatriation during the Great Depression.
Mexican repatriation studies, for the most part, have
~

been ignored by most American historians.

Specifically

speaking, they "have approached the study of iwJnigration
from a European orientation and have almost totally ignored
immigration from the Western Hemisphere. 111

Because of this

approach, Mexican immigration and Mexican repatriation
studies are practically nonexistent. 2
This episode in American history, nonetheless,
tragically affected approximately half a million people
from Los Angeles to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Even though

hundreds of thousands of people were repatriated from the
country, nevertheless, Mexican American repatriation during
th~ Great Depression has been previously omitted from
American history books.

Such an omission is "a forceful

indictment of neglect given to the historical presence of

1 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the
Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. xiv.
2 Ibid.

vii

the Mexican American people. 113

Most importantly, today

many Mexican Americans and Mexican Nationals, who are aware
that Mexican American repatriation did occur, wonder if a
similar incident will ever happen again during their own
lifetime.
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CHAPTER ONE
Background: Mexican Emigration
to the United States
From a historical perspective, some of the oldest and
newest Americans are from Mexico. 1

As early as 1525,

Spanish exploration unfolded on the Western Hemisphere-north from Mexico.

This exploration eventually focused

and settled, for the most part, in the area now identified
as the southwest section of the United States. 2

What soon

followed were Spanish settlements, whose inhabitants would
later become American citizens as a direct result of the
Mexican-American War.
The establishment of these isolated outposts was
attributed not only to Spanish efforts, but to the efforts
and contributions of both Mexicans and pueblo Indians.
Moreover, in California the dedication and labor of the
Mexican colonists and indigenous groups later helped
immensely in establishing the most significant outposts of
the Mexican empire.3

1 Thomas Sowell, Ethnic America:
Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 21.

A History (New York:

2 carey Mcwilliams, North from Mexico: The SpanishSpeaking People of the United States (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1968), p. 21.
3 rbid., pp. 27, 34.

1

2

In the end, thriving Indo-Hispanic communities were
firmly established in the Southwest.

They extended along

the rim of the seacoast from San Diego to San Francisco,
existing within twenty-one missions in California, four
presidial towns:

San Diego, Santa Barbara, Monterey, and

San Francisco; and two pueblos:
Angeles (1781) • 4

San Jose (1777) and Los

Attempts were also pade to establish

communities in the valleys of California, except hostile
Indians made this feat impossible. 5

Other settlements

in Texas numbering some twenty-five missions were also
founded, although "their principal and ultimately their
only settlements between the Sabine and the Rio Grande were
San Antonio (1718); Goliad or La Bahia; and Nacogdoches. 116
For almost 300 years, since the initial exploration in
the early 1500s, Mexico's northern province would be dominated by Spanish heritage.

Historian Leonard Pitt

described the strong Spanish provincialism which existed in
California, even after Mexico's independence and confrontation with Americanos:
In 1826, California's Spanish heritage was still
in·strong evidence. Only one generation separated
California from the pioneer stage, a fact still
obvious in the crudity and sparseness of settlement.

4 Ibid., p. 25.
5 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
6 rbid., p. 26.

3

Stretched along a 500-mile coastline, the "nationals,"
the gente de razon, numbered about 8,000 and in
Monterey, the capitol, 300. From the beginning,
California had been little more than an outpost of
empire, a remote frontier.
Since the province lay at
the farthest reaches of New Spain, itself a Spanish
colony, California's colonial status was twice
removed. This geographic and political isolation bred
provincialism. An essentially medieval and clerical
society, California had twenty-one Franciscan missions
which subordinated all and sundry to their will.
Neither the military officers at the presidios, nor
the civilians in the pueblos and ranchos, could rival
the power of the padres in their heyday.7
This provincialism prevailed throughout the isolated
geographic and political outposts of Mexico for nearly 150
years.

Strong ties to the motherland, New Spain, and

unflinching Spanish-Mexican influence helped further to
maintain the colonial dogma.
I,

However, because of a series

of political events in Mexico between Mexicans and
Spaniards during the early 1800s, these provincial territories--referred by Carey Mcwilliams as the fan of SpanishMexican influence "North from Mexico 11 --experienced social
and political unrest. 8

This unrest ultimately ended

with Mexico's independence from Spain.
It would be only a short time after Mexico's independence from Spain in 1821 that a new series of political and

7 Leonard Pitt, The Decline of the Californios: A
Social History of the Spanish-Speaking Californians, 18461890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966),
p. 2.
8 McWilliams, North from Mexico, p. 48.

4

geographical occurrences would unveil.

This time Anglos,

'\

not Spaniards, would contribute to the social and political
unrest in the northern provinces of Mexico.

Moreover,

increasing political and cultural conflicts between Anglos
and Mexicans gradually opened the gates to the once isolated frontier of Indio-Hispanic societies. 9

In addition,

the conflict caused mass changes to the salient features of
a long history of Spanish-Mexican influence and,

likewise,

among the inhabitants.
Before Mexico's independence, cultural and political
contact between Anglos and Mexicans was limited.

However,

increasing westward-pressing Anglos entering the provincial
Inda-Hispanic society soon altered the status quo. 10
Thus, Ya~kee expansionistic attitudes of Manifest Destiny
began to permeate Mexico's northern frontier, which inevitably put Mexico-on the defensive as antagonism escalated
between both groups.
Unquestionably, antagonism between Anglos and Mexicans
existed prior to Mexico's independence.

However, the

hostility between Americans and Mexicans in Mexico's
northern provinces became even more pronounced after

s. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, eds., Readings
on La Raza: The Twentieth Century (New York:
Hill and
Wang, 1974), p. xv.
9 Matt

lOrbid.

5

Mexico gained its independence from Spain and continued
to allow Moses Austin and later his son Stephen Austin to
establish colonies in east Texas. 11

Eventually tens of

thousands of Anglos entered into this Mexican outpost.
Later, as the number of Anglos increased, Mexicans were
outnumbered by five to one: inevitably conflict followed. 12
In 1826 the Mexican government attempted to seize
control of Texas, although it proved unsuccessful.

r
)

.

As a

result, Mexico prohibited further colonization by Anglos,
but Anglo sentiment to this restriction led to armed
conflict in the successful Texas Revolution of 1836. 13
Consequently, after the Texas Revolution, nine years of
tension and sporadic guerrilla warfare between Anglos and
Mexicans fol lowed.

Most importantly, by this time, "Texas

was always threatened by the possibility of Mexican
reconquest. 1114
Another important factor that contributed to Anglo and
Mexican antagonism pertained to the United States'

11 Leo Grebler, Joan Moore, and Ralph Guzman, The
Mexican American People: The Nation's Second-Largest
Minority (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 40: Meier and
Rivera, The Chicanos: A History of Mexican Americans (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1972), pp. 57-58.
12 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, p. 40.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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unsuccessful endeavors to purchase territory within
Mexico's isolated province during the early 1820s.

What

later followed was a policy of confrontation persuaded by
the United States against Mexico. 15

Convinced that they

were the chosen race, the Yankees pursued, with the utmost,
their theory of Manifest Destiny:

"to control and settle

the area from the eastern seaboard to the Pacific Ocean. 1116
Hence, this philosophy of Manifest Destiny led to the
annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845, and one
year later the outbreak of the Mexican-American War
followea.. 17

The latter event eventually ended by a peace

treaty--The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

Most importantly,

this treaty signed by the United States and Mexico in 1848
fulfilled the Yankees' yearning to control Mexico's
isolated area north from Mexico.
The end result of the Mexican-American War proved
fatal to Mexico, because half of her national territory was
acquired by the United States. 18

From this newly acquired

territory, the United States created what now forms the
states of California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Texas, New

15 Meier and Rivera, La Raza, p. xv.
16 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 56.
17 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, p. 49.
18 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 70.

7

Mexico and various sections of Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Wyoming. 19

In addition, the United States acquired

1 percent of Mexico's population.

According to historians

Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera,
Nearly all 80,000 Mexican citizens living in the
ceded territory eventually became citizens of the
United States; about 2,000 moved southwest across the
new political border to retain their Mexican citizenship.20
The vast difference between Mexicans who became United
States citizens and those who did not was partly due to
provisions prescribed in the treaty.

Basically, under the

terms in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, these new citizens living within the ceded domain had one year to decide
to maintain their Mexican citizenship, or to retain their
new citizenship of the United States. 21

Another chief

provision of the treaty
provided specific guarantees for the property and
political rights of the "native" population and
attempted to safeguard their cultural autonomy, that
is, they were given the right to retain their
language, religion, and culture.22
Consequently, most of this new ethnic population,
Mexican Americans, became outcasts of this new, but

19 rbid.; Sowell, p. 247.
20 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 70.
21 McWilliams, North from Mexico, p. 51.
22 rbid.

8
familiar, land.

For example, in comparison to the larger

majority, the small Spanish and Mexican population, which
remained in the new southwestern part of the United States,
t, '

~;.

'

/-"',-~~.
'

.
.

I"
.

became victims of prejudice, violence, and corrupt
officials.

Also, many of those who had possessed .land

?

during Mexico's earlier land reform programs lost their

-

~

I

ti
It

I

f,

-I
I
I

I

land, regardless of the provisions prescribed in the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 23
Consequently, Anglo and Mexican conflict
continued long after the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo • • • •
For this peace treaty, like the
earlier formal agreements was merely an ineffective
stopgap in a continuing history of conflict.24
Therefore, unlike other ethnic groups in America, the
Mexican American population continued its legacy of a long
'''n'lstory of political and diplomatic conflict.

Thus, the

conflict, for the most part, ended in group clashes between
the conquerors and the conquered. 25
Push and Pull Factors
Over half a century after the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the frontier north from Mexico
played another vital role in both American and Mexican

· 23 Sowell, p. 247.
24 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, p. 40.

9

history.

This time, however, the issues encompassed an

array of social, economic, and political causes, rather
than solely Yankee expansionistic ideals.
Prior to 1900, Mexican iro.migration north from Mexico
"had been a trickle

• to the borderlands:

Texas had an

immigrant population of 71,062 in 1900; Arizona, 14,172;

fI

California 8,096; New Mexico, 6,649." 26

Yet, one estimate

held that from 1900 to 1920, an excess of a million Mexican

i

immigrants came to the United States, and, for good reason,

1

concentrated in the Southwest. 27

I

I

It is generally agreed that after 1900, the great wave
of Mexican immigration to the Southwest brought nearly 10
percent of Mexico's total population.

Moreover, "the

industries in which Mexicans were concentrated

• • were

those vital to the economic development of the Southwest. 1128
The catalyst for this mass immigration was triggered by
Mexico's deplorable social and economic conditions that
existed pri~r to the 1910 revolution. 29
During this period, most of Mexico's formidable
condition was brought about by the ideology of one man--

26 McWilliams, North from Mexico, p. 163.
27 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 123.
28 McWil·liams, North from Mexico, p. 164.
29 Meier and Rivera, La Raza, p. 3.

10
Porfirio Diaz.

As a young mestizo officer, Porfirio Diaz

led a successful revolt that took over Mexico, which
resulted in his assumption of the presidency from 1876 to
1910. 30

Under his dictatorship, he unveiled a new ideology

to restore Mexico's already unstable government.

His

ideology, in essence, which included a number of proposed

I

II
I

guidelines and plans to make Mexico a strong nation, was
based on the teachings of the positivists, who were
followers of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte.

The

goals set out by these positivists
known in Mexican history as "los cientificos, 11 • • •
planned and worked for a modern scientific Mexico,
which would take its rightful place among the nations
of the world.31
From the beginning of his dictatorship in 1876 to his
overthrow in 1911, Porfirio Diaz' prime concern focused in
controlling both the government and the economy.

This

concern, however, did not include the bulk of the Mexican
l

majority--peones (unskilled laborers} and Indians.

Instead

his liberal policies, the political stabilization, and
domestic tranquility all encouraged peace, opportunity, and

30 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 116.
31 Ibid., p. 117.
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prosperity for a selected few. 32 '

Most of them were

foreigners, and
by the beginning of the twentieth century, Mexico had
become known as the stepmother of Mexicans and the
mother of foreigners, as European and American
businesses extended their economic and political
control over Mexico.33
These foreign investors, in general, had focused their
interests on the railroad subsidies, government support of
mining and oil development, arig federal lands. 34

Neverthe-

less, both foreign and domestic investors made their impact
on Mexico with serious consequences for a societal socioeconomic equilibrium. 35
The burden of Porfirio Diaz' political, social, and
economic ills were mostly felt in the local and rural
levels, where Diaz' system of government treated the
majority of Mexico's people with contempt and disdain.·
These racist attitudes and conditions were enhanced further
by Diaz' failure to recognize their socio-economic
interests, especially his neglect to adequately prepare the
"underdog" for democratic participation in their government

32 rbid., p. 116: Stanl.~y R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero,
Apostle of Mexican Dernocraoy (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1955), p~ 27.
33 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 117.
3 4 Ibid • , p • 116 •
35 Ross, op. cit., pp. 27, 29.

12
during his long tenure in office. 36

The following expla-

nation by Stanley Ross, a writer of Mexican history,
provides additional information concerning the woeful
conditions among the neglected Mexican majority, under the
dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz:
The people of Mexico also suffered from a lack of
equity in the administration of justice. Justice,
like security and opportunity, was the prerogative of
the few.
The state of education was disgraceful.
Schools were built, but the number was inadequate and
the distribution uneven. Outside the capital and key
provincial cities, facilities were practically
nonexistent. Even accepting official statistics, the
illiteracy rate was shocking and showed only a slight
decrease by the end of the period.
In 1895, 86
percent of the population was unable to read and
write, and after the close of Diaz' regime four out
of every five persons were still illiterate. Health
conditions were equally discouraging. There was a
high incidence of enteritis, pneumonia, malaria and
venereal disease.37
For the most part, these serious and dreadful living
conditions affected the peon and Indian majority.

Further-

more, because of Diaz' haughtiness toward the bulk of
Mexico's people, the rural area remained isolated, and
neglected geographically and culturally, from national
life, whereas the great cities prospered and contained all
the necessary facilities required to function accordingly. 38

36 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
37 rbid., p. 28.
38 rbid.
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In addition to the insurmountable obstacles already
inflicted on the myriad of Mexico's underdog, Diaz'
agrarian policy made matters even worse.

Unlike earlier

reformers, motivated by ideals of liberalism and individualism who sought out to destroy the feudal pattern of
Mexican landholding, Diaz' agrarian policy opposed these
aspirations.

To illustrate, his policy ignored the efforts

of these reformers and their efforts during the mid-nineteenth century reform movement, which resulted in la
desamortizacion (law of expropriation) of 1856.

1-sY qe

This law

was a well-intentioned effort to advance the Indian
economically by making him an owner of private
property, to develop the ranchero (small farmer) class
as a counterpoise to the large estate owners, and, by
achieving both these goals, to make possible real
democracy in Mexico.39
Diaz' stance, unfortunately, only added to the landholding
struggle among the privately owned estate, the semifeudal
hacienda, and the communal landholding village. 40
With this Spencerian theoretical dogma of making
Mexico a mighty modern and industrial nation, Diaz and his
followers unleashed new legislation which broke up the
communal lands and manifested disdain toward Mexico's
Indian population.

By enforcing Reform Laws against

39 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
4 0ibid., p. 29.

II

i
!if

14
communal villages and decreeing that all communal lands
must be divided, one estimate indicated that from 1889 to
1890 over two and a quarter million acres were allotted to
individuals--with most of the acreage going to large landowners, speculators, and land companies. 41
further wholesale ,attacks by Diaz

1

Because of

government and its

series of colonization laws, the equilibrium of native
society and the majority of Mexico's mass population
suffered tremendous mental and physical anguish.
Eventually, the majority of people, including the
small landowners, were left landless and forced into
peonage.

In short, debt peonage rose to alarming new

heights--because of the large haciendas' pathetic low wages
that amounted to less than twenty cents per day, and the
result of the exploitive operation of the large landowners
serving as creditors to their hired helpers. 42

The debts

of the peones were rarely paid off: hence, future
generations usually inherited them, literally keeping them
in bondage to their respective hacendado.
Finally, because foreign and large landowners took
advantage of Diaz' new legislation, the hacendados
controlled half the land and rural population and over

41 rbid., pp. 29-30.
42 Meier and Rivera.

The Chicanos, pp. 117-18.

15
four-fifths of the rural comm.unities by the end of Diaz'
regime.

By this time, they were able to dominate poli-

tically, economically, and socially the lives of Mexico's
Thus,

mass population.

the agrarian policy of Diaz'

government which brought victory to the hacienda resulted
in a new generalized form of agrarian feudalism throughout
Mexico. 43
Unfortunately,

neither a real democracy nor the theory

of making Mexico a strong, modernized, and industrialized
nation developed under Diaz' dictatorship.

Instead,

his

government fervently practiced economic discrimination
based on race and color for foreign and domestic investors
alike.

Such practices led to economic, social, and poli-

tical injustices to Mexico's mass population: and
ultimately contributed to Diaz' downfall and the 1910 revolution.44

Yet,

"the most tragic aspect of the material

progress and prosperity of Porfirian era was the fact that
the mass people did not participate," but only contributed
to its despair. 45
Without any hope, a slow but steady influx of
Mexicans, mainly from the central and eastern states, left

43 Ross, pp. 29, 31.
44 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, PP~-~17-18.
45 rbid.
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Mexico to seek a better livelihood in the United States
Southwest.

This small scale immigration became the fore-

runner of the two other great waves of Mexican immigration

I'

,1

'

'

.

1·

to the United States:

the first,

second, from 1920 to 1930.

from 1900 to 1920; the

Later, the first major waves of

Mexican immigrants totaling approximately one-tenth of

f'I;

Mexico's populatioh soon followed prior to her 1910 revo-

I·!ilt

regime and his precipitated downfall by Francisco I.

I

\I. !

lution.

The 1910 revolution, directly linked to Diaz'

Madero's political campaign for president, was -the most
significant "push" factor for the onset of this mass
irnmigration. 46
Other "push" factors responsible for Mexico's mass
exodus depended upon this essential fact:

Mexico's popu-

lation was increasing, whereas its economic opportunities
were decreasing.

It was estimated that Mexico's population

increased from 9,400,000 in 1877 to 15,200,000 in 1910.
During this period, wages consequently remained the same,
while prices rose rapidly.

Because of the rising cost of

food and the decline in real wages, a large percentage of
the rural lower classes were dying of hunger throughout

46 McWilliams, The Mexicans in America (New York:
Teachers College Press, 1968), p. 9~ Meier and Rivera, The
Chicanos, p. 118.

17
Mexico.

Persons engaged in mining, corrmerce, and industry

experienced similar hardships. 47
Next, from 1880 to 1910, Mexico constructed 15,000
miles of railroad which allowed numerous Mexican laborers
seeking employment to travel by coach from such cities as
Chihuahua, Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, Durango, and San
Luis Potosi to communities or cities north of the United
States-Mexican border.

Furthermore,

the old borderlands immediately south of the United
States-Mexican border offered no very great
inducements for people to stay there • • • • Mexicans
could be easily induced to cross the border in search
of work, the more so since crossing the border
involved no great problems and the trip was not
expensive.48
Then, of course, the inception of the revolution by
Mexico's president Francisco I. Madero on November 29,
1910, resulted in a decade of inflation, violence., and
internal upheaval in Mexico. 49

Finally, the major goals of

revolution, such as land redistribution, were not fully
accomplished by its leaders and supporters.

47 Lawrence A. Cardoso, "Labor Emigration to the
Southwest, 1916 to 1920: Mexican Attitudes and Policy,"
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 79 (1976):
401; Meier
and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 118.
48 McWilliams, loc. cit.; Meier and Rivera, The
Chicanos, p. 118.
49 cardoso, op. cit., p. 400; McWilliams, The Mexicans
in America, pp. 9-10.
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In regard to the "push and pull" theory of migration,
the Mexican revolution continued to be the most significant
"push" factor;
refuge.

it caused thousands of people to seek

On the other hand, the increasing demand for labor

in the Southwest, roughly coinciding at the time of the
Mexican revolution, became the vital "pull" factor which
encouraged this northward migration to the United States.
Below Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera address some
interestin~ apd crucial points concerning the first wave of
Mexican immigrants to the United States:
In addition to thousands of ordinary peasants
uprooted by the revolution, many soldiers and
supporters of revolutionary leaders like Villa,
Obregon, Carranza, and Zapata immigrated into the
United States. Also included in this mass movement
were supporters of the government in power. Because
many fled political persecution, this wave of migrants
came from more varied backgrounds than those of any
other Mexican migrations before or since: included in
this group was a large percentage of women~ children,
and older people. These displaced people greatly
increased the population of Mexican Americans towns
and barrios. Despite plans to the contrary, most of
them never returned to Mexico, as they found
acceptance and cultural security in the familiar
milieu of the Mexican American communities in which
they settled.SO
Middle and upper class refugees, who likewise felt
threatened by Mexico's turmoil, were also among the first
wave of immigrants.

Some refugees from this nobility

managed to escape with capital.

And, unlike peons, their

50 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, pp. 123-24.

19
survival was not as dramatic after arriving into the United
States.

In fact,

some of them later went into business for

themselves along the border.

Nonetheless, opportunities

for the peons were very few: they had to accept menial
agricultural and industrial work in order to survive. 51
Comm.only, the mode of transportation for these
refugees was the rail lines.

Thus, the bulk of Mexicans

entering the United States by train came from a group of
states in the Mexican Central Plateau, ~articularly the
states of Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes,
and Zacatecas. 52

Traveling by train from central Mexico to

U.S. border towns cost ten to fifteen (U.S. dollars) per
person. 53

Once reaching the border,

the route comm.only

used by many Mexicans to enter the United States occurred
(

through Texas.

After residing temporarily in Texas, many

1 ater continued their journey, usually to Arizona and
California.

"Others al so went by way of Nogales, Arizona

51 rbid., p. 124.
52 John C. Elac, "The Employment of Mexican Workers in
U.S. Agriculture, 1900-1960: A Binational Economic
Analysis" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los
Angeles, 1961), p. 176.
- 53 Ricardo Romo, "Responses to Mexican Immigration,
1910-1930, 11 Aztlan 6 (1975):
176: Charles Wollenberg,
"Working on El Traque: The Pacific Electric Strike of
1903," Pacific Historical Review 42 (1973): 63.
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and in the late 1920s through Calexico, California and
Mexicali,- Baja California. 054

Ironically, once they

crossed the border many of these immigrants were recruited
by U.S. railroad agents.or by other labor agents called
enganchadores. 55
Historically, Mexican labor was used in the United
States before the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

As early as

the 1880s Mexicans toiled on the transcontinental railroads--normally under a six-month work contract--at a
dollar a day. 56

They worked on construction and mainte-

nance crews, and as section hands.

Furthermore, Mexican

labor was employed to extend rail-lines through the harsh
desert regions of the Southwest by Southern Pacific and
Santa Fe Railroads.

Carey Mcwilliams stated that

it was no east feat to push rail lines through the
rugged, semi-desert, mountainous terrain. There were
few points at which materials could be assembled; the
isolation of the region impeded construction. But
fortunately, cheap Mexican labor, both resident and
immigrant, was available in large quantities.57

54 Romo, op. cit., pp. 174-176.
55 rbid., p. 177.
56 Peter N. Kirstein, 11 ~.nglo Over Bracero: A History
of the _ Mexican Worker in the United States from Roosevelt
to Nixon" (Ph.D. diss., Saint Louis University, 1973), p.
3; Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great
Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 7.
57 Kirstein, op. cit., p. 2; McWilliams, The Mexicans
in America, p. 10.
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Many of the early enclaves of Mexicans--usually in the form
of boxcar housing or, later, in rows of company housing-could be found along major rail lines of the Southwest in
such states as Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and, as far away as, Illinois. 58
Most importantly, resources were unlocked in the
Southwest because of th~ railroad.

Thus, industries, such

as sheep, cattle and mines prospered by the turn of the
nineteenth century. 59

Although Mexican labor was initially

imported to construct the new rail lines; nevertheless, it
played a key role in the development of all these industries and the new entering economic phase in the Southwest
by this time.
Meanwhile,

the primary impetus for the first waves of

Mexican i:rnrnigrants in the twentieth century was the rapid
agricultural expansion in the Southwest.

As a result, job

opportunities in various agricultural states became available and economically inviting for this influx of
immigrants.

For example, openings to pick various crops in

California's Imperial Valley and San Joaquin Valley, the
Salt River Valley of Arizona, and in the Lower Rio Grande
Valley~of Texas, indeed, attracted thousands of unskilled

58 Hoffman, loc. cit.; Mcwilliams, The Mexicans in
America, p. 10; Ki:r:;stein, p. -3.
59 McWillia:rns, The Mexicans in America, pp. 10-11.
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and farm workers to the States. 60

The sugar beet industry

in the states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Colorado also
encouraged the Mexican northward migration in a similar
manner.

Of course,

as the cotton industry expandea in the

Southwest, Mexican labor came north to meet it. 61
One of the most significant keys that unlocked the
agricultural industry in the American Southwest was the
Reclamation Act of 1902, which resulted from the Federal
government cooperating with private, city and state-owned
corporations.

Hence, major projects directly promoted by

this irrigation act came about in the region.
r .

To illus-

trate, main projects such as the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona
and the Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico when completed
increased thousands of previously untilled acres for
farming. 62

A large percentage of these irrigated lands

eventually had to give way to the large-scale cotton
farming in the states of Arizona, California, and
especially, Texas--where cotton farming began as early as
the 1890s.

Gradually Arizona, California, New Mexico, and

Texas became major centers for cotton production. 63

60 Hoffman, p. 7.
61 McWilliams, The Mexicans in America, p. 11.
62 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 125.
63 McWilliams, The Mexicans in America, pp. 11-12.
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The impact of this economic mobilization greatly
accentuated the labor shortages in both agricultural and
industrial areas within the Southwest prior to World War I.
Even though domestic and foreign labor was available,
nevertheless it proved to be insufficient for meeting the
economic development of both industry and large commercial
farms.

Moreover, rapid changes of immigration from Asia

caused by Congress passing the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882, and,

later, by the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan

of 1907, created and augmented a serious vacuum in western
labor by 1910.

Largely, Chinese and Japanese had supplied

much of the seasonal, foreign,

low-wage labor in the

Southwest until Mexican labor became more desirable.

How-

ever, when the severe depression of the mid-seventies
struck the country, nativistic-oriented unions raised the
issue of "yellow peril" which inevitably pressured the
United States Congress to pass the Immigration Acts
previously mentioned.

These acts unwittingly aided the

demand for Mexican laborers. 64
Because of the changes in Chinese and Japanese
immigration and the increased demand for American farm and
fiber products brought on specifically by World War I,
labor shortages rose dramatically in the agricultural

64 Romo, p • 1 7 5 •
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southwest and in many industrial areas around the country.
In addition,

the conscription of American citizens for

military service and the wartime boom increased the availability of industrial jobs in cities, such as Chicago,
Detroit,

and New York.

Soon thousands of poor white and

black laborers, especially from the deep south and southwest regions of the United States, flocked northward
seeking better paying jobs.

Ultimately, American farm

laborers emigrating from the country to the cities
decreased the manpower in agricultural areas.

Hence1 in

many farming areas, only old women and children were available for stoop labor in the fields. 65
Growing numbers of commercial farmers began complaining about the alarming losses of employees leaving
their farms to war-related industries and the military.
Since they could not compete with the more lucrative wages
and year-round employment offered by most of these industries, many farmers claimed they were helpless to cope with
the problem.

Under these circumstances, American farmers

demanded government assistance. 66

65 Cardoso, p. 401.

66 George C. Kiser and Martha w. Kiser, eds., Mexican
Workers in the United States: Historical and Political
Perspectives (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1979), p. 9
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Immediately some farmers suggested to the government
that opening the gates at the Mexican border was an ideal
solution to fill the serious labor vacuum.

Farmers also

supported this suggestion by stating that they "needed the
Mexicans to plant and harvest the crops and the Mexicans
desperately needed the work to keep from starving." 67
Other favorab 1 e conditions, such as "the proximity of
Mexico to the United States, the already established
reliance of American Southwest on Mexican nationals for
stoop labor," were expressed by them as well.

.At the same

time, their boisterous protests pressured the goverrunent
not to take their case too lightly. 68
In response to these pressures, the Un~ted States
Congress in May, 1917, instituted special regulations
allowing the entry of temporary farm workers from Mexico.
Under these regulations Mexican workers were exempt from
the eight-dollar head tax, a literacy test, and quota,
which, otherwise, were required for admission of regular
immigrants prescribed in the Immigration Act of 1917. 69
Paradoxically,

the 1917 Immigration Act enacted by Congress

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
69 John R. Martinez, "Mexican Emigration to the United
States, 1910-103 0 11 (Ph.D. diss., University of California
Berkeley, 1957), p. 17; Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos,
pp. 129-130.
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only three months ear1ier was considered to be the most
~estrictive Immigration Act in American history. 70
The Emigration Phase
Exemptions to the 1917 Immigration Act lasted for
three years.

During this period, approximately 50,000

Mexicans emigrated north of the internati0nal border on a
temporary basis.

However, it is estimated that at least

another 100,000 entered the United States illegally. 71
Under the conditior.s set forth to the special Mexican
labor program, Mexican workers could be admitted into the
country only after an official certification verified that
an individual employer demonstrated a need for them.

Also,

the employer had to "enter into specified contracts with
them, and accept responsibility for returning them to the
Mexican border. 1172

Further rules and regulations set by

the Labor Department required all Mexican workers to be
photographed and issued identification cards.

These

workers were also restricted only to agricultural work, and
to those employers with whom they had been certified.
Other specific requirements included that Mexican workers
were not al 1 owed to bring any dependents with them to the

7 °Kiser and Kiser, p. 9.

71 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 130.
72 Kiser and Kiser, p. 10.

~
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United States, and upon completing their work contract they
had to return to Mexico.
would return,

As a guarantee that the laborer

twelve and one-half cents (American currency)

were deducted from each day's wages and deposited in a
savings account with the United States Postal Savings Bank
until a sum of fifty dollars was accumulated.

The sum and

interest earned were then returned to the worker after his
contract, normally a six-month period by law, had ended. 73
Even though the Labor Department established elaborate
guidelines and regulations in order to maintain control of
the special Mexican labor program, these rules for the most
part were not enforced.

For instance, many workers

abandoned their employers for whom they had been certified
and took advantage of other jobs available in various
industrial companies and nonfarm work.

George C. Kiser and

Martha Woody Kiser, American historians, wrote nthere was
no systematic mechanism for compelling employers to comply
with contracts, and claims of labor shortages were not
carefully investigated. 117 4
Besides this veracious attempt by the Labor Department
to watchdog what is generally agreed to as the first
bracero program, on a broader level the American and

73 Martinez, p. 43.
74 Kiser and Kiser, p. 10-11.
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Mexican governments did not make any agreements or guarantees concerning employment, or living conditions for these
workers.

Thus, large numbers of workers unfortunately

lived in poor housing and earned low wages. 75
Shortly after the Immigration Act of 1917 was passed,
which later included the waivers for Mexican farm workers
as noted previously, other economic interests for labor
support in addition to farm-related employers, began to
express their concerns.

For the most part,

the reason

these interests voiced their concerns was due to the sharp
drop of immigration from southern and eastern Europe by
almost 50 percent, which directly resulted from the war and
the 1917 Immigration Act.

Hence,

large numbers of other

unskilled workers for hire in nonfarm and farm industries
were deeply cut.

As noted by Lawrence Cardoso,

sugar beet growers and refiners in Colorado, for
example, were no longer able to hire German and
Russian workers.
Farming interests in California were
deprived of Italian, Slav, Greek, and Portuguese
immigrants • • • •
In 1914 persons entering the United
States totaled 1,218,480; for the remainder of the war
the annual nurobers of immigrants hovered around the
300,000 mark. By 1918, after the implementation of
the 1917 legislation, the annual number of newcomers
was less than 10 percent of that in 1914.76

75 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos; p. 130.
76 Cardoso, p. 402.
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By this time Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, who
earlier had authorized the exemptions for Mexican agricultural workers on May 23, 1917 from any and al 1 tests
imposed by the 1917 Immigration Act, was being confronted
by railroad, mining, and industrial interests also
expressing their need for Mexican workers--in the name of
national defense. 77

For example, Cardoso mentioned that a

spokesman for the United States Railroad Administration
during this wartime emergency period "asked governmental
permission to secure 50,000 track laborers from Mexico. 117 8
To illustrate further, Cardoso suggested that similar
sentiments were echoed by other industrial interests.

For

instance "one industrialist, apparently expecting a long
war,

suggested that 1,000,000 Mexicans be recruited by the

government to fill factory jobs throughout the United
States. 1179

Due to these interests and employers, the

Secretary of Labor in July, 1918, extended his waiver to
include nonagricultural workers.

Soon afterwards, Mexican

laborers were found working in railroads, mining, construction, and other nonrelated farm industries, such as

77 rbid., p. 403.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.
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government construction projects, particularly in the
building of army camps. 80
Consequently,

the United States war-induced labor

shortage began to have deleterious domestic effects on
Mexico.

Most of Mexico's complaints centered on the

depopulation and industrial and agricultural retardation. 81
Strong expulsionary forces,

such as Mexico's domestic

situation and the United States domestic demand, played key
roles behind Mexico's social and economic setbacks during
the first few decades of the twentieth century.

However,

by now, the most serious problem contributing to Mexico's
socio-economic retardation, indeed, was the massive
emigration of her fellow countrymen to the United States.
Officials of the Mexican government, including employers
and nationalists, realized the grave situation facing their
country's social and political equilibrium which was caused
by this immense irnmigration. 82
On the other hand, some opponents who felt indifferent
towards this immigration problem began to express their
beliefs that social and economic benefits were indirectly
gained for Mexico by the direct contact between Mexican

80 rbid.: Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 131.
8 1 Kirstein, p. 4.
82 Cardoso, p. 4 o4.
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Nationals and American civilization and culture.

Others

compared unfavorably the former working conditions that
thousands of Mexican immigrants experienced in Mexico in
contrast to their ~orking conditions in the United State~
Unlike the primitive conditions in Mexico which encompassed
a great deal of starvation or brutal treatment by Mexican
employers, the working conditions with American employers
were not so likely to occur.

Other observers alluded to

the cultural benefits gained from America, such as Manuel
Bonilla, Madero's secretary of development, who acknowledged that "the experience of being in contact with an
advanced culture aided emigrants in improving their own
1 ife styles." 83

Lawrence Cardoso pointed out that an

editor from El Universal, one of the leading dailies in
Mexico City,
believed that the peasantry learned how to be
temperate, to dress well, to eat properly, to speak
English, and to employ the latest agricultural
techniques. When the migrants returned to their
homeland with their new skills, they would be cultured
persons and a progressive element for Mexico.84
Still, opponents were clearly speaking out against
emigration from Mexico.

Those totally opposed to the

numbers of emigrants leaving were the majority of literate
Mexicans.

Likewise, patriotic Mexicans, particularly

83 rbid.
84 Ibid.
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revolutionary nationa'l ists, asserted that the severe problems their country was undergoing, such as the frustrated
economic growth and national security, directly came about
from Mexico's underpopulation.

Additional comments by

nationalists went as far as insinuating that emigrants were
traitors to the fatherland.

"Just when their own nation

was in need of their labor and support," wrote Cardoso,
"they deserted Mexico and went to provide benefits for the
Yankee colossus. 1185
explain,

These nationalists, Cardoso went on to

"also believed that the flight of labor had

weakened industrial development because of the exodus of
much-needed technicians. 11 86
In spite of conflicting opinions, the continuous flow
of Mexican emigrants to the United States grew in number.
Even though the Mexican government did not view its
citizens abandoning their country favorably; nevertheless,
some national political leaders agreed that emigration was
necessary.

At this time 1,rexico was stil 1 in the midst of

her civil war problems:

chaotic conditions prevailed

throughout her whole nation.

Other realities included

Mexico's inability to provide jobs or political stability
for its citizens.

All those reasons only encouraged

8Srbid., p. 405.
86 Ibid.
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thousands of her people to seek basic needs, something most
of them hope they would find in America. 87

Moreover, many

emigrants after finding work in the United States would
send back money to relatives in Mexico to help alleviate
their poverty there.

Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera indi-

cated that "the dollar income that emigrants were sending
back to Mexico--between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000 per
year--was a vitally needed addition to the Mexican
economy. 1188

Furthermore,

it was also generally agreed that

Mexican administrators were inclined to believe emigration
acted as a safety valve. 89
Mexican policy toward emigration was not always viewed
favorably.

In fact, Mexico's policy became confusing and

contradictory.

To illustrate, "On one occasion," wrote

Lawrence Cardoso; "even Carranza 's government officially
praised the cultural benefits and progressive attitudes
supposedly manifested by returning nationals. 1190
11

However,

when braceros became involved in difficulties of a serious

nature," stated John Martinez, a Mexican historian,

"their

government then expressed its basic disapproval and for a

87 rbid., Romo, p. 185.
88 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 147.
89 rbid., Cardoso, p. 404.
90 Cardoso, p. 404.
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short time endeavored to discourage emigration to the
United States. 1191

Likewise, on another occasion, President

Venustiano Carranza with assistance from the Departamento
de Migracion went as far as offering free passage on
Mexican railroads to all who desired to work in America. 92
Nevertheless, the Mexican government was disconcerted
because it was unable to take care of her own people,
as evident by the citizens who were literally leaving
their homeland to seek a better livelihood in the
United States. 9 3
Regardless of Mexico's vacillating pol icy on emiI

,

gration, Mexican Nationalists and employers continued to
urge the Mexican government to discourage its citizens from
leaving the country.

In response, Mexican officials imple-

mented various methods to deter Mexicans from emigrating.
Warnings regarding difficulties encountered by Mexican
emigrants in the United States were issued by the government.

Ricardo Romo mentioned that the Times, a leading

paper in Los Angeles, commented in March of 1920 that the
Mexican government had warned
the workmen not to leave Mexico, stating that they
would receive no protection from the American

91 Martinez, p. 42.
92 rbid.
93 cardoso, p. 404.
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government, that justice would be denied them~ and
that they would become victims of mob violence if they
went to the United States.94
Romo also added,
the Times stated that the exodus to the United States
was causing alarm. Northern Mexican states sent news
that there was serious danger to numerous industries
in northern Mexico through non-use and to large areas
of farm land through lack of cultivation.95
Perhaps the best example of a middle course in policy
imposed to deter Mexican emig~ants from the United States
was Carranza's government intensive propaganda campaign.
The crux of this policy instructed governors of the
northern border states to advise would-be emigrants of
prejudice and exploitation faced by Mexicans in the United
States. 96

In the form of a publicity campaign, governors

of northern Mexico pursued their efforts to curtail the
emigration.
ganda.

Consula~ reports were commonly used for propa-

For example, after a consular's propaganda report

received approval by the Secretary of Foreign Relations, it
was then circulated through several Mexican newspapers.
Most reports had the same bottom line: penalties and
miseries awaited braceros across the border. 97

94 Romo, p. 185
95 rbid.
96 cardoso, p. 406.
97 rbid., p. 407.
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workers, largely from the Secretary of Interior's
Department of M:igration, also gave similar warnings to
would-be emigrants. 98
Carranza's propaganda campaign, nonetheless,

failed.

The rising tide of emigrants continued to cross the United
States-Mexican border.

Part of the campaign's failure was

that despite the dismal publicity written by Carranza's
government, Mexicans preferred taking a chance of finding
employment and better living conditions in the United
·states than face the hardships in Mexico. 99

·Furthermore,

the vast majority of Mexicans, especially in the rural
areas, were illiterate.

Thus, the grapevine served as a

significant medium for these Mexicans.
workers," Lawrence Cardoso explains,

"Returning

"painted glowing

pictures of better living and working conditions across the
border. 11100

He commented further on the general opinions

of workers toward their government during this period:

.

...,

Besides, the typical worker distrusted the government,
whose agents seemed always to exploit him and yet to
protect the employer class. Why, now, should one
believe in the protective efforts of untried
revolutionary regimes? Why stay at home and face
possible starvation or violent death? If United
States employers and officials occasionally abused
Mexicans, the workers' experiences with employers and

98 Ibid.
99 Romo, p. 185.
lOOcardoso, p. 408.
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officials in their own country had taught them how to
deal with such treatment.101
Ironically, because of the Selective Service Act of
1917,

thousands of Mexicans were returning to Mexico

shortly after the thrust of Carranza's propaganda campaign
was initiated.

Under the provisions of this act,

set into

law on May 18, 1917, American born males twenty-one through
thirty years of age had to register for the wartime draft.
Similarly, foreign residents who had taken steps to become
naturalized were required to register as well.

However,

due to rumors concerning the status of foreign nationals,
mainly Mexican, thousands of Mexican Nationals thought they
were subject to the draft.

This havoc largely occurred

when the state and federal governments neglected to inform
Mexican Nationals of their status.

Moreover, Selective

Service officials in the absence of clear guidelines from
Washington regarding proof of nationality and certificate
of birth made matters worse.

Thus,

it was estimated that

nearly one month after the Selective Service Act of 1917
became law, approximately 9,851 Mexican workers had
returned.
to Mexico,

With thousands of laborers voluntarily returr-ing
the United States immediately took steps to halt

the ~everse flow of these workers. 102

lOlrbid.
10 2 rbid., pp. 413-14.
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Despite Mexico's own problem with emigration at this
time, Mexican officials cooperated with American
representatives to help curtail the loss of needed workers
for the United States' domestic war effort.

Strategies

advising Mexican Nationals of the minimal requirements
under the 1917 Selective Service Act were carried out most
conspicuously.

"On telephone poles, billboards, train

station walls, and stores, Spanish language posters
informed braceros that not one of them would be
drafted." 103

Moreover, in this extensive effort, parish

priests read (official) letters to their Mexican communicants to provide additional assurance from being drafted.
In addition to these letters, Cardoso mentioned that
"priests,

together with 'friendly Mexic~n officials,'

visited farm, mining, and rail camps to explain the
position of the United States government." 104

He concluded

by stating,
this latter effort had a marked effect in quieting
fears about possible difficulties with selective
service personnel. By August 17, calm was restored
and the number of braceros in the United States
approached those of pre-draft times.105

l0 3 Ibid., p. 414.
l0 4 Ibid.
l0Sibid.
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In the meantime, Mexican Americans also felt the
socio-economic burden of Mexican Nationals.

By 1917,

Mexican Nationals became literally the prime source of
cheap labor for the American Southwest, especially in
California and Texas.

Their prominence, moreover,

prevailed in other western states, mostly because of their
satisfaction with low-wage, minimal housing, and primitive
working conditions per se.

On the other hand, Mexican

Americans, particularly along the border areas, were displeased by the increased low-wage competition Mexicans
created in industries, such as agriculture, mining, and
railroad.

Because of this competition and wartime oppor-

tunities within industrial centers, Mexican Americans for
the first time began to migrate to midwestern and northeastern cities during the wartime period. 106
Though Mexican Nationals could be found working in
similar industrial jobs held by Mexican Americans, their
numbers in such jobs were far less than Mexican Americans;
the difference was mainly due to the amount of acculturation
Mexican Americans had with Anglo society as compared to the
less assimilated Mexican in general.

Notwithstanding

Mexican and Mexican American wartime job opportunities for
the most part were hazardous, dirty, unskilled, or

l0 6 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 130.

40

arduous. 107

Regardless, individuals from either

nationality could likely benefit monetarily by
swaying from the more traditional menial jobs in
agriculture and on railroads.

Thus, their economic

position at least was improved to some degree. 108
Socially Mexican Americans and Mexican Nationals
shared a synonymous identity by now.

The former, who

considered themselves Arrfericans were largely labeled by
Anglos as Mexicans.

It should be noted, also, that

al though the unfounded and half-truth rumors as·sociated
with the Selective Service Act of 1917 had presented a
serious problem for Mexican Nationals, many Mexican
Americans, nevertheless, were more than willing to sign up
for the draft.

In spite of urging~ by some community

members to do otherwise, "many thousands of Mexican
Americans, 11 as noted by Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera,
"served valiantly in the Army and Navy, where their record
for voluntary enlistment was proportionately greater than
that of any other ethnic group. 11109

They commented further

on the Mexican American's patriotism by stating,

l0 7 Ibid.
lOBibid., pp. 130-31.
10 9 Ibid., pp. 131-32.
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although Mexican Americans proved their loyalty by
excellent armed services records and civilian support
of the war effort, their patriotism was frequently
questioned, and they continued to suffer
discrimination.110
Discrimination not only plagued the milieu of Mexican
Americans throughout the war but Mexican immigrants also.
Reports of hardships and abuses encountered by thousands of
Mexicans from American employers and American immigration
officials were definitely overwhelming.

In 1917 the

Mexican paper El Excelsior reported that four thousand
Mexicans had been incarcerated in Arizona and New Mexico,
apparently for using violence during strikes against mine
operators instigated by the Industrial Workers of the
World. 111

Moreover, in other parts of the United States

similar reports of abuses and mistreatment toward Mexican
workers were many and varied.

Because of such facts and

other related problems, Mexico actively attempted to
resolve any and all problems her compatriots faced to and
from the United States. 112
A policy by Carranza's government to protect Mexican
Nationals abroad was the use of Mexican consuls in the
United States.

As early as NoveITber 10, 1916, these

llOibid., p. 132.
111Martinez, pp. 44-45.
112 Ibid., p. 44.
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diplomats were ordered to use, if necessary, the full
powers of their offices and all legal recourses as a last
resort to protect or aid their Nationals.

Part of the

consul's duties included visiting migrants in jail to
inform them of their legal rights under local law, making
sure those rights were carried out fairly.

Only under

extreme circumstances surrounding any migrant's case were
federal courts to be used to investigate any foul play by
state and local judicial bodies.

Other measures went as

far as instructing these diplomatic representatives to
inform, then, Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations
Candido Aguilar as well as the Mexican Embassy in
Washington, D.C., if any trial was handled by their opinion
unjustly.

It w~s only "after each case was studied on its

merits," Cardoso explained that "a decision would then be
made as to presentation of a formal protest. 11113
This policy of consular protection unfortunately
suffered from numerous handicaps.

Consuls encountered

problems involving illegal migrants who feared making
themselves publicly known~ hence, incidents of unfair
treatment among these Mexicans by employers or otherwise
went mostly unreported.

At the same time thousands of

Mexican migrants simply "tended to distrust the whole

113 cardoso, p. 411.
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of officialdom. 11114

Limited funding also dampened the

consular effectiveness.

Funds for paying legal fees were

frequently unavailable.

Furthermore, as a result of the

consular districts being commonly large and inadequate
office staffing, any given area to be policed was greatly
reduced.

According to Cardoso,

"there were never more than

several dozen consuls at a time when Mexican Nationals in
the United States numbered in the hundreds of
thousands. 11115
In spite of these severe limitations, Mexican diplomats continued fervently to protect and educate their
fellow Nationals abroad.

An excellent example of consul

intervention under the protective policy occurred at
Spreckles Sugar Company in California.

According to the

intervener Consul General Teodulo Beltran, in May 1918, he
found sugar beet field hands at the company working under
conditions which closely resembled those suffered by
Porfirian peons.

He acknowledged in a report sent to the

Mexican government that company treatment near slavery,
unduly extended work hours, irregular pay, poor food and
housing, and even armed guards within the work camps to
ensure submission were typical conditions Mexican workers

114 rbid.
115 rbid.
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faced every day there.

However, after a formal complaint

against the company was filed with the proper United States
authorities by Beltran, he and company officials immediately began to negotiate some imperative changes.

The

result of the deliberation ended with a new labor contract,
which included a $2.25 wage for a nine-hour day with an
additional 25 cents an hour for overtime, better food,
and housing.

Company officials also agreed to eliminate

the armed guards.

Lastly, workers were entitled to enjoy

complete personal freedom after work hours, including
holidays. 116
Notwithstanding some success, Carranza's government
was still unable to solve the emigration problem.

By now

Mexico wanted to stand up to the United States to express
its discontent, suggestions, and ideals regarding unregulated emigration, "even at the expense of the United States
if necessary. 0117

However, because of its past dealings

with the United States, Mexico was very much aware that any
formal protest to her American counterpart during the
domestic wartime effort would only be greeted with apathy.
It occurred
\

l16rbid., p. 412.
117 Ibid., p. 415.
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only when its own national interests were threatened
in the draft scare of 1917 did the government
in Washington allow its agents to deal with
Mexican officials on this matter.118
Though the above quote is in reference to wartime waivers
for Mexican emigrants,

this American sentimentality

contributed greatly to Mexico's failure in effectively
implementing any program to help curtail her dilernrna of
emigration, specifically during World War I.

118 Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO
Mexican Migration Post World War I
Both the United States and Mexican governments
generally agreed that Mexican workers who were used as a
temporary expedient for wartime purposes would return to
Mexico when the war ended.

Yet, after the signing of the

armistice on Noverrber 11-, 1918, migration continued
fervently from Mexico to the United States.

One estimate

noted that from 1918 to 1920, approximately 250~000
Mexicans legally crossed north of the border. 1

Conse-

quently, thousands of Mexican laborers were affected
socially and economically by the labor problems due to the
end of World War I.
Among the most important labor issues facing the
United States at this time were the millions of soldiers
expected to return home seeking employment.

This issue

ultimately ended with the Department of Labor enacting
exigent orders on December 18, 1918, notifying all foreign
emigrants admitted legally for emergency wartime labor to

1 Lawrence A. Cardoso, 11 Labor Emigration to the
Southwest, 1916 to 1920: Mexican Attitudes and Policy,"
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 79 (1976): 403; John R.
Martinez, 11 Mexican Emigration to the United States, 19101930" {Ph.D. diss., University of California Berkeley,
1957), p. 34.
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leave the United States and return to their respective
countries.

By deporting these alien workers, the

Department of Labor assumed that immediate employment,
particularly in agricultural areas, was to be made available for the home-bound soldiers.

However, according to

John Martinez:
Soldiers could not be discharged in time and in
sufficient nurobers during the spring and summer of
1919 to provide the necessary manpower. Farmers who
anticipated a labor shortage protested and petitioned
the Department of Labor strongly enough to get the
immigration provisions waived again for the year 1919.
It was mainly the cotton growers of Texas and the
other states of the Southwest who most strongly urged
the continued use of braceros. The Congressmen from
these states formed a committee and persuaded
Secretary of Labor W. E. Wilson to allow further use
of Mexican labor~2
Unfortunately, tens of thousands of Mexican workers
were deported before the 1919 immigration provisions became
effective.

These deportations, furthermore, began as early

as one week after the war ended and resulted in thousands
of Mexicans being stranded at towns along the border.
"Eagle Pass and Matamoros were two main centers through
which the deportations were made. 113

Moreover, because many

of the deportees did not have money, they were not able to
leave the border area: thus, many of them were literally

2 Martinez, p. 34.
3 rbid., p. 44.
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left stranded along the Mexican border without food or
shelter.

In short,

they suffered greatly in the desert areas south of
the border. Many died as a result of being thrust
across the frontier.
Fatigue and starvation took a
sure toll.4
El Excelsior reported that the Sub-secretary of
Foreign Relations, Garza Perez, exclaimed that
the deported Mexicans could not remain at the border,
for there was nothing for them to do there.
[And]
that trains would be made available to transport these
people to the states of Chihuahua, Guanajuato,
Durango, and Zacatecas, where it was hoped the mines
would absorb them.5
For this reason, the Mexican government did express overtones of discontent toward the United States' handling of
the deportation.

However, like previous formal protests,

the results were fruitless. 6
At the same time that Mexicans were being deported,
one source pointed out that over 300,000 soldiers were
returning monthly to civilian life--to civilian jobs. 7
Even though mounting pressure by interest groups inevitably
caused the Department of Labor to extend the Exclusion

4 rbid., pp. 44-45.
5 rbid., p. 44; Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.}, 24 Decewber
1918.
6 Martinez, p. 44.
7 Ricardo Romo, "Responses to Mexican Immigration,
1910-1930," Aztlan 6 (1975}: 182.
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clause of the Immigration Act of 1917; nevertheless,
thousands of Mexicans holding civilian jobs were left
jobless.

While Mexicans working in the urban areas were

hit hardest with layoffs, a great demand for Mexican labor
still prevailed in agriculture, transportation, and
.

.

mining.

8

Mexican workers continued to be a vital labor force
regardless of the "normally prosperous times 11 the United
States was experiencing after World War_ I.

This reasoning

largely stemmed from the fact "war veterans were not
sufficient to replace Mexican • • • labor even when they
did accept farm and other kinds of 'stoop' labor. 119

In

addition, disagreements on wages, working conditions, food,
and housing were quite common between an American employer
and his ~Jnerican employee, especially in rural farm areas.
The outcome usually ended with the latter leaving his place
of effiployment, creating a job opening which would quickly
be filled by a more cooperative Mexican worker.
Paul Taylor, a prolific writer on Mexican labor in the
United States, described a general attitude that some
American employers were developing as their preference for
choosing Mexican laborers instead of American laborers.

8 Ibid.
9 Martinez, p. 34.

To
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illustrate, a proprietor of several hundred acres of cotton
1anct stated the following:
I would rather have Mexican tenants than either
Negroes or whites. You can't tell the whites so well
what to do. They think they are on an equality with
you and they want to live in a house about like you
do. They are always wanting better clothes and more
provisions. The Mexicans have bigger families and
more labor to get out a big crop.10
Notwithstanding, preference for Mexican labor went
beyond just the veteran question, or fer that matter the
discretionary practices of hiring used by different
e~ployers.

Many of the explanations had to do with the

economic stimulus brought on by the war--crop productivity
of cotton and sugar beet that exceeded the American
agricultural labor supply.

Equally important, the fruit

and vegetable industries in both southern California and
Arizona also reached new records in crop production.

On

the whole, all four of these products not only expanded to
new heights but they, also, became exceptionally
profitable. 11

Hence, employers in such industries who

realized the potential profits to be made became very much
aware that a labor shortage still existed, and by and large

10 Paul s. Taylor, "Mexicans North of the Rio Grande,"
Survey, 1 May 1931, p. 136.
11 Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: South
Platte Valley, University of California Publications in
Economics, vol. 6, no. 1. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1928, p. 105.
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agreed that Mexican workers could help alleviate the
belated labor vacuum.
Because such postwar labor shortages remained in a
nuwber of economically important American industries, tens
of thousands of Mexicans migrated across the border with
the hope of finding some work.

They entered along the

border towns located in the states of Arizona, California,
New Mexico, and Texas.

For example, El Paso, Texas, was

commonly used, like earlier antecedents, as a main port of
entry by thousands of Mexican migrants.

This was mainly

due to Mexican rail lines which ran from various cities in
Central Mexico north to the city of Juarez.

Despite

whatever means of travel or entry used by migrants, one
estimate noted that in the year 1920 alone, nearly 138,050
Mexicans legally crossed the United States-Mexican
border. 12

A larger percentage of women and children,

unlike before, were also among the thousands crossing the
border into the United States. 13
To attract Mexican migrants to the Southwest,
California farmers in the Imperial Valley for the first
time in 1920 paid to have Mexican workers imported with the

12 u.s. Department of Labor, Reports of the Department
of Labor, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1921), p. 693;
Martinez, p. 35.
13 Romo, p. 17 7 •
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promise of a return passage to Mexico.

Mexican wages per

day, based normally on nine working hours, varied
California depending on the region or occupation.

J..rr

Mcst

Mexicans, however, earned from $1.50 to $7.00 a day;

the

higher wages were generally earned by those working ~n
factories. 14

Notwithstanding, the trend of paying for

imported Mexican labor in numerous industries mushrconed
throughout the American -Southwest.

In fact,

it was esti-

rr,ated that Mexican workers, imported or not, did 80 percent
of the menial labor in the Southwest by 1920. 15
Without the assistance from American labor
contractors, emigrating north of the border would have been
impossible for thousands of Mexican migrants.

Lack of

transportation and capital were major obstacles which prevented a number of migrants from reaching the border;
therefore, many traveled by foot or found some other means
to reach the border.

Yet, to assure that a sufficient

quantity of Mexicans would reach the border, American
farmers and other interested employers often hired "Mexican
citizens to recruit labor within Mexico and to transport
them to the border where the American labor agents awaited

14 Martinez, p. 35; El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 4 July
1920.
15 servando I. Esquivel, "The Immigrant from Mexico,"
Outlook, 125 May 1920, p. 131.
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them.

n16

Once across the border, American labor agents

issued money payments and had migrants sign a work contract
before delivering them to employers. 17
Naturally, some Mexican migrants did not benefit from
che activities of enganchistas or American labor
contractors.

Promises made within Mexico to migrants by

labor contractors were not always fulfilled upon reaching
the border; consequently, many Mexicans were literally left
stranded.

Among those stranded were the old, young, and

diseased.

Of course, the dreadful fate of the young and

diseased was not entirely attributed to labor contractors
activities, because by now, iro.migration laws prevented
Arnerican border officers from permitting the diseased and
children under sixteen unaccompanied by parents to enter
the United States. 18

Nonetheless, the labor contractors'

avid behavior was initially to blame for the untimely
destiny of many Mexican hopefuls:
since these labor contractors were paid by American
employers so much a head for each laborer, they
indiscriminately took old, young, diseased, and anyone
who listened to their promises.19

16 Martinez, p. 36.
17 Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.}, 15 March 1920.
18Martinez, p. 46.
19 Ibid.
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Postwar activities to recruit Mexican labor for
Arr,erican employers were not carried out by labor
contractors alone.

For example, American employers,

particularly cotton farmers in Texas and Oklahoma and sugar
beet growers in the Northwest, who clearly understood the
value of migratory labor for their expanding agricultural
economy, incorporated various devices to attract and simultaneously to hold Mexican labor. 20

One popular device used

by farmers to attract and maintain migrants, was to provide
each interested male worker with a piece of land for
himself and his family. 21

American employers generally

agreed at the time that married men and their families were
more stable and permanent.
In Texas, the practice of tying Mexican families as
well as single workers to the land was widely used on
cotton farms. 22
As cotton moved west from east Texas • • • the
sharecropping and tenant system operated by Negroes
and "whites" gave way to Mexican workers. While
Mexicans in no way became sharecroppers, they were
given their "shacks 0 to live in and a piece of ground
plus a money wage.23

20 carey Mcwilliams, North from Mexico: The SpanishSpeaking People of the United States (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1968), p. 170; Martinez, pp. 36-37.
21 El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 4 July 1920.
22 McWilliams, lee. cit.
23 Martinez, p. 37.
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The major reason why so many American employers resorted to
this type of practice was simply to reduce the inconvenience and expense of recruiting labor each required
season. 24
Despite American employers' and labor contractors'
practices for attracting and holding Mexican labor, stagnation of European irnrnigratio? during 1919 and 1920 played
another key factor for the continued dependency on Mexicans
in industries which demanded them.

Even though an

abundance of industries was affected by postwar levels of
available European immigrants, nevertheless, one of them
most touched both economically and traditionally was the
sugar beet industry.

Such economic and labor problems

particularly affected the sugar beet industries located in
the Northwest and Middle West regions of the United States,
where traditionally the use of Germans, Belgians, and
Russians were used as the primary source of labor for the
beet fields prior to World War

r. 25

Nevertheless, the

stagnating effects of European immigration after World
War I as well as the other reasons previously mentioned,
only necessitated the dependency on Mexican labor in those
much needed industries.

24 rbid., p. 36.
25 Taylor, Mexican labor in the United States, p. 105:
Martinez, pp. 37-38.
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In brief, the labor demands, which followed shortly
after the war ended, drew tens of thousands of Mexican
migrants in numbers as never before to the United States.
Moreover,
it became fairly clear • • • that Mexican labor had
become a necessary and integral part of the economy of
the Southwest rather than just a temporary expedient
as theretofore considered.26
Most importantly, Mexican migrants had become a crucial and
valuable source of inside and outside labor for the United
States during ,the im.rnediate postwar years.
Migration, 1921 to 1924
By the beginning of 1921, the tide of Mexican
migration began to decline and reverse its direction.
reasons for these changes were several.-

The

However, the fore-

most cause notably was the United States Economic Recession
of 1921, which greatly reduced the demand for Mexican labor
throughout agricultural and industrial areas.

Conse-

quently, as a result of the recession's drastic effect on
labor reductions, Mexicans by the thousands had no other
choice but to return to their native land.

Yet, no matter

what influence the economic crises had on Mexicans already
here at the time, few Mexican migrants, nonetheless, still

26 Martinez, p. 26.
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continued to cross north of the border in search of
employment.
Unquestionably, as the economic crises got worse
during the early months of 1921, Mexicans from either side
of the border found out that finding work in the United
states was nearly impossible under such economic circumstances.

One estimate holds that during this economic

recession, roughly 35,000,000 people were affected by it in
some way or another.

Moreover, "there was scarcely an area

of the country or segment of the population that was unaffected.1127

Finally, amid the crisis-stricken

population,

there were about five to six million unemployea. 28
Because the economic crisis was mainly an industrial
one, the areas with the highest levels of unemployment
occurred in the urban-industrial centers located in such
cities as Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and New York. 29
Unemployment in such centers was a solemn reality for
millions of people, Americans and aliens alike.

However,

Mexicans did manage to locate or be employed in some type
of work.

But Mexican workers as compared to American

27 Ibid., p. 53.
28 Ibid., p. 52.
29 u.s., Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration,
Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration,
1923 {Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923), p. 16.
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workers were generally the first to be laid off and the
last to be hired.

For example, Mexicans who suffered most

severely from unfair labor practices were those engaged in
coal, railroad, steel, and textile industries.

It was in

these industries where thousands of Mexican laborers
vicariously lost jobs to their American counterparts.
Although many of the Mexican layoffs were directly linked
to the recession being chiefly industrial, public outcry
against Mexicans working in the recession-inflicted
industries resulted in thousands of Mexicans losing
their jobs as well.30
Similar issues and circumstances, which plagued
Mexican workers in the urban-industrial centers, pertained
to Mexican laborers within rural-agricultural areas as
well.

For instance, before the economic crises, Mexicans

had constituted the majority of the 60,000 to 80,000
workers who helped harvest wheat in the grain belt, which
passed through the states of Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska,
Kansas, and the Dakotas. 31

But, because of the scarcity of

jobs and public outcry, Mexicans were displaced in great

30 Martinez, p. 52.
31 Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United
States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1945), p.
145~ Martinez, p. 53.
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numbers by "unemployed Americans brought into the grain
belt by the United States Employment Service. 1132
Besides the activities of the American Employment
Service, California's growers, particularly the Valley Fruit
Growers of Fresno, also pitched in to help provide employment for their fellow countrymen.

Representatives from

this growers' association pleaded with their members to hire
only Americans, not Mexicans for farm labor.

Therefore,

many of these farmers were hesitant to hire American labor,
because
housing and boarding facilities had to be provided
them while the Mexicans boarded themselves and carr~ed
out under the fruit trees. But in 1921 American labor
moved about the state in automobiles and like the
Mexicans agreed to "camp out."33
,Since American migrants were more flexible and less
demanding with farmers during the crises, American farmers
became very ardent and willing to hire them instead of
Mexicans. 34

It is generally agreed that this preference

and enthusiasm for American labor gradually swept
throughout the American rural-agricultural areas.

32 Martinez, p. 53.
33 rbid.: U.S., Cong., Senate, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Education, Violations of Free Speech and
Rights of Labor, Hearing, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1940, part
53, p. 19860.
34 Martine~, p. 53.

60
As unemployment and layoffs in agricultural and
industrial areas worsened with each passing month of the
recession, the plight of Mexicans residing in the United
States became grimmer.

Historically, unlike ever before,

Mexican Consulates located all over America were inundated
by tens of thousands of Mexicans asking to be repatriated.
One source claimed as many as 400,000 during the 1921
recession. 35

Mexican consuls did righteously attempt to

answer as many requests as possible in the form of
financial aid and repatriation assistance, but thousands of
requests went unanswered.

Even though some Mexicans,

especially those who lived closer to the border, were able
to repatriate themselves, nevertheless, the thousands of
Mexicans still seeking repatriation at the time was by and
large an unrealistic task for the limited resources these
consulates had to work with. 36
Because of the unfavorable consequences the 1921
recession was having on Mexican consulates and compatriots
throughout America, the Mexican government now under the
presidency of Alvaro Obregon took active measures to assist
its citizens abroad.

One such measure imposed under

Obregon's administration to assist the already overburdened

35 El Universal (Mexico, D. F.), 3, 11 May 1931.
36 Martinez, p. 53.
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consuls was the creation of three new Mexican consulates
for the states of Idaho, Oklahoma, and, at that time, the
territory of Alaska.

Obregon intended to provide consulate

service in these areas for the thousands of Mexican workers
spread about within the sugar beet and railroad industries
of Idaho, the railroad and cotton industries of Oklahoma,
and the fish canneries of Alaska.

President Obregon,

furthermore, authorized his consulates to pay for the train
passage and food costs to the United States-Mexican border
for Hexicans wishing to return home.

Once across the

border, Mexicans were then transported on Mexican railways,
free of cost, to their respective states. 37
Another strategic measure implemented by Obregon to
assist Mexicans in the United States was his creation of
the Departamento de Repatricion.

Lorenzo Jaracho, an

appointee of Obregon, headed this new agency.

Inci-

dentally, since the agency did not carry full cabinet rank
due to its temporary sta~us, "it was placed under the
authority of the Secretary of Foreign Relations"~ thereby
it limited Jaracho's power to some degree during his
service in the new agency. 38

3 7 Ibid., pp. 74-74.
38Ibid., p. 75.
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Department of Repatriation's main purpose was to coordinate
the activities of Mexican consulates present in the United
States.

Thus,

more funds and personnel were made available for
consulates which were harder pressed than others either
because of their large Mexican population or because
so many braceros passed through their areas of
jurisdiction.39
Other vital factors in the Mexican repatriation relief
program were the Society for Repatriation, La Alianza
Hispano-Americana, and Comisiones Honorificas or
Commissions of Honor.

Though each of these Mexican

societies contributed much of its time and assumed several
essential functions in assisting with the Mexican relief
program, the society most instrumental and most recognized
for its success, notably by Obregon's administration, was
the Commission of Honor.

Members of this society basically

consisted of U.S. landowners of Mexican nationality who
had charters located in districts throughout America.

The

(

first charter was founded at Los Angeles by Eduardo Ruiz, a
Mexicari consui. 40

At the time the Honorificas, as they

were popularly calJed, began initially helping destitute
Mexicans return home.

Their services, however, soon

expanded to include such activities as educating, feeding,

39 rbid.
40 El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 5 March 1921.
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and providing both financial and moral support for indigent
Mexicans.

In recognition for the Honorificas' superlative

patriotism, they were regarded as auxiliaries to consulates
and empowered with a semi-official capacity by the Mexican
Ministry of Foreign Relations. 41
Mexican-affiliated organizations and governmental
bodies were not the only sources which assisted indigent
Mexicans during this recession.
became actively ipvolved.

American employers also

Henry Ford, for example, paid

transportation costs to the border tor nearly 3,000
destitute Mexicans in Michigan, who were on his payroll
before the economic setback. 42

In addition to Ford's

assistance, cotton growers in Texas and other agricultural
employers from the Southwest performed similar deeds.

Yet,

the motive in some instances was not benevolence, but
rather a desire to be rid of a sizable idle alien
population which inevitably drew upon local
authorities and charities and posed serious social
problems.43
By the time the crises ended, the number of Mexican
repatriates resulting from the 1921 economic recession was
estimated at about 100,000.

This figure excluded hundreds

41 Martinez, pp. 74-75.
42 El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 12 February 1921: Matt
s. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, The Chicanos: A History of
Mexican Americans {New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 142.
43 Martinez, p. 54.
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of Mexicans who were deported by American immigration
authorities. 44

Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera

mentioned a per,tinent statistic:
The Mexican government spent $2,500,000 in aiding
stranded persons returning to Mexico with food and
transportation for the trip from the border back to
their native towns and villages.45
Some criticism from members of Obregon's administration prevailed regarding the costs and abuse of funds
used for the large-scale repatriation of Mexican citizens.
For exarople, General Plutarco Elias Calles, who headed the
Departamento de Gobernacion, complained that the availability of funds by way of Mexican consulates in America for
repatriation only encouraged emigration from Mexico.

More-

over, he felt that, in many cases, braceros emigrated to
the United States when no jobs could be found, but at the
same time knowing aid could be received from Mexican
consuls, if needed.

In Spring 1922, Calles planned to

recommend to President Obregon as a solution to these
issues surrounding Mexican repatriation, that the
appropriations allotted for repatriations be rescinded. 46
In contrast, history clearly points out that no such
recommendation to eliminate repatriation funds was ever

44 El Universal (Mexico, D. F.), 24 October 1921.
45 Meier and Rivera, op. cit., p. 147.
46 Martinez, p. 76.
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approved by Obregon.

Besides1 the Mexican government

really had no other alternative under the circumstances,
but to proceed with the appropriation of funds to assist
its distressed citizens engulfed in a crisis abroad.
Meanwhile, the American government had taken steps to
abate its domestic economic problems.

Since America's

major question at the time was directed to rampant
unemployment, the Department of Labor carried out one of
the first measures to alleviate the crises at home.

The

action taken by this department entailed the canceling of
the special stipulations under the terms of the 1917
Immigration Act that had exempted Mexican immigrants from a
$8.00 head tax,

literacy test, and quota.

noted, Secretary of Labor

w.

As previously

B. Wilson had approved these

exemptions during and after World War I, for the specific
use of Mexican labor in agricultural and industrial areas.
Even though agricultural and industrial employers were able
to secure the special exemptions for Mexican emigrants
until March 1921, nevertheless, the revocation of the
provisions had adverse effects on Mexican emigration to and
from the border.

John Martinez pointed out that

the revocation was not merely to stop more Mexicans
from entering the United States, but there was also a

47 u.s. Department of Labor, Ninth Annual Report of the
GPO, 1921),
Secretary of Labor1 1921, (Washington, D.C.:
p. 26: Martinez, p. 54.
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stipulation to the effect that all Mexican aliens were
to be returned to Mexico.47
Shortly after the Department of Labor revoked the
special provisions of the 1917 Immigration Act,

Congress

implemented measures to lessen the issues associated with
the crises.

Hence, on May 19, 1921, Congress passed the

Immigration Act of 1921, which became the first immigration
quota law in the history of the United States.

This 1921

Immigration Act placed limits on the number of entrants
admitted annually to the United States to 3 percent of the
number of foreign born of that nationality already residing
here according to the census of 1910.

However, Mexicans

and Canadians, as well as other immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere, were exempt from the 1921 quota act. 48
During the discussions in Congress over the 1921
immigration law, proponents suggested that the same quota
stipulations which were being applied to European nations
should also be placed on Mexico.

If approved by Congress,

this law would have allowed about 1,500 Mexicans to enter
annually into the United States.

In addition, advocates

recommended to Congress that Section 3 of the 1917
48 Marion T. Bennett, American ~igration Policies
(Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp. 41-42: Romo,
p. 188.
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Immigration Act--which allowed the Secretary of Labor to
grant inadmissible alien workers permission to emigrate to
the United States--to be rescinded. 49
Mexico's reaction to the proponents' recommendations
in Congress to include its nation into the quota
stipulations of the 1921 Immigration Act was received
unfavorably.

Thus, the United States Congress was assured

by President Obregon that if Mexico was placed on a quota
as prescribed by the 1921 quota law, his government would
enact a similar law to exclude foreign workers, specifically Americans.

The American government realized that a

comparable quota law applied to American workers, even
though they were few in numbers, could have a serious
effect on American investments in Mexico.
reasoning,
1 ightly.

Because of this

Congress did not take Obregon's proposal too
Al though,

Mexico also might have suffered from excluding
Americans, it was hoped that if Mexico's position
regarding the immigration quota were made clear such a
law would not be necessary.SO
Despite Mexico's position on the immigration quota,
arguments for and against on open Mexican immigration to
the United States were presented by pro-interest groups and

49 u.s., Congressional Record,
1926, p. 10866.

69th Cong.,

1st sess.,

50 Martinez, pp. 76-77: El Universal (Mexico, D.F.),
3 March 1921.
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restrictionists to Congress before the 1921 quota act
became law.

Restrictionists contended that

it was inconsistent to shut off Europeans while the
"illiterates," the "diseased," the "criminal," and
"racially inferior," from Mexico were al lowed
practically free access to the United States.51
Many advocates came from agricultural areas along the
border states located in the Southwest where Mexicans
worked in larger numbers as compared to other regions
throughout the continental states.

But most advocates were

from the East Coast, where the core of the Restrictionist
movement "concerned itself with the non-nordic European
groups such as Italians, Jews, Slavs, and Greeks. 1152
Pro-interest groups, on the other hand, who favored
open quotas for Mexico argued in Congress that Mexican
immigration to the United States, as compared to European
nations, revealed a smaller percentage of legal immigrants.
Ricardo Romo indicated that from 1911 to 1921, Mexican ,
immigration constituted less than 4.0 percent of the total
immigration to Arnerica. 53

Other interest groups expressing

their stance on open Mexican immigration contended that
"Mexicans returned to Mexico much like 'homing pigeons. 11154

51 Martinez, p. 55.
52 Romo, p. 188.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.

69
Still others argued that "the Mexican was less visible in
the United States because he was geographically isolated
and therefore did not present a racial problem to
society. 1155

The majority of the pro-interest groups were

from Texas, Arizona, and California where more than 90
percent of the Mexicanos lived within these three states. 56
In spite of the polemical contentions for and against
immigration quotas on Mexico, John Martinez briefly
discussed that when the Senate committee asked prointerests groups, particularly agricultural representatives
from the Southwest why American labor could not be used
instead of Mexican labor in these fields of work-especially with widespread unemployment--they replied that
local labor would not do that kind of work. The
unemployed in the industrial areas were too far from
the border and the farmers could not afford to
transport them that far. Moreover, Mexicans were
practically native to the area and could work in the
intense heat of the arid sections in the Southwest.57
On the whole, the ardent protest presented to Congress
by agricultural interests and testimonies by Congressmen,
such as Representative Hudspeth from Texas, contended the
importance and dependency on Mexican labor for expanding

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Martinez, p. 56: U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on
Immigration, Hearing on H.R. 14461, 66th Cong., 3d sess.,
1921 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1921), pp. 87, 117-18.
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agricultural industries within the southwestern states. 58
Likewise,

Congressman W. H. Knox, who represented the

cotton Growers Association of Arizona and Southern
California, pointed out how many of the cotton industries
in the Southwest benefited from Mexican labor and became
dependent on it. 59

Such testimonies served as important

influential factors in deterring Congress from making
Mexican quotas a reality in the United States.

Still,

the diplomatic problems involved in singling out
Mexico and not the other American Republics perhaps
was even more influential a factor in not placing an
iro.rnigration quota on our southern neighbor than the
contention of farmers.60
Nonetheless, the 1921 Immigration Act was passed by
Congress and used as a temporary stopgap unti 1 a more rigid
quota law could be worked out.

Furthermore, this act had a

profound impact on alien immigration to the United States.
Marion T. Bennett, who did some excellent studies on
American immigration policies, reported that
in the fiscal year 1921 there were 805,228 immigrant
aliens admitted to the United States.
In the
following fiscal year, when the 1921 law was fully
effective, there were 309,556 admissions, a reduction
of 495,672.
Nonimmigrant admissions, i.e., those not

58 Martinez, p. 56.
59 Ibid.
6 0ibid.
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coming for permanent residence, were 122,949, a
decrease of 49,986 from the previous year. Rejections
and deportations remained about the same.61
Because of the 1921 Immigration Act having significantly reduced alien immigration to America, the harvest
season creating jobs, and the thousands of destitute
Mexicans repatriating themselves, the situation of Mexicans
who remained in the United States during the crises began
to improve by summer and fali of 1921.

As for America, by

the closing months of the economic recession, agricultural
and industrial areas were gradually showing signs of
recovery.

All the same, not until two years after the

1921 crises ended did the industrial prosperity and
continued agricultural expansion in the Southwest begin to
reach their normal operating levels.

Moreover, because of

this economic improvement in the United States, the tide'of
Mexican migration once again reversed its direction
northward. 62
A unique aspect about Mexican migration to the United
States after the 1921 crises--continuing until the latter
months of 1924--was its composition.

During this period,

migration from Mexico was not only composed of Mexican
immigrants alone.

By now, due to the provisions in the

61Bennett, pp. 41-42.
62 Meier and Rivera, pp. 142-43: Martinez, p. 75.
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Immigration Act of 1921, other alien immigrants, mostly
Europeans, who could not or would not comply ,with the 1921
quota act began entering the United States through
Mexico. 63
Part of the explanation why many European immigrants
chose Mexico as a means of entry into the United States was
due to the advantages and alternatives it provided as
compared to the regular channels with U.S.
officials.

immigration

For example, iIDmigrants from the Western

Hemisphere were exempt from many restrictions imposed on
Europeans under the terms of the 1921 Immigration Act and
only had to comply with a head tax, literacy test, and one
year's residency requirements.

Therefore, many Europeans

who otherwise could not legally enter the

United States

gained entrance to America through Mexico. 64

However, as a

sheer effort to counteract the increasing surreptitious
entries through Mexico and other Western nations,

e.g.,

Canada, and to reduce the volume of al 1 1 egal alien
immigration to the United States, Congress once more took
active measures to strengthen the immigration restrictions
by passing the Immigration Act of 1924, on May 26, 1924. 65

63 Martinez, p. 58
64 u.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration,
Annual Report, 1923 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923), p. 16.
65 Bennett, p. 51.
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After the 1924 Immigration Act was passed, its effects
on alien immigration became even more technical and lengthy
than the previous Immigration Act of 1921.

But most of all

the 1924 law made the issue of Mexican immigration only
more complex.

"Opponents of Mexican immigration became

adamantly concerned about the failure of Congress to
include the Mexican on the quota 1 ist," Ricardo Romo said.
Moreover,
As the Restrictionists gathered strength, representatives from agriculture and railroad companies
took an active role in def ending the free f 1 ow of
Mexican laborers into this country.66
Predeoression Years
By the mid-1920s,

the open-border,policy for Mexicans

had become the single most important p·olemical conviction
among Americans either for or against it.

Labor unions,

eugenicists, and racists were just part of the factions who
voiced strong opposition toward unrestrictive Mexican
immigration, while agricultural and railroad interests as
well as business associations mainly argued in favor of
open-border policy.

Between both factions,

their amount of

support, writings, and speeches were plentiful on this
policy.

Moreover, both factions had politicians in their

66 Romo, p. 189.
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camps. 67

Furthermore, as the controversy over restricting

Mexican immigration reached even greater depths during the
predepression years, proponents and opponents aggressively
accepted any opportunity to uphold their position before
representatives in state and federal government.
One very aggressive proponent for,placing Mexico under
the so-called "quota system" was Congressman John C. Box,
Democrat from Texas.

a

Congressman Box, who became an avid

spokesman for such labor organizations as the American
Federation of Labor and the California State Federation of
Labor, repeatediy tried to have the 1924 Immigration Act amended
by presenting bill after bill to the House of Representatives.

His initial effort was aired in committee hearings

during January and February 1926. 68

Box and other

restrictionists in general concurred that by amending the
1924 law to include Western Hemisphere nations {Mexico as
their primary target), it would not only reduce Mexican
immigration but also any unwelcome consequences Mexican
immigrants had on American society.

Even though

Representative Box did present his bills several times

. 67 Abraham Hoffman, •The Repatriation of Mexican
Nationals from the United States during the Great
Depression" {Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los
Angeles, 1970), p. 37.
68Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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before and after 1926 to Congress, they often died in
committee and always ran into heavy opposition.
Perhaps one of Box's strongest opponents at the time
was Samuel Parker Frisselle, a lobbyist against restriction
of Mexican immigration.

Frisselle, himself a farmer and

proprietor of 5,000 acres of California land, was convinced
that if Box's bill became ·1aw, the immigration quota
applied to Mexico would have detrimental results on the
agricultural growth in the ~..merican Southwest.

Therefore,

he contended before Congress that in order to harvest crops
grown in the West, large quantities of labor were needed;
"white men would not or could not do the work, and the only
source of labor came from Mexico. 1169

He added,

We must have 1 abor; the Mexican seems to be the only
available source of supply, and we appeal to you to
help us in the matter, imposing upon California the
least possible burden.70
Besides Frisselle taking the stand, farmers from the states
of Arizona, Minnesota, Texas, and other states gave
testimonies pleading to Congress not to approve any Mexican

69 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great
Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 27.
70 u.s., Cong., House, Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from Mexico,
Hearing 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1925-1926 (Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1926), pp. 4-27, passim.
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restriction bill, or revision in the 1924 Immigration
Act. 71
Even before the above congressional debates had
reached their zenith,

the Mexican "quota issue" had caused

anxiety among some United States officials.

Secretary of

Labor William B. Wilson's successor, James J. Davis,

like

Congressman Box agreed that an immigration quota on Mexico
w~s. extremely necessary.

Though total Mexican immigration

fell from 89,339 in 1924 to 32,378 in 1·925, 72 which was
said to have resulted from the $10 visa fee, $8 head tax,
and literacy test required under the terms of the 1924
Immigration Act, Secretary of Labor Davis and other
opponents of unrestricted Mexican immigration generally
agreed that Mexico--not being limited by the 1924 law was
largely responsible f9r the increase of both legal and
illegal crossings ove-r the United States-Mexican border. 73
Illegal traffic across the international border was,
as has been mentioned,

a major issue prior to the passage

of the 1924 quota legislation.

Commissioner General of

Immigration, Harry E. Hull, in his 1923 annual report

71 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 27.
72 Jay s. Stowel 1, "The Danger of Unrestricted Mexican
Immigration," Current History 28 (August 1928): 765.
73 Maldwyn A. Jones, American Immigration (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 291; Bennett, p. 59;
Martinez, p. 53.
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stated:

"It is difficult, in fact impossible, to measure

the illegal influx of Mexicans over the border, but everyone agrees that it is quite large. 1174
illegal entry of Mexicans,

In addition·to the

the smuggling of Asian and

European aliens over the Mexican border was another matter
that the Commissioner General and his subordinates had to
deal with.

An inspector in charge of a San Antonio

district in Texas, while commenting on the illegal and
attempted illegal entry of Europeans, had this to say in
part concerning the professional smuggler:
The Mexican border smuggler is an extremely
dangerous person to deal with. He goes "armed to the
teeth" and does not hesitate to fire upon officers at
sight. A number of federal and state officers have
been ki 11 ed on this border in the recent past by these
smugglers, and it has been more luck than anything
else that many of our men have not been killed. There
is hardly a week goes by that they are not fired
upon.75
As a measure to combat the large numbers of illegal
entrants and illegal activities of smugglers, Congress in
1925 appropriated $1,000,000 dollars to the Bureau of
Immigration for the creation of the Border Patro1. 76

74 u.s., Department of Labor, Bureau of Immigration,
Annual Report, 1923 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923), p. 16.
75 Ibid.
76 Hoffman,
pp. 45, 47-48.
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Abraham Hoffman briefly discussed some of the
obstacles and changes the Border Patrol and Commissioner
General of Immigration Harry E. Hull underwent from its
conception until mid-1928.
Handicapped at the start by lack of uniforms,
inadequate and unqualified personnel, and a high
turnover rate, the Border Patrol soon developed high
standards of efficiency and morale. At first the
Patrol had insufficient officers and equipment; areas
which required attention twenty-four hours a day were
covered for eight at the most, if at all. In 1926,
with 472 men in the Border patrol, the Commissioner
General of Immigration • • • requested a force of 660;
in 1927, with the force grown to 632 employees, he
asked for at least 1,000. By mid-1928 the Border
Patrol numbered 791 employees, of whom 700 were patrol
inspectors. The service attracted veterans and men
with a sense of dedication.77
Dedication of these few hundred men of the Border
Patrol was still not enough to deter thousands of aliens
from illegally crossing over the United States-Mexican
border.

Although the Border Patrol had captured over

100,000 illegal aliens and more than 3,600 smugglers
attempting to cross aliens over the border within a seven
year period following the Patrol's creation, nevertheless,
illegal entrants continued to run rampant.

Moreover,

during this period, fifteen men were killed while serving
the Patrol, twelve of them along the border.

In spite of

the occupational hazards, as well as lack of funds and
personnel, the Border Patrol helped deliver the message

77 Ibid.
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that the United States meant business in stopping the
surreptitious entry over the international border. 78
Beginning in August 1928, the United States initiated
further steps to control the influx of both illegal and
legal Mexican migration across its border.

One step

imposed specifically to deter illegal crossings was
Congress passing a·law which made illegal entry a punishable crime.

Furthermore·, President Herbert Hoover ordered

consular officers to enforce the provisions of the 1917
Immigration Act,

"which in effect denied entry ·to most

Mexicans who applied for visas. 117 9

Mexicans desiring entry

into this country were denied for three basic reasons.

The

first was illiteracy; the second, the liability of becoming
a public charge (LPC);

the third,

the issue of contract

labor. 80
For the most part, the last two reasons proved the
most unfavorable for thousands of Mexican applicants.

For

example, under the 11 LPC 11 rigid interpretation,
if the consul decided that a visa applicant might
become indigent in the United States the visa was
refused, even if the applicant possessed funds at the
time of his interview with the consul.81

78 rbid., pp. 46-47.
79 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 30.
BO Ibid., p. 32.

81 rbid.

80

with reference to the question of contract labor, if the
applicant
indicated an advance commitment for employment.in the
United States, his visa could be denied on the grounds
that the commitment violated the provision of the 1917
legislation forbidding the entry of contract labor.82
Most importantly, President Hoover had endorsed these
measures as a way to avoid any quota legislation on Mexico
or in any way be insulting to the Mexican governrnent. 83
The year 1928 also witnessed a number of heated
congressional debates on issues for and against Mexican
labor.

At this time, Congressman Box once again reintro-

duced his quota bill to Congress amid speculation of it
passing, or at least being heard.

The Senate committee did

agree to the first hearing of the bill on February 1, 1928,
while the first House date was set for three weeks later.
Meanwhile, lobbyists against Box's bill began laying out
strategies with one aim in mind--influence the Senate to
oppose his bill. 84

Included among the lobbyists

·were Senator Samuel Shortridge and Congressman Joe Crail of
California, as well as some members of the southwestern

82 rbid.
83 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
PP. 4 5 , 4 7-4 8 •
84 Ibid., p. 39; "Mexican Immigration and the Farm,"
Outlook, 7 December 1927, p. 423; "Protection for Skilled
Labor," Saturday Evening Post, 7 January 1928, p. 32.
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business communities, representing agriculture, railroads,
and industry. 85

This group of lobbyists, Hoffman stated,

even went as far as to vote its sentiment into writing:
The agricultural interests through the border and
mountain states are a unit opposing this bill,
realizing that it will interrupt and embarrass
agricultural production throughout these states.86
Hoffman added,

"the men pledged that their 'whole endeavor,

therefore, should be to kill it if possible. 11187
In addition to the southwestern lobbyists, George P.
Clements, a leading spokesman for Mexican labor, became
activeiy involved with the struggle against restricting
Mexican immigration before the Senate hearings.

His

involvement and support were carried out by sending to
senators and congressmen mimeographed copies of antirestriction propaganda.

He emphasized in the copies that

since the Mexican was an alien he could be deported:
whereas Negroes, Filipinos, and Puerto Ricans, if
brought into the Southwest to do agricultural work,
would be there to stay.88
Other contemporaries shared similar viewpoints as Clements'
on the importation of Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, and Negroes

85 Hoffman,
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to the American Southwest.

For instance, Journalist George

Marvin wrote in the Indeoendent during 1928:
If white men cannot and will not perform the manual
labor of the Southwest, and willing Mexicans en bloc
are prohibited from doing it, who is going to do the
work?
To import negro labor from the southeastern
states in sufficient quantities to attempt the varied
manual industry now satisfactorily performed by
Mexicans would not solve the economic problem but
would add a formidable social and political proble~.
On a small scale it has already been tried and proved
an expensive failure. Importation of Porto [sic]
Ricans or Fi 1 ipinos would be open to the same
objections.
If the neighboring Indians of Mexico are
objectionable, how could black negroes, brown
Filipinos, or cafe au lait Porto [sic] Ricans be made
more acceptable simply because the Stars and Stripes
flies over their being?89
Factions for restricting Mexican immigration made
their preparations to meet the challenge as well.
Nativist, novelist Kenneth L. Roberts wrote a series of
articles during the early months of 1928, which appeared in
the Saturday Evening Post, a strong partisan of alien
immigration restriction.

The crux of Roberts' articles

dealt not only with the historical aspects of immigration,
but also on the American Southwest development and the
issue whether "the economic value in the Southwest's
proposal to provide hypothetical profits for some farmers
and manufacturers in 1928" was worth "the expense of

89 George Marvin, "Monkey Wrenches in Mexican
Machinery," Independent, 14 April 1928, p. 352.
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saddling all future Americans with a dismal and distressing
race problem. 1190

Abraham Hoffman noted that

the Post also strongly editorialized on January 7,
1928 that 'Every consideration of prudence and sound
policy indicates that Mexican immigration must be put
under quota restrictions. '91
The Senate hearings on restriction of Western
Hemisphere countries finally came to order on February 1,
1928, with opening discussions led by Congressman Box's
counterpart, Senator William J. Harris.

Senator Harris

began his deliberations by introducing S. 1437, a bill to
place all Western Hemisphere nations except Canada under
restrictive quotas. 92

Lobbyists against the Harris blll

and Box's bill were present and ready.

~.mong them were

representatives of agricultural interests from Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Texas, and
Wyoming, including lobbyists from the cattle, mining, and
railroad interests. 93

On the whole,

the opposition to

these bills was more than the restrictionists had bargained
for.

Even though leading spokesmen,

such as Chester B.

Moore of the Vegetable Growers of Imperial Valley and Ralph

90 Hoffman,
p. 40.
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H. Taylor, executive secretary of the Agricultural
Legislative Committee of California, who represented nearly
175,000 farmers,

orchardists, grape growers, milk and

poultry producers, were "interrupted any number of times by
Eouse or Senate committee members, their testimony and the
statements of the other lobbyists carried the day. 1194
Lastly, these bills never got out of committee during
1928. 95

After 1928, the controversy of unrestricted Mexican
immigration still continued ardently between proponents and
opponents.

Factions from both sides continued to defend

their stance on Mexican immigration by delivering speeches,
writing articles, and petitioning their representatives in
all levels of government.

Magazines and newspapers

likewise upheld their position on the polemical immigration
issue.

The Saturday Evening Post, with a total circulation

over 2.7 million, periodically printed its strong partisan
editorials opposing unrestricted quotas for Mexico. 96
Still others had their own reasons either for or against
the Mexican question.

Some even believed that illegal

migration to the United States was sufficient to meet the

94 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
95 rbid., p. 29.

96 Ibid.
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country's labor needs: and good enough reason "why the
legal entries should be restricted. 1197

Others warned of

the dangers of miscegenation, or the flooding of nonassimilable aliens across the border. 98

Still others

simply felt there was no end nor near solution to this
quota controversy.
However, by 1929 the Mexican immigration controversy
had brought forth some new developments.

By now, due to

President Hoover's tightening up the enforcement of the
1917 immigration legislation, illegal entry being
punishable by a year in prison or a fine up to $1,000, and
the Border Patrol policing its side of the international
border,

the northbound movement from Mexico had signifi-

cantly declined.

Some restrictionists viewed the Mexican

immigration decline as a partial victory while a number of
anti-restrictionists, particularly in the southwestern
states, sought ways to maintain their Mexican labor.

Texas,

in particular, passed the Texas Emigrant Agent Law of 1929,
which prevented companies from recruiting (Mexican)
laborers in its state without paying a tax.

Although, this

97 samuel J. Holmes, "Perils of the Mexican Invasion,"
North American Review 227 (May 1929): . 622-23: Hoffman,
"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," p. 43.

98 c. M. Goethe, "Other Aspects of the Problems, 11
Current History 28 (August 1928): 766-68: Hoffman, "The
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," p. 43.
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law did keep Mexicans from leaving ~nd spreading into a new
territory and at the same time dampened any agitation for a
Mexican quota: 92 the Texas law haphazardly proved outdated
shortly after its passage.

During the autumn of 1929, the

stock market had collapsed; thus, the United States and
other countries in Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere
entered the Great Depression.

92 McWilliams, p. 185; Hoffman,
Mexican Nationals, 11 pp. 48-49.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Great Depression:

Campaign Pressures

Immediately following the 1929 crash, the accompanying
Great Depression brought economic misery and new social
problems to Mexicans and other people residing in the
United States.

The first-critical socioeconomic problem to

stir millions of lives in America was rampant unemployment.
Unemployment went from four million to thirteen million
from 1930 to 1933, and, by 1933, nearly 25 percent of the
American labor force was unemployed.
literally underemployed:

Millions were also

wages dropped from 35 cents to

approximately 14 cents an hour. 1
Mexican workers, in particular, were detrimentally
affected by this economic collapse.

For example, they were

among the first to be fired from their jobs. 2

Moreover,

since these jobs were traditionally ill paid, most Mexicans
were unable to accumulate a financial reserve.

Hence,

large numbers without work or savings went on some type of

1 Matt s. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, The Chicanos:
History of Mexican Americans (New York: Hill and Wang,
1972), p. 150.
2 Abraham Hoffman, 11 The Repatriation of Mexican
Nationals from the United States during the Great
Depression" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los
Angeles, 1970), p. 49.
87
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private or public relief program.

Americans were no

exception, because they also applied for local or state
relief just as many broke and hungry Mexicans after the
drastic depression struck the country.

Nevertheless, a

widespread belief then among many Americans was that

"the

majority of Mexicans had become public charges on the
American taxpayer. 113

This sentiment against Mexicans

especially prevailed in the Southwest. 4
Another unfavorable condition brought about by the
depression that harmed M~xicans both socially and economically was discriminatory job practices.
practices were signs reading:

Evidence of such

"Only White Labor Employed"

and "No Niggers, Mexicans, or Dogs allowed. 115
Even though Mexican workers had proved themselves reliable,
nevertheless, racists' attitudes caused worthy Mexicans to
be "left stranded without much possibility of getting
employment. 116

Moreover, Mexicans who had to compete harder

for the few available jobs with unemployed Americans
usually discovered that the latter group got the jobs.

3 Meier and Rivera, op. cit., p. 159.
4 Ibid

5 rbid., p. 154.

6 Emory s. Bogardus, "Current Problems of Mexican
Immigrants," Sociology and Social Research 25 (NoyemberDecember 1940): 169.
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This competitiveness for jobs was particularly evident in
the industrial areas, the midwest, and the Hispano villages
of the Rio Arriba region in New Mexico and southern
Colorado. 7
Eventually, the conditions of the Great Depression
became too much to tolerate for thousands of unemployed
Mexicans.

Although federal relief programs were available

to Mexicans who could meet the eligibility requirements,
thousands of eligible Mexican males chose not to apply
because of their pride and attitudes termed machismo. 8
Instead,

thousands thought that the only solution to their

social and economic problems was to return to Mexico.
Thus,

the first repatriates to leave the United States

occurred during the winter of 1929-1930.

Contrary to

popular belief, all repatriates were not destitute because
many of them returned with material possessions, such as
automobiles and furniture. 9
American consuls duly noted the increasing numbers of
Mexicans moving southwardly.

In February 1930, Consul

General William Dawson reported that over 5,000 Mexicans
had assembled near San Antonio, Texas, preparing to return

7 Meier and Rivera, p. 151.
8 rbid., p. 158.
p.

9 Hoffman,
54.
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to Mexico.
General,

Robert Frazer, Dawson's successor as Consul

later noted that approximately 2,700 repatriates

had passed through the border station of Nuevo Laredo
during the first two weeks in December 1930.

By August

1930, Consul W. P. Blocker at Ciudad Juarez found out that
the Mexican Migration Service had announced that a special
train would provide transportation to any Mexican desiring
to leave the United States.

Blocker further noted that the

train was capable of transporting 2,000 people at one time
from the border to central states in Mexico, and that two
such trains had departed within a ten-month period.

He

added that the special Mexican trains greatly reduced the
excess population of Ciudad Juarez. 10
Besides Ciudad Juarez, Mexicans were able to board a
similar train in Nogales.

By early 1931, large numbers of

would-be repatriados flooded the Mexican border stations.
Consequently, the Mexican government changed its occasional
special train service at least on a weekly basis. 11

Border

stations, moreover, located at Nogales and Ciudad Juarez
witnessed other dreary outcomes associated with the
southward Mexican movement.

Ciudad Juarez municipal

10 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great
Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-39 (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1974), pp. 36-37.
11 Robert N. McLean, "Goodbye, Vicente!" Survey, 1 May,
1931, pp. 182-83.
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government, for example, was burdened with the task of
feeding nearly 200 people a day. 12

Regardless,

consular dispatches continued to describe a torrent of
people passing through their border stations, an
amalgam of repatriado and deportee, with a growing
percentage of them penniless and hungry.13
Repatriados passing through the border stations, for
the most part, did not bother to record their departure
with American authorities.

This led American consuls to

believe that "at 1 east half and perhaps more of these
repatriates were illegally in the United States. 1114
Although additional theories were speculated by American
consuls, the truth of the matter was that Mexicans were
I

crossing south of the international border illegally or
legally.

For example, the total numb~r of Mexican

repatriados from January 1, 1930 to A~ril 30, 1933 was
290,051.

Once across the border approximately 80 percent
i

of these repatriados went back to their native communities:
l

15 percent to the large cities, 5 percent to Mexican
j

repatriation centers. 15

p.

12 Hoffman,
55.
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For some repatriados who returned to their native
villages or towns,

the homecoming was well received by

their respective family groups.

According to Mexican

custom, shelter and food were shared with returning
relatives,

11

even though no work or additional food was

immediately available. 1116

On the other hand, repatriados

who chose the big cities to seek work found their welcoming far less from being CU§tomary in the traditional
sense.

Many Mexicans, after reaching the cities, experi-

enced few job opportunities and had great difficulties
coping with metropolitan conditions.

Emory Bogardus said

this about one such city dweller:
A repatriado who had lived fourteen years in the
United States ••• who worked temporarily as a
painter on the National Theater in Mexico City.
said to the writer:
"I have made a terrible mistake.
I should have stayed in the United States. Opportunities here {Mexico City) are fewer than in the
United States. 11 17
Meanwhile, Mexicans who remained in the United States
were undergoing social economic hardships as well.

11

In

fact, conditions were about to worsen considerably for the
many thousands who had not yet considered the idea of
Repatriation. 1118

The United States government, concerned

16 rbid., p. 170.
17 Ibid. , pp • 1 7 0-71.
,

18 Hoffman,

p. 56.
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about the large number of aliens in the country, decided
that the nation take measures to rid itself of these
foreigners, especially the illegals, during a period of
economic disaster.

In short, the federal government

commenced an active drive on illegal aliens in the United
States.

Even though the anti-alien campaign pressures

were directed at illegal aliens in general, both Mexican
Nationals and Mexican Americans found themselves the prime
targets for the Department of Labor's Bureau of
Imrnigration. 19
The Federal Deportation Drive
Heading the Labor Department's Bureau of Immigration
was William N. Doak, who replaced Secretary of Labor James
J. Davis.

Appointed by President Herbert Hoover, Doak took

office on December 9, 1930, and very quickly the new labor
secretary made his position clear concerning aliens holding
down jobs that could be used for American-born citizens.
Doak asserted that "the only way to provide work for
unemployed Americans was to oust any alien holding a job,
and to deport him. 1120

He also announced that out of -the

19 rbid.
20 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 39.
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400,000 illegal aliens in the country, nearly 100,000 of
these aliens were deportable under the immigration acts. 21
By the beginning of 1931, the federal deportation
drive spearheade? by Secretary Doak was in full swing.
Moreover, by this time, Doak's immigration agents had
carried out their hunt for deportable aliens zealously.
"They raided private homes and public places in a search
that extended from New York to Los Angeles. 1122
City,

In New York

for instance, Doak's agents raided a dance party held

by a local Finnish organization.

As reported in the New

York Times, during this event all exits were blocked by·
twenty Department of Labor agents and ten New York
policemen.

Next, 1,000 guests were lined up.

Thereafter

each one was ordered to show proof that he had the right to
be in America.
the test.

"All but sixteen men and two women passed

These were taken to the West 123rd Street Police

Station and then to Ellis Island for deportation. 1123
Doak's dragnet methods,

in various cases, were harshly

criticized by defenders of civil liberties.

Objectors

included liberal journals such as the Nation' and New

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Gardner Jackson, "Doak the Deportation Chief,"
Nation, 18 March 1931, p. 295; Hoffman, "The Repatriation
of Mexican Nationals," p. 60.
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B,__epublic, which ran a series of editorials denouncing
arbitrary arrests and semi-secret procedures they claimed
were used by Doak's department. 24

Still,

Doak's attitude

for promoting the federal deportation drive was best
described in this manner:
If the people don't like our methods they ought to
adopt registration. We're about the only country that
hasn't it [sic].
Most of the European countries have.
They ought to make all these people give us their
thumb prints and hand prints when they come into the
country and we'd keep records of them.
Then we'd be
sure where to find them and wouldn't have to raid
dances.25
Paradoxically, although Doak's controversial raids were
conducted for the sole purpose of reducing the national
unemployment problem; nevertheless, many of his targets
were "literally jobless and on relief. 1126
While liberals and civil rights activists were
protesting Doak's deportation policy, the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (also known as
the Wickersham Commission) was adopting an intensive and
highly critical report concerning the immigration policies
under President Hoover's administration.

President Hoover,

from the onset of the depression, clearly supported Doak's
policies and their enforcement.

Hoover, like Doak, also

24 Hoffrnan, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 39.
25 Jackson, op. cit., p. 296.
26 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 40.
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believed that aliens were taking away and holding down jobs
that should belong to Americans.

Moreover, he supported

the curtailment of both legal and illegal entries, and,
simultaneously, got rid of the undesirable aliens in the
country.

Notwithstanding, because of Doak's departmental

activities, public protests concerning illegal immigration
procedures, and contradictory pronouncements by officials,
the Wickersham Commission earnestly carried out its
investigation regarding Hoover's policies. 27
Upon completion,

the Wickersham Commission's report

was of modest size, a compilation of statements and
findings by its eleven member committee, and a detailed
study on the enforcement of the United States deportation
laws submitted by Reuben Oppenheimer from the Baltimore
bar and retained by the Wickersham Commission.

In brief,

the Commission greatly approved of Oppenheimer's report,
which filled most of the Commission's report.

Moreover,

they found out that the deportation system was radically
defective.

For example, the Commission pointed out the

following:
It lacks efficiency and works injustice to the alien.
It results in cruel abuses and unnecessary hardships,
and many aliens are deported, who, if their cases were

27 Ibid.: Herbert c. Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert
Hoover: The Great Depression, 1929-1941, vol. 3 (New
York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 47-48.
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heard by an impartial tribunal, would be allowed to
remain in the country.28
Even though the Wickersham Commission report disclosed
valid flaws within Hoover 1 s immigration policies, nevertheless, Doak's deportation campaign continued.
Doak protested the findings of the Commission.
he was concerned,

Moreover,
As far as

the public and federal support he was

receiving gave him credibility, far more important than the
Commission's investigation.

.!
.
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He stated,

"Never has congres-

sional support for our deportation activities been so
strong. 1129

In addition to congressional support,

President

Hoover publicly assured Secretary Doak that he would not
lack funds for his deportation campaign. 30
Assisting Doak in his anti-alien deportation drive was
Colonel Arthur Woods.

Appointed by President Hoover as the

national coordinator of the President's Emergency Committee
for Employment (PECE), Colonel Woods wrote to cities
throughout the country offering his support and advice.

At

the same time he requested "information on individual local

28 Francis F. Kane, "The Challenge of the Wickersham
Deportations Report," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 23 (November-December 1932), pp. 47-48.
2 9 Jackson, p. 295.
3 0rbid.
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relief efforts so that the PECE could act as a clearing
' 1131
house.

PECE became particularly interested in the city of Los
Angeles where the relief committee was praised by PECE for
having "tackled the problem of unemployment in an affirmative way. 1132

Woods' agency also discovered that the Los

Angeles Chamber of Commerce had implemented the first
active measures to help relie"-[e, the city's unemployment
problem.

Upon receiving this information, the PECE

suggested to Los Angeles authorities that a general city
committee be organized composed of local officials and
representatives from several social agencies in order to
help combat the city's unemployment and socioeconomic
problems. 33
Thus, on the eve of December 24, 1930, the local
coordinating committee in Los Angeles became a reality.
The Los Angeles Citizens Committee on Coordination of
Unemployment Relief included Mayor John

c.

Porter, County

Supervisor Frank L. Shaw, Los Angeles Times publisher Harry
Chandler, Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce President

31 Erving P. Hayes, Activities of the President's
Emergency Committee for Employment, 1930-1931 (Concord:
Rumford Press, 1936), pp. 41-42.
32 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 42.
33 rbid.
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John C. Austin, and numerous city officials and businessmen.

It had been organized into two committees:

a city committee and county committee.
committee, headed by Harvey

c..

The county

Fremming, a labor official

from Long Beach, handled the affairs of all unemployed
people who were not residents of the city of Los Angeles.
Charles P. Visel, on the other hand, had been appointed
director of the city committee.

Visel's plans for his

committee were to "contact all government, industrial, and
private sources of labor with a view toward creation of
employment. 1134
together,

Al though both committees planned to work

the city committee became the center of attention

and controversy shortly after its organization.

Visel's

uncanny plans for unemployment relief were the basis of
this controversy. 35
According to Abraham Hoffman, "Visel soon placed a
curious interpretation on his responsibilities 1136 after
learning of Doak's statement that 400,000 illegal aliens
resided in the country.

Hence, he sent a letter to Colonel

34 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation: The 1931 Federal
Deportation Drive and the Los Angeles Mexican Community,"
Pacific Historical Review 42 (May 1973): 207~ Hayes,
pp. 103-7, passim.
35 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," pp. 207-8.
3 6 rbid., p. 208.
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woods on January 6, 1931, informing him that it was his
belief that 20,000 to 25,000 of Doak's estimated illegal
aliens were situated in Southern California; and with
proper manpower they could be apprehended.

At the time,

Charles P. Visel was very much aware that a mass arrest and
deportation campaign could be a very large task for the
local immigration office with its very limited personnel.
So, Visel appropriately indicated in his correspondence to
Woods that local police and sheriff personnel would
cooperate if their services were requested.

He further

stated, "You advise please as to method of getting
rid.

We need their jobs for needy.citizens. u3?
On January 8, 1931, Visel received Woods' reply.

Woods confirmed that "there is every willingness at this
end of the line to act thoroughly and promptly." 38

The

PECE national coordinator, furthermore, asked Visel to
contact Labor Secretary Doak and clarify to what extent
local law enforcement authorities would assist federal
immigration officials.

Visel immediately sent a telegram

to Secretary Doak on January 11, 1931, pressing him to send
agents from various cities to California.

Visel's intent

37 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 43, and "The
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," pp. 65-66.
38 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 208.
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was to produce a psychological gesture, if and when the
agents did arrive.

Visel promised Doak that "this apparent

activity will have tendency to scare many thousand deportables out of this district which is the result desired."
The next day, Doak wired Visel thanking him for his
suggestions and efforts. 39
Visel's deportation campaign against aliens in
Southern California was based along a few simple tactics.
First, he would provide local newspapers, especially
foreign language newspapers, with publicity releases
announcing the anti-alien deportation drive and emphasizing
that the local Bureau of Immigration office would receive
assistance from nearby districts.

Next, with the help of

both local police and deputy sheriffs a few aliens would be
arrested.

Then, accompanying these arrests would be as

much publicity as possible with pictures.

Finally, Visel

hoped that due to the overwhelming press coverage of the
deportation campaign, along with the publicity of alien
arrests,

11

some aliens would be frightened into leaving and

that others would steer clear of Los Angeles. 1140
From the very beginning, large numbers of Mexican
aliens residing in Southern California, particularly in the

39 Ibid.
40 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 43-44.
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city of Los Angeles, were the
deportation campaign.

11

primary" targets of Visel's

Moreover, since Visel was well aware

that Los Angeles had within its population the largest
number of Mexican Nationals outside of Mexico City,
including Mexican Americans.

Furthermore, Visel knew that

compared to other minority groups, such as Orientals or
aliens from Europe, Mexicans outnurr~ered these groups by
far during the economic depression. 41 ,
Mexicans in California had other peculiarities that
had a profound impact on their lives.

For instance, many

had entered the country illegally during the years when the
Immigration Bureau was lenient or before exigent laws were
passed; therefore, they were quickly made aware of their
vulnerability by officials.

Mexican Nationals, for

example, were barred from employment on public works
projects.

Their exclusion, mainly in Southern California,

directly resulted from state legislation endorsed by both the
Los Angeles City Council and the County Board of
Supervisors. 42
Specifically, the legislation endorsed by the civic
elements in Los Angeles called for restricting illegal
aliens from "establishing a residence, holding a position,

41 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 209.
42 rbid.; Los Angeles Record, 24, 25 November; 17
December 1930.
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or engaging in any form of business. 1143

Supervisor John R.

Quinn was particularly supportive of any law which banned
illegals from government projects.

Quinn believed that by

ridding and barring illegal aliens--whom he honestly felt
totaled between 200,000 and 400,000 in California alone-from federal or state projects, a sort of cure-all for all
problems caused by_ these aliens would come about.

He

supported his claim wit~ the following statement:
If we were rid of the aliens who had entered this
country illegally since 1931 • • • our present
unemployment problem would shrink to the proportion of
a relatively unimportant flat spot in business.
In
ridding ourselves of the criminally undesirable alien
we will put an end to a large part of our crime and
law enforcement problem, probably saving many good
American lives and certainly millions of dollars for
law enforcement against people who have no business in
this country.44
Meanwhile, along the same lines as Supervisor Quinn,
Visel also felt certain that his anti-alien campaign would
solve the unemployment problem plaguing his districts.
Therefore, he continued to pursue his plans for ridding Los
Angeles of undesirable aliens.

Consequently, on January

19, 1931, Visel sent a copy of his news release that he
planned to have local newspapers publish on Monday,
January 26, to Colonel Woods for examination.

Moreover,

43 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 47.
44 Ibid.
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accompanying Visel's publicity release was a letter
requesting that a strong follow-up story, which could be
used later, and if needed~ be wired by the Labor Department
to his office.
coordinator:

Visel, likewise, informed the PECE national
"It is the opinion of the immigration

authorities here that these articles will have the effect
of scareheading many thousand deportable aliens. 1145
Some controversy, however,-did come about from Visel's
claims that local immigration officials wholeheartedly
supported his deportation and publicity plans.

Most of the

dispute centered on and stemmed from statements noted in
Visel's letter to Colonel Woods on January 19, 1931, which
were allegedly given by the Los Angeles District Director
of Immigration Walter E. Carr to Visel during an interview
between the two of them.

Mr. Carr stated--according to

Visel's version of this interview--"that there are
undoubtedly many thousand aliens illegally in this section
(mostly Mexicans and Japs [sic])," and "that the machinery
set up for deportation would be entirely inadequate on a

45 Hof~man, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
pp. 67, 691 see also Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans,
pp. 170-71, for verbatim copy of "Visel's Publicity
Release."
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large scale." 46

Visel also reported in his letter to the

PECE coordinator that Carr had mentioned the following:

With a little deportation publicity, a large
number of these aliens, actuated by guilty selfconsciousness, would move south and over the line of
their own accord, particularly if stimulated by a few
arrests under the Deportation Act.47
After Carr found out about his alleged statements
sent by Visel to Woods, he·firmly denied making any such
assertions or endorsements· calling for the deportation of
one particular ethnic group.
made this observation:

11

Abraham Hoffman, interestingly,

It would seem that Visel set down

in print what he had wanted to hear rather than what he had
heard. 1148

Also, Woods carelessly read the contents of

Visel's news release:
He failed to consider how Visel's words might be
interpreted in a city that, except for Mexico City,
contained within its population the largest number of
Mexican nationals.49
Instead,-Colonel Woods contacted Labor Secretary Doak and
informed him of Visel's plans.

Immediately, Secretary Doak

sent a special officer and a number of federal agents from

46 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
pp. 68-69.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 69.
49 Hoffman, nstimulus to Repatriation," p. 210.
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the Department of Labor to investigate the presence of
illegal aliens in Los Angeles. 50
Decentralization, Target on Los Angeles
On January 26, 1931, Visel's publicity release was
published by the local newspapers of Los Angeles.

In many

cases, the text had been printed according to the way each
newspaper saw fit.

Some newspapers printed sections of

Visel's news release exactly as written, while others
paraphrased and summarized.

The Los Angeles Examiner, for

example,. announced, "Deportable aliens include Mexicans,
Japanese, Chinese, and others," without an in-depth
explanation or qualifying details.

Embellishments were

used, such as "Aliens who are deportable will save
themselves trouble and expense by arranging their departure
at once," as suggested by the Illustrated Daily News.

In

addition to Visel's release, information regarding the
impending arrival of Doak's special agents and the
assistance from adjacent districts was published.
Moreover, Visel had provided this information to the Los
Angeles press. 51

SOibid.
51 rbid.; Los Angeles Examiner, 26 January 1931; Los
Angeles Illustrated Daily News, 26, 30 January 1931.
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Mixed reactions toward Visel's news release were
expressed by other civic elements shortly after its publication.

The Evening Express, a local Los Angeles newspaper

that had a reputation for being "Mexican baiters,

11

applauded Visel's anti-alien drive and went as far as
running an editorial that "endorsed restrictionist legislation and called for compulsory alien registration. 1152
Still, some local newspapers criticized Visel's deportation
plans.

La Opinion, Los Angeles' leading Spanish-language

newspaper at that time, ran an article on January 29, 1931
that spread across its front page condemning Visel's
publicity campaign.

The headline combined direct quotes

from Visel's news release and its previous versions
published by the Illustrated Daily News and Los Angeles
Times.

The article emphasized that those of Mexican

nationality were the main targets of Visel's deportation
drive. 53
Two days later, the La Opinion again ran an extensive
front page article dealing with Visel's scare campaign;
however, this time it had a different bottom line.
Specifically, the article reported that the major objective

"
52 Los Angeles Evening Express, 28 January 1931;
Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 49.
53 La Opinion (Los Angeles), 29 January 1931; Hoffman,
"Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 210.
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of the federal government's deportation drive was to
apprehend aliens with criminal records and was not directly
aimed at Mexicans alone.

This assurance had been clarified

by Walter E. Carr, the district director of immigration in
a press release in which he stated:
It has never been the policy of the State
Department [sic] to direct its forces against any one
race. We are treating the Mexicans on exactly the
same basis as we treat the Canadians, neither of whom
are under quota provisions.54
He also asserted:
If we have aliens who have committed crimes we
are going to spend all available funds1 if necessary,
to deport them before we deport honest laboring people
who may be in this country illegally because of some
technicality.55
Equally important, Carr had given this interpretation of
the deportation campaign to all Los Angeles newspapers the
day before La Opinion printed its article.

Yet, for the

most part, the press failed to clarify the intention of
Carr's immigration department.

"If anything, the bureau's

motives were confused and misinterpreted all the more. 1156
Carr's press statement resulted from an investigation
conducted by the Mexican government.

To illustrate, after

the Mexican government learned of Visel's deportation
54 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. SO.
;

55 Ibid.
56 rbid., p. 49.
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campaign, Mexico's department of Foreign Relations
contacted Consul de la Colina and "instructed him to send a
report describing the possibility of a large number of
Mexican residents in Los Angeles being deported. 1157
Meanwhile, Consul de la Colina, who had been working on the
idea of repatriation plans with city officials and the
Mexican government~ objected to any plan which called for
deporting their countrymen in large numbers.

Thus, the

Mexican consul contacted George P. Clements, an advocate of
Mexican labor and member of the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce in order to ask him to urge all persons directly
involved in the publicity to "restate and clarify their
intentions in the newspapers. 1158
Thereafter, Clements followed up on the Mexican
Consulate's request.

Clements immediately visited de la

Colina's office and discussed the deportation issue
further.

During his visit, Clements discovered that "the

consul had the definite impression that the deportation
campaign in Los_Angeles was to be aimed specifically at the
Mexican cornmunity. 1159

Clements, however, assured the

consul that no such plan existed.

57 rbid., p. 48.
58 Ibid.
S 9 Ibid • , p • 4 9 •
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out that additional telegrams sent from Mexico City were
received by Consul Colina ordering him to carefully
investigate and report on the activities of Visel's
deportation drive. 60

Only a few weeks earlier, Arthur G.

Arnall, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce's General
Manager, had warned
Visel to keep his publicity "from upsetting the whole
Mexican population by wholesale raids which are
misunderstood by the Mexic-an, 11 and which might also
disturb the communities that served California's
agricultural labor needs.61
At any rate, Clements left the Mexican consul's office with
the intent of making Visel aware that the "scare campaign
was ill-advised in its application to an entire ethnic
community. 1162
Later, Clements went to see Visel at City Hall.

After

he arrived at the relief coordinator's office both men
began reviewing Visel 1 s publicity release.

Hoffman writes,

"Either the coordinator recognized the misinterpretations
possible in his publicity, or else he was made aware of its
potential by Clements. 1163

Afterwards, Clements and Visel

vis.ited Carr at his office for additional input.

During

61 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 211.
62 rbid.
63 Hoffrnan, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 75.
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this meeting Carr agreed that a statement be issued to the
press, as soon as possible, which denied any deportation
drive aimed at Mexicans only.

Still, as noted earlier,

Carr's statement, which was used to clarify his department's
intentions, was treated unfairly by the press.

Also, "when

undertaken, the actual campaign proceeded on lines rather
,divergent from the direction promised by Carr. 064
Doak's federal agents from Washington, D.C., finally
arrived in Los Angeles on Saturday, January 31, 1931, to
assist ~ith Visel's anti-alien campaign.

Supervisor for

this special group of agents was William F. Watkins of the
Bureau of Immigration.

Shortly after Supervisor Watkins'

arrival, a meeting was called at the local Immigration
Bureau office.

Present at this meeting were Sheriff

William Traeger, Chief of Police Roy E. Steckel, and, of
course, Walter E. Carr and Charles P. Visel.

The agenda

was mostly centered on Visel restating his reasons for
requesting federal assistance from Labor Secretary Doak to
help rid Los Angeles of deportable aliens.

Visel also

pointed out to the group of officials that it was his

I
I

'I

I
j
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belief that 20,000 of Doak's estimated 400,000 deportable
aliens were concentrated in Southern California alone.

In

addition, he assured special agent Watkins that both local

64 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
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police and Sheriff's officers would aid immigration
personnel in apprehending illegal aliens. 65
Watkins, however, soon learned that Visel's affirrnation--that Los Angeles alone housed approximately 20,000
deportable aliens--had no basis. 66

Because Visel's

assertion lacked reason, Supervisor Watkins concluded "that
there cannot be 5 percent of the total number of the
deportable aliens in the United States situated in this
locality. 1167

Before making this statement, Watkins had

pointed out that although Doak did maintain a number of~
400,000 deportable aliens, the labor secretary had qualified his comments by stating that under the current immigration laws only 100,000 were eligible for deportation.
Evidently, Visel had either overlooked or was not aware of
the latter figure given by Doak.

Hoffman inferred that the

ambiguity underlying Visel's reasoning in bringing Watkins
all the way from Washington, D.C., apparently agitated the
special agent.

Watkins was quoted as saying, "it serves to

illustrate the viewpoint and attitude of Mr. Visel toward
this matter in general. 11 68

65 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 51.
66 rbid.
67 Ibid.
68 rbid.
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Visel's plans to scarehead aliens, mainly Mexicans,
out of the Los Angeles area without the use of formal
deportation hearings was criticized by Watkins as well.
Notwithstanding, Watkins was quite aware of the sophism
behind Visel's deportation scheme.

Watkins later wrote in

his report of the meeting with city officials that
the success of such an idea is, of course, open to
question, as doubtless many aliens who have wilfully
and knowingly entered the United States in violation
of law would not choose to so easily forfeit their
improperly acquired privileges here, and would more
likely move further from the border rather than toward
it, as a result of these deportation activities.69
Inevitably on February 3, 1931, Watkins and immigration agents had commenced their deportation activities
in the Los Angeles area and its suburbs.

After the first

few days, Watkins and his agents together with the
assistance of local police and sheriff deputies had apprehended thirty-five aliens.
Of this nurober, eight were immediately returned
to Mexico by the "voluntary departure" method, while
an additional number chose to take the same procedure
in preference to undergoing a formal hearing. Several
aliens were held for formal deportation on charges of
violating the criminal, immoral, or undesirable class
provisions of the immigration laws.70
Meanwhile, press coverage was extensive; Los Angeles

69 Ibid.

?Oibid., p. 53.
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newspapers covered every step of Watkins and his men's
activities. 71
Watkins did not necessarily view his press coverage
favorably.

His animosity was clearly expressed during a

meeting in Chief Steckel's office on February 2, 1931,
where Watkins blamed Visel's publicity policy for much of
the unwelcome news coverage.

Furthermore, he was very

displeased with the practices of Los Angeles journalism.
For instance, before Watkins actually began his drive on
aliens, he insisted that no pictures be taken of his agents
or any information be released concerning his plans in the
press.

But, on the initial day that Watkins commenced his

campaign on deportable aliens, several newspapers published
news releases anyway.

The Examiner, in particular, printed

across its front page, "U.S. AND CITY JOIN IN DRIVE ON L.A.
ALIENS. 1172
In addition to the English-language press, local
foreign language newspapers, such as Italian, Japanese,
Mexican, and other ethnic periodicals, ran similar
headlines and editorials regarding statements made by

71 Ibid., p. 53.
72 Los Angeles Examiner, 3 February 1931: Hoffman,
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," pp. 79-80.
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Watkins, including those given by Chief Stecke1. 73

One

editorial contained a profound statement made by Steckel,
it read:

"When an arrest is made, attention will be paid

not only to the person under arrest, but to al 1 members of
his family." 74

Steckel also stated in another editorial

the following:
Most of our c·rime problems are caused by aliens
without respect for the laws of the country. Many of
them are open to deportation. Now, with the full
cooperation of the government, we will give particular
attention to their status as citizens.
In cases where
there is doubt the Government will be immediately
notified and will have ample time to investigate.75
Besides the press's activities, Watkins also became
dissatisfied with the amount of assistance he was receiving
from local authorities, mainly Chief Steckel and Sheriff
Traeger.

Hence, Watkins asked Steckel and Traeger to

inform him if they were going to help his campaign
according to the manner in which Visel had promised earlier
in his letter to the Labor Department.

Watkins received a

reply from Steckel and Traeger shortly after making his
request.

Later, Watkins reinterpreted their response into

his own words:

73 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 81.

74 rbid., p. 80.
75 Los Angeles Examiner, 3 February 1931.
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Their inability to undertake any such cai.upaign, and
• • • for them to attempt such a drastic move,
involving indiscriminate apprehension of aliens by
their officers who are admittedly unqualified to
determine the question of deportability of aliens, and
the delivery of aliens wholesale merely on the
suspicion that they might be illegally in the United
States in order that they shall be examined by
immigration officers to ascertain deportability,
following which they would be released or held, as the
facts warranted, would not only have no jurisdiction
in law but [would] render them liable to numerous
damage suits for false arrests, etc.76
,

Regardless of the less than enthusiastic and unqualified support of local officials, Watkins continued his
earnest efforts to apprehend deportable aliens in S~uthern
California.

However, it became very apparent to Watkins,

nearly one week after he began assisting with Visel's
deportation campaign, that

11

the semi-secret nature of the

work involved in detecting illegal aliens had been
seriously compromised by all the publicity. 1177

Watkins'

viewpoint was elaborated further in his report to Assistant
Labor Secretary White, dated February 8, 1931:
Though the representations made to the Secretary
concerning the alien situation here be discounted, it
is my opinion that a very fertile field exists
hereabouts for energetic and intelligent activity on
the part of the immigration service toward
accomplishing the expulsion of deportable aliens.
The
force regularly attached to this office appears to be
too small to adequately care for the deportation work
which I believe can be developed. It is my belief

76 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 53-54.
77 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,
p. 83.
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that several months [sic] effort on the part of the
augmented force will-be necessary to accomplish the
desired results in connection with the deportation of
aliens hereabouts. We will, of course, devote our
best efforts to that end.78
During February 1931, county officials witnessed a
concerted drive on deportable aliens in Southern
California.

Although Carr had previously assured the

. ethnic communities that the Bureau of Immigration was
primarily interested in apprehending aliens with criminal
records and was not directing its drive at any specific
ethnic group, "the aliens questioned, arrested1 or detained
in the drive could only have made the Mexican community
wary of official statements. 1179

A series of raids in the

Mexican community became further evidence of Carr not
keeping his promises.

On February 13, 1931, for example,

immigration agents plus thirteen sheriff's deputies under
the command of Captain William J. Bright staged a raid in
the El Monte district.

Approximately 300 people were

questioned; thirteen were incarcerated.

Of the thirteen

people arrested, only one person had a criminal record; the
other twelve, who happened to be all Mexicans, were
arrested simply because they not prove legal entry.SO

78 rbid.
79 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 214.
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The Times and Examiner gave the El Monte raid
prominence in their Sunday editions.

The Examiner

published the names, ages, occupations, birth places, years
in the United States, as well as years or months in Los
Angeles county of the thirteen people arrested.

On

the other hand, the Times was more discreet by printing
their names only. 81

Again, Watkins complained about the

practices of Los Angeles journalism.

In a report sent to

Assistant Secretary White, dated February 21, 1931, Watkins
wrote about the coverage:
Unfortunate from our standpoint, because the
impression was given by the articles that every
district in Los Angeles County known to have aliens
living there would be investigated. Our attitude in
regard to publicity was made known to the authorities
working with us in this matter
• but somehow the
information found its way into the papers.82
Notwithstanding the publicity of the El Monte raid,
Watkins continued his quest for aliens in Los Angeles
County.

Except, after numerous raids into the East Los

Angeles area, Watkins and his men found that their job had
become increasingly more complicated.

His agents would

find the streets deserted, even though Watkins had
commented to White in a letter on February 21, 1931, that

81 Los Angeles Examiner, 15 February 1931; Los Angeles
Times, 15 February 1931.
82 Hoffman,
p. 85.
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the Belvedere section of East Los Angeles had approximately
60,000 Mexicans concentrated there.

Likewise, "in the

rural sections of the county surveyed by Watkins men, whole
families disappeared from sight." 83
The aliens in hiding did not discourage Watkins from
carrying out his searches, but it did cause him to look
elsewhere for them.

Thus, Watkins assigned several of his

agents to the county jail in search of aliens who might
have committed other crimes.

In the jail investigation,

200 prisoners were questioned; from this number, 19 were
found to be deportable.

They were charged with such crimes

as prostitution, procuring, and fraud. 84

In addition,

during the first three weeks of February, 1931, thousands
of people had been stopped and questioned at various
locations across Los Angeles County by immigration agents
of whom most spoke Spanish.

Abraham Hoffman indicated that

by late February,
some 225 aliens subject to deportation has been
apprehended.
Sixty-four of them agreed to depart
voluntarily and were taken to the Mexican border by
truck, while the rest were held for formal warrant
proceedings.85
He added, "The latter category, of course, held a number of

83 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 214.
'

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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Chinese, Japanese, and Caucasians, but in Watkins words, it
was 'the Mexican element which predominates.

111

86

Unquestionably, the Mexican community became furious
with Watkins' uncanny investigations.

As a result, a group

of over one hundred members from the Hispanic business
community called a meeting on the evening of February 16,
1931, to voice their complaints and concerns.

Platforms

stemming from merchant problems to nationalistic pledges
were discussed at this asseroblage; advice and assistance
was provided as well.

The meeting also resulted in the

organization of the Los Angeles Mexican Chamber of
Commerce, which was to be geared at protecting the business
rights of Mexican and Mexican American merchants.

The

Mexican Consul, Rafael de la Colina, was also invited as a
guest at this meeting.

He warned all persons present to

carefully check the credentials of anyone soliciting funds
for charity or issuing affidavits of legal entry.

In

addition, de la Colina vowed to "uphold the rights of his
compatriots before the pressures of immigration officials
who acted in so arbitrary a manner. 1187

86 Ibid.
87 rbid., pp. 214-215; Los Angeles Evening Express, 17
February 1931; La Opinion (Los Angeles), 16, 17, 19, and 18
February 1931; Los Angeles Record 24 February 1931.

121
A short time after the February 16 meeting,
irrmigration officials stopped their raids for a few days.
During this period, Watkins and Carr issued a new statement
to convince and assure the ethnic communities that the
activities of the Immigration Bureau were aimed at no
particular group.

The statement also emphasized that only

illegal aliens were to be deported from the United States.
Abraham Hoffman noted the following:

"This statement may

be contrasted with the one released to the papers by Carr
on January 30. 1188

Furthermore, he speculated that the

Hispanic community "must have found the contradictions
baffling, as official pronouncements of fair treatment
alternated with intensive prosecutions. 118 9

He concluded by

stating that even the Express, after it changed ownership
in mid-February·
presented an editorial regretting the current
impression "among Mexican residents of Los Angeles
that they are the particular object of search of
federal and local officials, and that irrespective of
the manner of their entrance into the country they are
liable to deportation. 11 90
The federal deportation drive once again became the
center of controversy in Los Angeles on February 26, 1931.

88 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 90; Los Angeles Evening Express, 19, 23 February 1931.
89 rbid.
90 rbid., Los Angeles Evening Express, 19, 23 February,
1981.
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on

this day, Watkins' men and over two dozen police

officers raided the downtown plaza during the late
afternoon.

These men apparently had surrounded the city

plaza and detained for over an hour nearly 400 people.

It

was reported in the La Opinion, on February 27, 1931, that
eleven Mexicans, five Chinese, and a Japanese were taken
into custody.

In passing,

the Spanish-language newspaper,

besides giving the event extensive coverage, was the only
Los Angeles metropolitan paper that did not ignore this
foray. 91
After the city plaza raid, Watkins found it necessary
to change his method of investigating for illegal aliens.
Watkins decided that his searches, which were usually conducted at fixed places, proved, for the most part, unsu~cessful in a city where it was uncommon by now to find a
significant number of aliens grouped in one location.
Instead, he ordered his men to carry out their investigations in small groups throughout the county's outlying
districts; he also directed t"hem to be as discreet as
possible.
No.

Incidentally, Watkins was assigned to "District

31," which covered an area from San Luis Obispo south

to the Mexican border and eastwardly from the Pacific Ocean
to Yuma, Arizona.

Also working with Watkins in District

91 La Opinion (Los Angeles}, 27, 28, February 1931;
Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 59-62.
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No. 31 were Carr, the director of the district, and Carr's
subordinate, Inspector Judson Shaw who was in charge of the
Los Angeles city office. 92
In most cases, Watkins' arresting procedures were
conducted according to the immigration laws at the time.
In other words,
the procedures that Watkins followed in detaining
aliens, holding them without benefit of counsel, and
telegraphing for a warrant of arrest after a provable
case was found; were standard methods in 1931.93
Although Watkins did report to his superiors in Washington,
D.C., that every effort was being made by him to release
innocent people quickly as possible, many of the suspected
aliens were detained for a number of days anyway.
essence, these aliens had no civil liberties.

In

In fact, it

took until 1933 to make changes in labor laws which granted
some basic civil rights to aliens. 94

Still, Watkins'

procedures and the federal anti-alien drive on the national
level were greatly criticized by liberal journals and
American Civil Liberties groups. 95

92 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 62-63, and
"Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 216.
93 Hoffman, Stimulus to Repatriation, p. 216.
94 Ibid.
95 rbid.
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Despite the protest of civil libertarian~ and others,
watkins proceeded with the anti-alien drive as usual.

By

early March 1931, however, the numbers of alien arrests had
noticeably declined.

This decrease was largely attributed

to concealment and elopement of aliens.

Nonetheless,

Watkins did manage to locate and arrest a significant
number of aliens during this period.

Briefly after these

arrests were made, he wired Washington, D.C., requesting
warrants to be used in formal deportation proceedings.

On

March 7, 1931, Watkins received a total of 138 such
warrants.

These warrants were used to deport 80 Mexicans,

19 Japanese, 8 Chinese, and the rest for other nationalities:

Besides these aliens, approximately 80 other

deportable Mexicans were allowed by Watkins to leave the
country under the voluntary departure option.

The federal

government also provided the Mexicans with transportation
to the southern border. 96
In early March, a series of raids was carried out by
Watkins and his agents located in areas outside of Los
Angeles and its nearby suburbs because alien arrests had
noticeably declined within the county limits.

Therefore,

"Watkins dispatched eleven inspectors to visit other parts
of the district, and went himself to Bakersfield .for

96 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 64.
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further investigatory work. 097

These investigations

resulted in twenty-seven Mexicans being arrested.

In

addition, they all agreed to leave the United States
voluntarily.

Most importantly, soon after these arrests

were made, the federal deportation drive in Los Angeles,
technically came to an end.
~

.

ir

But, on the local level,

deportable aliens were still being arrested by immigration
agents as part of their "routine tasks. 1198
On the whole, 230 aliens were deported from Southern
California by formal proceedings; of this number, 110 were
Mexicans.

However, 159 additional Mexican aliens returned

to Mexico under the voluntary departure option.

According

to Hoffman, the overall figure of 389 deportations listed
by Watkins on April 22, 1931, indicated that seven out of
ten persons deported were Mexican.

Lastly, he noted that

in order to apprehend 389 deportable aliens, Supervisor
Watkins and his agents rounded up and questioned from 3,000
to 4,000 people. 9 9
Notwithstanding the federal deportation campaign still
failed to solve the unemployment problem in Los Angeles.
Instead,

11

it created new tensions and accelerated hostile

97 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," p. 217.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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attitudes. 11100

The coordinator of the Citizens Committee

for Coordination of Unemployment Relief, however, was
pleased with the work Watkins and his men performed in
ridding the city of undesirable aliens.

The following is

an excerpt from a letter sent by Visel to Secretary Doak on
March 19, 1931, which clearly expressed the city coordinator's enthusiasm for Watkins' deportation activities:
Six weeks have elapsed since we have received
Mr. Watkins, in reply to our request for
deportable alien relief in this district. We wish to
compliment your department for his efficiency, aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and the altogether sane way
in which he is endeavoring and is getting concrete
results.
The exodus of aliens deportable and otherwise who
have been scared out of the community has undoubtedly
1 ef t many jobs which have been taken up by other
persons (not deportable) and citizens of the United
States and our municipality. The exodus still
continues.
We are very much impressed by the methods used
and the constructive results steadily being
accomplished.
Our compliments to you, Sir, and to this branch
of your service.101
The Los Angeles coordinator never did receive a
personal reply from Secretary Doak.
assistant, W.
letter.
C

w.

Instead, Doak's

Husband, answered Visel's endorsement

Doak's main intention for having his assistant

ii"

j

I

I
'

acknowledge Visel's letter was to avoid any further

lOOibid., p. 218.
lOlHoffman,
p. 97.

"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
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publicity directed at him because he feared it to be
detrimental to his already over-publicized department.
Eventually, Visel received a letter on March 27, 1931, from
Husband.

He stated,

It is the purpose of this Department that the deportation provisions of our immigration laws shall be
carried out to the fullest possible extent but the
Department is equally desirous that such activities
shall be carried out strictly in accordance with
law.102
Husband also clearly brought it to Visel's attention that
from the viewpoint of the federal government it was
the local authority that was supposed to respond to
the federal government's initiative in the enforcement
of federal laws, not the other way around.103
By the beginning of March 1931, the federal government's deportation drive in Los A~geles officially ended.
However,

the impact this deportation drive had on the

Mexican community was without doubt, a devastating one.
This was especially true for those community members who
had entered the United States when immigration laws were
lenient.

Thus, in most cases, they never regularized their

illegal entry.

As a result of this technicality, many of

them even after years of working and living in the country
found themselves being deported against their will.
Although the Mexican community made every effort to adapt

l0 2 rbid.
l0 3 Ibid., p. 98.
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to the pressures of the federal anti-alien campaign,

this

campaign unfortunately became th~ least of their worries.
Just when the federal deportation was about to end,

local

city officials in Los Angeles implemented a repatriation
program which ran concurrently with the government's drive.
Tens of thousands of Mexicans, consequently, were repatriated from the country under the Los Angeles repatriation
program.

Included in these thousands were American

citizens as well.

One estimate noted that by the end of

1931, from 50,000 to 76,000 Mexican Americans and Mexican
Nationals were repatriated from Los Angeles. 104
city's program, however, was just the beginning.

This
Soon

afterwards, repatriation programs sprung up throughout the
country; and Mexicans, without question, became the main
target of these programs.

l0 4 Hoffman, "Stimulus to Repatriation," pp. 218-219.

CHAPTER FOUR
Repatriation Pressures and the Mexican Community
From 1931 on, repatriation programs in the United
States became an unwelcome reality for the Mexican community.

Such programs, for the most part, were conducted

under the auspices of social agencies in cities and

-----:-----=-.:~-· -· ---·-- -_-·

-·-governments were faced with major socioeconomic problems,
specifically low income from taxes and a dramatic rise in
relief costs, local and state agencies began to pressure

J

~'.;'.::'~~xi :o ;y-th:-;;:;,~~~~ -;:;:r ity
of Anglos, particularly in the southwestern states,
commonly believed that Mexicans in general were taking away
jobs from unemployed Americans and overburdening the

~ f a ~ I;

.~:.:-J

addition, many considered Mexicans as only

foreign, short-term labor; thus, they had no right to

--

rrfos-t--lmre-ri7:affs concluded that the only logical answer to
the Mexican problem was simply to repatriate Mexicans from
the country. 1

1 George Kiser and David Silverman, "Mexican
Repatriation During the Great Depression," Journal of
Mexican American History 3 (1973): 148-49; Matt S. Meier
and Feliciano Rivera, The Chicanos: A History of Mexican
Americans (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 160.
129
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Generally, American officials shared the attitude that
Mexicans had a propensity to return to Mexico anyway.
officials also generally agreed that if the cost for the
Mexicans' departure was provided by the government, they
would be even more willing to leave the United States.
Local governments became very supportive of this rationale,
especially after many of them had calculated and discovered
that transportation costs to the United States-Mexican
border were cheaper than the annual welfare payments of all
~

their Mexican residents.

Thus, local and state governments

became convinced that this service would not only reduce
their economic burdens, but would also reduce their swollen
welfare rolls. 2
The pseudo-solution claims of the lower branches of
'

governments as a cure-all for their economic woes contributed to the complexity of the Mexican repatriation
question, both ethically and legally.

For example,

Mexicans were repatriated from the country, although
hundreds of thousands of them had contributed to the North
American prosperity with their blood, sweat, and tears.
Moreover, after living and working in the United States for
decades they were repatriated because of their illegal
status.

To complicate the problem, many of them had

2 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 160.
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American-born children who otherwise could not be legally
deported.

Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera noted that at

least half of the Mexican repatriates throughout the 1930s
were American-born citizens.

Both of them also stated that

when these children later wished to come back to the
United States in the belief that they were citizens,
many found that they had unwittingly lost their
citizenship by serving in the Mexican army or by
voting in a Mexican election.3
Consequently, Mexicans were affected by the technicalities of U.S. immigration laws.

Without question, they

became the victims of ethical considerations and civil
rights violations.

Even though, formal deportations were

required and, in many cases, fulfilled for thousands of
these illegal entrants; nevertheless,
the surprising aspect of repatriation is that very few
Americans spoke out in defense of the constitutional
rights of their fellow citizens, and a majority
condoned these repatriation programs.4
The United States government contributed to these injustices due "to the failure on the part of government
officials" to inform them of their rights. 5
Mexican repatriates were basically c-lassifie~, into

-·----

three di;tinct categories during the Great Depression:

3 rbid., pp. 160, 163.
4 rbid., p. 160.
5 rbid., p. 163.
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Another method employed official

announcements concerning free transportation to the Mexican

I

border; inducements to persuade Mexicans to leave by direct
threats of physical removal were not uncommon either. 8

As

a result of these categories, hundreds of thousands of

11

Mexicans returned to Mexico.
Still, Mexican repatriation during the depression
directly resulted from the widespread beliefs held by
I

•

Americans that Mexicans had become public charges on
..,-- 1-

taxpayers and from "actual or potential competitors for
·- ~f~t~-

I
J

I,

I
.

6Abraharn Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the
Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), p. 166; Meier
and Rivera, eds., Readings on La Raza: The Twentieth
Century (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 80.
7 Emory s. Bogardus, "Mexican Repatriates," Sociology
and Social Research 18 {November-December 1933): 174.
8 Kiser and Silverman, p. 149; Meier and Rivera, The
Chicanos, p. 161 •
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scarce job opportunities. 119

However,

powerful interest groups opposed it.

less popular but
Their reasons, which

were other than humanitarian, mainly came from growers and
ranchers from the southwestern states.

They opposed

repatriation because they saw it as a direct threat to an
adequate supply of cheap Mexican labor for their farms and
ranches.

So, by the mid-thirties, many of them continued

to resist the curtailment of Mexican immigration by introducing much legislation to Congress.

Their efforts

eventually resulted with Congress passing legislation which
extended the quota system for Mexican labor.

This

extension was definitely looked upon as a victory by southwestern ranchers and growers.

Still, many Mexicans who

were hired by these interests, specifically greedy growers,
later found themselves being repatriated by the same
ranchers and growers who requested them. 10
During the depression, repatriation programs were
largely regarded as a local and state affair by the federal
government.

For example, Hoover's administration, as sug-

gested by historians George Kiser and David Silverman,
feared that any intense and apparent involvement at the

9 Kiser and Silverman, p. 157.
lOrbid.; Meier and Rivera,

The Chicanos, p. 161.
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national level would disunite southwestern farming
interests and would hurt American and Mexican diplomatic
relations.

As a result of federal policies, the

repatriation process became a very decentralized one.

For

this reason, the federal government maintained a low
profile.

Thus, local and state governments were allowed

much flexibility in carrying out their repatriation
programs. 11
On the other hand, the federal government still kept
close tabs on the northward movement of immigrants from
Mexico.

American immigration statistics after the 1929

crash clearly indicated that Mexican immigration underwent
some drastic changes.

One source noted that "from 1931 to

1940 inclusive, only 20,000 Mexicans legally immigrated to
the United States."

Likewise, "as a percentage of all

immigration to the United States, Mexican immigration
dropped from 20 percent in 1927 to about 3 percent in the
mid-thirties." 12

As a whole, the rapid and massive change

in the northward direction of Mexican migration chiefly
resulted from the American consulate in Mexico reducing the
number of visas issued to Mexicans, and the border patrol

11 Kiser and Silverman, p. 157.
12 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 159.
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increasing its surveillance along the international border
for surreptitious entrants. 13
It should also be noted that there were some parallels
between the economic depressions in the 1920s and 1930s,
such as the continuous efforts by the federal government
to curtail Mexican immigration as described above.

In

addition, the variety of arguments either for or against
Mexican labor that prevailed were accompanied by the
blatant racism of Anglos toward Mexicans in general.

Both

eras also had similar uncontrollable socioeconomic influences which drastically altered the milieu of Mexican communities throughout the United States.

However, the social

and economic influences during the 1930s were more
pronounced in industrial areas located in the northern
enclaves.

Industrial regions, for instance in such states

as Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, were hardest hit by the
depression.

So many of the Mexican population, mostly

Mexican
Americans, became unemployed in the three states.
' ,,
Inevit;.ably,

the Mexican unemployment problem in these mid-

western states ended with thousands of Mexicans being
repa_triated.

Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera pointed out

that one-half of the total number of persons of Mexican
descent from these states underwent repatriation.

Paul

13 Ibid.; U.S., Congressional Record 71st Cong., 2d
sess., 1930, pt. 8: 8748; Kiser and Silverman, p. 141.
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Taylor also observed that in just three years, from 1930 to
1932, over 32,000 Mexicans were repatriated from Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio: 14
Southwestern states, mainly Texas and California, had
ample percentages of Mexican repatriates, as evidenced in
Texas, which had the largest Mexican and Mexican American
population during the 1930s.

One estimate notes that the

Texas Mexican population totaled some 700,000 in 1930.
Taylor also specified that approximately 132,639 people

I

of Mexican ancestry were repatriated from the Lone Star
state between 1930 and 1932. 15

Most of them were first

1.

I

:' Ii

and second generation Texans who before being repatriated,
either voluntarily or forcibly, had been located in the
southern half of Texas in order to work as tenant farmers

'

-/I·.

and migrant laborers.

In spite of the fact that Texas led

·•

I

the country in repatriations, "its percentage of returnees

14 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 162; Paul S.
Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Migration
Statistics, II, University of California Publications in
Economics, vol. 12, no. 3 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1934), p. 45.
15 Taylor, p. 45; Abraham Hoffman, "The Repatriation of
Mexican Nationals from the United States During the Great
Depression" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los
Angeles, 1970), p. 174a.
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to Mexico was not large enough to reduce significantly
Texas' Spanish-speaking population. 1116
For California, repatriation figures totaled some
52,946 from 1930 to 1932. 17

To illustrate, during the

1930s, most Mexicans in the Golden State underwent repatriation from the County of Los Angeles, which initiated the
first county-organized repatriation programs, and served as
a prototype of such programs that other cities and counties
ultimately embarked on across the United States.

Moreover,

because of the uniqueness of repatriation in Los Angeles
such as the total nurober of Mexicans repatriated,
expenses administered, methods used, and media involved, a
special case study of Los Angeles repatriation programs
during the Great Depression follows. 18
Los Angeles Programs
Repatriation programs in Los Angeles began as early as
the winter of 1930-1931; however, they were not all countysponsored.

In fact, months before county-sponsored

programs had been officially implemented by local

16 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 174a; Herschel T. Manuel, "The Mexican Child in Texas,"
Southwest Review 17 (April 1932): 291-292; H. T. Manuel,
"The Mexican Population of Texas," Southwestern Political
and Social Science Quarterly 15 (June 1934): 36-38.
17 Taylor, p. 45.
18 Hoffman, op. cit., p. 122.

138
officials, Mexicans were repatriating themselves from the
"City of Angels."

Part of the explanation for self-

repatriation--besides poverty, discrimination, mass
unemployment, and issues concerning the status of
Mexicans--was mainly due to the assistance indigent
Mexicans had received from such groups as the Catholic
Welfare Bureau, La Sociedad de Damas Catolicas or the
Society of Catholic Ladies, the Midnight Mission, and the
Comite de Ernergencia or the Emergency Committee.

Even

though funds raised by these organizations were largely
used for local distribution, nevertheless, nearly 10
percent of these funds was applied for repatriation
purposes.

Another significant reason for this self-

repatriation occurred when Mexicans were allowed by the
Mexican government duty-free admittance of personal
vehicles and farm equipment. 19
On the other hand, Mexicans without personal transportation were able to board a train headed to El Paso,
Texas, by paying a charity rate just under $15.00 per
passenger. 20

This rate was made possible through the

efforts of Mexican Consul Rafael de la Colina with the

19 Ibid., pp. 124-25.
20 carey Mcwilliams, Southern California Country (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 316-27: Kiser
and Silverman, p. 151.
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cooperation of both William H. Holland, Superintendent of
the County Department of Charities, and Southern Pacific
railroad officials.

The number of Mexicans who took

advantage of the special fare by signing up with Consul de
la Colina varied each week, from as low as twenty to as
high as a hundred or more, in the winter of 1930-1931.
Once the train reached El Paso, it made a connection at
Ciudad Juarez: thereafter, repatriates would be transferred
to a Mexican train bound for the central states of
Mexico. 21

Carey Mcwilliams witnessed Mexican repatriates

leaving via trains from Los Angeles during early 1931.

He

asserts:
I watched the first shipment of "repatriated" Mexicans
leave Los Angeles in February, 1931. The loading
process began at six o'clock in the morning.
Repatriados arrived by the truckload--men, women, and
children--with dogs, cats, and goats: half-open
suitcases, rolls of bedding, and lunchbaskets.22
Although informal arrangements aided Mexican repatriates, the local government of Los Angeles was still
confronted with. a major unemployment problem and, to make
matters even worse, a relief load in an access of
$2,000,000 a year.

However, Frank L. Shaw, Supervisor of

21 Meier and Rivera, La Raza .. p. s·s; Hoffman, "The
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," p. 125.
22 McWilliams, North from Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking
People of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press,
1968), p. 193.
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Los Angeles County's Second District, first proposed the
idea of a county-organized repatriation program, which he
was certain would at least help reduce the relief load.
Thus, by early 1931, Shaw, who also chaired the Board of
Supervisors' Charities and Public Welfare Committee, began
inquiring into the legality of such a program fully
materializing.

As a matter of fact, California state law

mad~ it possible to pass such legislation in order to
allow the use of county funds for transporting destitute
people out of Los Angeles. 23
After the legal and political barriers were removed,
plans for the first county-sponsored repatriation program
were set in motion.

Shaw together with the Board of Super-

visors' Charities and Public Welfare Committee undoubtedly
became instrumental with the active preparations.

Their

plans mainly focused on ways to induce Mexicans on relief
(from 9 to 11 percent Mexican born) to undergo the repatriation option being offered by the County of Los Angeles;
Inducements, for instance, included free transportation,
food, clothing, and medical aid.

Abraham Hoffman also

noted that officials evidently gave repatriates hints:
11

accurate or not,

that a return to the United States would

23 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
pp. 126-27.
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be possible after an improvement in economic conditions. 1124
Assisting Shaw and the Board of Supervisors with the

.
t

repatriation plans were various social agencies, Consul de

l

I

la Colina,

the Southern Pacific Railroad {which extended
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the charity rate mentioned previously), and, of course,

the

Mexican government which offered repatriates free passage
on its national trains from border towns to Mexico's
interior.

The Interstate Commerce Commission was involved

with Supervisor Shaw's plans as well.

This commission

simply "agreed not to question the fare prices as long as
the cost was borne by a county or municipal. 112 5
standing,

Notwi th-

the first organized county plan was completed by

mid-February 1931.

Under this plan, February 18, 1931, was

the date set for the first trainload of Mexicans to leave
Los Angeles in which nearly 350 Mexicans were expected to
participate.

However, because certain factors had been

overlooked during the planning stage,
was canceled.

the train departure

Hoffman explained that the cancellatfon

stemmed from officials being uncertain about
how many of the repatriates were going to be men,
women, or children, whether food for the travelers
would be purchased in Los Angel es or on the trip, and
what the exact expenses would be.26

24 Ibid., pp. 127-28.
25 Ibid., p .. 12 8.
26 Ibid., pp. 128-29 ..
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In spite of the postponement, local authorities
rescheduled the first trip for March 23, 1931.

On that

date, about 300 from the estimated 350 Mexican men, women,
and children who signed up for the previous trip boarded
the county-sponsored trains and departed from Los Angeles-their destination, El Paso, Texas.

Once at El Paso,

repatriates crossed the Rio Grande to Ciudad Juarez, where
they were transferred to Mexico's National Railroad headed
for the interior.

The Los Angeles Depa~tment of Charities

thereafter launched fifteen other special repatriation
trains on different monthly dates from 1931 to 1934:

the

trainloads averaged from as low as 412 to well over 1,000
Mexicans each. 27
On April 24, 1931, the second county-sponsored
repatriation train was launched.

A total of 1,150 Mexican

repatriates had participated on this day, out of which 800
had their passage paid by the County of Los Angel es, whi 1 e
the remaining 350 either paid their own train fare or made
other arrangements.

Nonetheless, some confusion existed on

part of the observers of the second departure.

Apparently,

observers mistakenly confused county-sponsored repatriation

27 Leo Grebler, Joan Moore, and Ralph Guzman, The
Mexican American People: The Nation's Second-Largest
Minority (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 524: Hoffman,
"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals, 11 p. 123.
For
specific totals of repatriates for each shipment from Los
Angeles County, see Appendix A.
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trainloads with those which were not.

Abraham Hoffman

wrote,
This was understandable, since the same train might be
carrying repatriates whose fares were being paid by
the county, repatriates paying their own fares, others
assisted by the Mexican consulate, some undergoing the
Bureau of Immigration's practice of voluntary
departure, and a few deportees being removed, the last
two categories being at the federal government's
expense.28
Adding to the confusion were weekly trains that occasionally carried large numbers of Mexicans repatriating themselves without county assistance.

This enigma gave others

the impression that the county has sponsored at its expense
another repatriation program. 2 9
Likewise, the terms repatriate and deportee caused
further confusion concerning the county's repatriation
program.

For example, this was particularly the case in

Mexico, where these terms were used interchangeably by the
press.

For instance, the American consul in Mexico City,

Robert Frazer, remarked in his report to the Department of
State on July 14, 1931, that Mexican newspapers did not
differentiate between Mexicans who were or would be
deported because of their illegal status and Mexican
repatriates who had legal status in the United States.
also reported that the Mexican press gave the impression

28 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 88.
29 Ibid.

He
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"that nearly every Mexican entering Mexico from the United
states has been deported, and under the most trying circumstances for the deportee. 113 O
In the United States, the press also helped increase
the amount of confusion over the Mexican repatriate.

For

the most part, the added havoc centered on repatriation
figures published in certain Los Angeles newspapers
approximately two months after the second county-sponsored
program had been embarked.

For example, the totaled

figures of Mexican repatriates who left Southern California
since the beginning of 1931 announced in such newspapers as
the Los Angeles Times and Record were very different from
the county totals.

The Times published on June 7, 1931,

that 40,000 Mexican repatriates had left Southern
California, yet the figures given by the county were 1,350
repatriates for the same period.

Then on June 16, 1931,

the Record announced that only 29,000 Mexicans had left Los
Angeles. 31
The problems and confusion stemming from the first two
county-sponsored trains were eventually resolved by county
officials and the press.

Meanwhile, figures of Mexican

repatriates from Los Angeles increased further due to the

30 Hoffman,
pp. 131-32.

11

The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,

11

31 Los Angeles Times, 7 June, and Record, 16 June 1931.

145
third organized repatriation program implemented on August
17, 1931.

The totaled figure of Mexican repatriates for

the third program was approximately 899. 32

Consequently,

the routine of the third trip ultimately became the same
one used for all other county-sponsored departures that
followed.

However, unlike the two previous train

departures, the scheduled destination from the third trip
on sometimes included the border towns of Nogales and El
Paso. 33
In short, by mid-1931, the county's repatriation
routine included as many as three Southern Pacific trains
and a representative from the Bureau of County Welfare who
was in charge of properly distributing county-provided
food,

assured that health and safety conditions were upheld

for repatriates, and, of course, made sure that all
repatriates remained with the train until they reached
Nogales or El Paso.

In addition, Consul de la Colina would

occasionally send his own representative to accompany these
trains headed·for the Mexican border.

This was the case

when Representatives Philip J. Robinson of the Charities
Department and Mexican Vice Consul Ricardo Hill accompanied
the second train that left Los Angeles on April 24, 1931.
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32 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 138 •
33 Ibid., p. 137.

146
As previously mentioned, when the county-sponsored trains
reached the proper destination, repatriates would then be
transferred to the Mexican National Railroad.

Again, the

trip to the border for most repatriates was paid for by the
county of Los Angeles. 34

{Appendix A has an itemized

listing of the total cost of each repatriation from Los
Angeles.)
It should also be noted that Robinson and two other
representatives, Horace D. Roberts and G. A. Elderson, were
sent by the Board of Supervisors to accompany the third
county-sponsored train that departed from Los Angeles in
mid-August.

However, on this particular trip, Robinson and

Roberts saw to it that repatriates safely arrived as far
away as Mexico City.

On the other hand, Elderson only

supervised the processing of repatriados through the border
station at El Paso, Texas.

Mexican Vice Consul Hill also

accompanied the third trip to the border. 35
Some evidence indicated that Mexicans were being
deceived by county officials during the third train

34 Los Angeles Evening Express, 24 April 1931; Hoffman,
Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 93-94.
35 Los Angeles Times, 17 October, and La Opinion {Los
Angeles}, 19 August 1931; Hoffman, "The Repatriation of
Mexican Nationals, 11 p. 138. Al so, Abraham Hoffman noted
that because of "incomplete country records for early
1931," the identities of person{s} who accompanied the
first repatriation train on March 23, 1931, is not
available.
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departure on August 17 as wel 1.

George P. Clements, a

me~ber of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce who also
witnessed the first two county trains to leave Southern
California, discovered that on this departure Mexican
repatriates were issues what seemed to be "innocuous"
departure cards by officials.
Arthur G. Arnell,

Furthermore, he reported to

the charo.ber's general manager,

that "most

of them had been told that they could come back whenever
they wanted to.

I think this is a grave mistake, because

it is not the truth. 1136

The truth revealed that the face

l

of the card asked for identification data--which seemed

t

harmless- "but the back of the card had been stamped 'LOS

1
j;:,

• -

J,,.'

ANGELES COUNTY/DEPARTMENT OF CHARITIES/COUNTY WELFARE DEPT.
[sic] /By

I

1137

Consequently, any Mexican born who

unwittingly signed this card could be denied readmission by
United States officials under the Liable to Become a Public
Charge (LPC) Clause of the 1917 Immigration Act. 38
Clements also observed that on August 17, many of the
would-be repatriates were American citizens.

In his report

sent to Arnoll on that same day, he substantiated this
observation by stating that 11 the vast majority of

36 Hoffman, 11 The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 135.
37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., pp. 135-36.
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repat;riates spoke the English language. 1139

However, on the

fol lowing day, the Los Angeles Evening Express ran an
article which claimed that "few of them spoke English"; but
it did admit that "many of the repatriates being described
as Mexicans were actually American ci tize,ns and that 'most
of them were born here. , .. 40
Most of the American citizens in question were
children.

According to Clements nearly 60 percent of the

total Mexican children being repatriated were Americanborn.

Clements, who became moved by this percentage, went

on record by stating that
No child could return, even though born in
America
•• unless he had documentary evidence and
his birth certificate and was able to substantiate
this, the burden of proof being placed entirely on the
individual.
He added, "This means that • • • these children are
American citizens without very much hope of ever coming
back into the United States. 1141
Clements' assessment of the Mexican American children
was disputed by the Bureau of County Welfare.

Apparently,

the bureau's request to the County Board of Supervisors for

3 9 Ibid., p. 139.
40 rbid., p. 139; Los Angeles Evening Express, 18
August 1931.
41 L.os Angeles Eve.ning Express, 18 August 1931;
Hoffman, "The Repatriation of '.Mexican Nationals,"
pp. 139-40.
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the third county-sponsored-repatriation had mentioned that
"All of these people [which included children] are at
present receiving aid from the County Welfare Division and
none of them are .American citizens. 1142

Abraham Hoffman

suggests that even though the County Welfare's request
maintained a greater degree of reliability as compared to
the offhand observation by:Clements and the reporter from
the Express,
logic demands that some of the children out of the 469
officially counted minors .under age 12 {and the
Express estimate of 700, which included non-charity
repatriates) would be AJ;ne_r;ican-born, the more so when
Cl'ements, reporting his having interviewed a number of
the adult repatriates, said that many of the men
admitted they had heen in the United States at least
ten years.43
The problem surrounding the question of citizenship
increased further due to a standard practice used by the
County Welfare officials for c'ategorizing Mexican children
on relief.

It was very common for local welfare agencies

to define Mexican .American children along cultural rather
than national lines.

As a result, these children were

classified either Mexican or foreigner regardless of their
legal status.

These agencies, moreover, did not view its

42 Hoffman, Unwanteq_.Me.~ican Americans, p. 95.
43 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 140.
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endorsement of sending Mexican Americans back to Mexico as
being anyway wrong. 44

Hoffman stated the following:

By thus mixing nationality and culture,- Los
Angeles County--and many white Americans across the
country, as well as the Southwest--was able to exclude
from its mind the thought that Mexican-American
children whose parents were on relief in a period of
economic depression might some day become productive
American adult citizens.45
Additionally, by the third repatriation trip, the
Charities Department was, for some time,. being investigated
by the grand jury--unfortunately not for the department's
unscrupulous policies but for its "financial irregularity."
The grand jury investigation resulted with the resignation
of William H. Holland, Superintendent of Charities, on
August 25, 1931--he pleaded i l l health.

Holland's sue-

cessor was William R. Harriman, who prior to his new
appointment was Superintendent of the County Farm.
Ironically, Holland's assistant, A.

c.

Price, was appointed

as Superintendent of the Bureau of County Welfare, regardless of some criticism.

Consequently, "no change in policy

in the repatriation program occurred, though the bookkeeping seemed to have improved. 1146

45 Ibid., p. 140.
46 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 96; Los
Angeles Evening Express, 4 July, 16, 18, 20, and 28 August;
and Los Angeles Record, 25 August 1931.
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Despite the problems, controversy, criticism, and post
changes the County Department of Charities experienced by
the third shipment, preparations for the fourth countysponsored repatriation trip, scheduled for October 29,
1931, were already underway by early autumn.

The months of

September and October witnessed county officials signing up
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as many Mexicans as possible for the fourth county trip.
Their efforts ended with approximately 1,200 repatriates
registered for the trip, out of which 1,059 were charity
cases.

Notwithstanding, when the repatriation trains

departed on October 29, some county officials had expected
a greater number of reoatriados.

Yet the less than

expected turnout, slightly over a thousand, did not cause
much alarm among officials.

For example, statements given

to the press by Supervisor Frank Shaw assured the public
that a tremendous saving to the county had resulted from
its fourth organized repatriation program. 47
The fifth county-organized repatriation trip did not
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occur until January 12, 1932.

As the previous trip, nearly

three months earlier, the number of Mexican repatriates,
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expenses, county representatives, and routine for the fifth

47 Los Angeles Record and Times, 29 October, and NewYork Times, 30 October 1931: Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican
Americans, pp. 98-99.
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departure were basically the same.

For the most part, the

routine for carrying out such a departure required a
written request from the superintendent of charities to the
board of supervisors, confirming the tentative date of
departure, estimated number of repatriates expected to
leave, and the total cost to cover food and transportation.
In addition,

the superintendent's request indicated which

welfare officials would accompany the repatriates bound for
Mexico.

Interestingly, during 1932, the sixth trip, on

March 8; the seventh, on April 29; the eighth, on July 7;
and the ninth, on August 18; were also similar to each
other in the number of repatriates, costs, chaperons, and,
of course,

shipment procedures. 48

Still, the succeeding repatriation trains which left
Los Angeles specifically between October 1932 and April
1933 were unmistakably different in total numbers of
repatriates and costs.

All and all, four shipments of

repatriates had departed during this period:

first,

on

October 6, 1932; second on December 8, 1932; third on
February 8, 1933; and the fourth on April 14, 1933.

These

departures included 868 relief cases totaling 3,150 men,

48 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 99-100.

153
women, and children.

The total cost to the county was

approximately $48,521. 49
Before the thirteenth movement of repatriates took
place on April 14, 1933, the issue as to whether the county
still wished to continue or discontinue its repatriation
programs was discussed by officials.

This discussion was

directly brought about by President-elect Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in 1933.

Because soon after Roosevelt became

president, his administration changed federal policies
which helped provide federal funds for county relief;
however,

the conditions stipulated that those funds be not

used for transporting destitute people out of any county in
the United States.

Therefore, the only alternative

officials in Los Angeles had to continue the repatriation
programs was the sole use of county funds.

Obviously,

since the thirteenth departure occurred the question of
continuing Mexican repatriation from Los Angeles did not go
unanswered.so
By the beginning of August 1933, the fourteenth
repatriation shipment carrying some 453 people departed
from Southern California.

And, by mid-December, the

49 rbid., p. 105. See also Appendix A for the date,
cost, and number of individuals for each Los Angeles County
repatriation departure.
50 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 105.
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fifteenth shipment followed with only 412 Mexicans departing.
clearly, these figures show that Mexican repatriations were
declining as 1933 came to an end.

With the close of that

year, Los Angeles welfare officials decided to evaluate the
county repatriation program thus far.

The means used for

part of the evaluation was statistical.

The statistics

revealed that, by the end of 1933, nearly 3,145 county
relief cases, totaling 12,668~repatriados, were sent back
to Mexico on county-sponsored trains.

Furthermore, the

amount spent by the Bureau of County Welfare to cover all
costs of shipment of repatriates was approximately
$182,575.

In terms of financial savings to the county,

the total figure was nearly $435,00o. 51
Qualitative evaluations were also prepared by the
Department of Charities.

The evaluations, which were sent

to both the Board of Supervisors and Mexican consulate,
included discussions on such areas as the "origins, procedures, success, and the future of the repatriation
program." 52

But, most importantly,

these reports disclosed

to welfare officials that the number of new volunteers for
the county-sponsored repatriation program had definitely
declined.

Officials, moreover, simply believed that, for

51 Ibid., p. 106.
52 rbid., p. 107.
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the most part, the de=:ine of volunteers occurred because
of the relief assista~=e being provided to the county by
the federal governrr.e~=. 53
Unquestionably, =::e role of the federal government was
largely accountable=~= the ebb of repatriates from Los
Angeles.

Again, muc:: Jf this decrease had been credited to

President Roosevelt's administrative philosophy.
earnestly believed t::at the

11

He

government was responsible for

the economic and social welfare of its citizens. 1154

The

major principal elese~ts of the New Deal program--relief,
recovery, and refor~--surely clarified the position of his
administration.

Roosevel t 1 s programs, such as the Federal

Emergency Relief AdmiListration and the Federal Civil Works
projects, indeed, contributed to the sudden decline of
Mexican repatriates. 55

The bottom line is that these

programs provided employment and additional relief to many
destitute Mexicans~ thus, many would-be repatriates had
good reasons not to leave the country or, for that matter,
Los Angel es.
However, the Los Angeles County's Department of
Charities, in an effort to increase the number of

54 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 156-57.
55 rbid., pp. 156-57.
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repatriates, staged an intensive recruitment drive prior to the
fifteenth trip.

Yet, after the campaign was completed, the

department only registered 120 relief cases, totaling 412
men, women, and children for the trip.

This figure when

compared to totals of the fourteenth trip decreased by 2
relief cases and 41 individuals.

Likewise, the same figure

when compared to all totals of shipments and costs ,from
1931 to 1933 was far below average. 56
Besides trying to increase the nurrb_ers of Mexican
recruits,

the Charities Department commenced the reduction

of its repatriation costs.

The department's first

recommendations made towards this aim were to eliminate the
food and medical attention for Mexican repatriates--once
they crossed the border.

According to Abraham Hoffman:

Each repatriate was to be given the illusion of
possessing his own financial resources. A repatriate
would receive a financial allotment covering himself
and his family; 25 percent of this was to be paid to
the repatriate at the branch of the Bank of Mexico of
his choice, either in Nogales or Juarez. This would
permit the repatriate to cash the check at a rate of
exchange favorable to him. It was then presumed that
the repatriate would use this money to obtain the
services that previously had been provided by the
county, a point assured by the continuing
accompaniment of county officials • • • on the
repatriation trains. The repatriate received the
remaining 75 percent of the allotment when he

56 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 107.

157
disembarked from the train, so that he did not
automatically arrive as a public charge. The average
amount per family of the cash allowance was ninety
pesos.57
Superintendent Price estimated that the new procedures
would save the Bureau of County Welfare approximately
$32,000 for the proceeding year;

therefore, on April 19,

1934, the procedures were applied to the sixteenth
repatriation shipment.

On this shipment 172 relief cases,

totaling 664 people, underwent repatriation to Mexico.
Once the Mexican repatriates reached the border, financial
allotments were properly distributed to them by county
officials according to the new policies.58
After the sixteenth shipment, no new county-sponsored
repatriation trains departed from Los Angeles.

However,- a

seventeenth trip, scheduled for March 20, 1935, had been
attempted by county officials.

The Board of Supervisors

had proposed a plan that would use state emergency relief
administration funds to carry out the trip for March 20.
Yet when the plan was submitted to the superintendent of
charities,

it became bogged down in bureaucratic red tape.

Eventually, legislation was approved for future repatriation programs, but

57 Ibid., pp. 108-9.
58Ibid., p. 109.
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intensive recruitment of prospective repatriates was
expressly forbidden by a policy stating that no
coercive measures were to be directly or indirectly
used on any alien in order to obtain his consent to
being returned to Mexico.59
This policy undoubtedly made it very difficult for county
officials to realistically carry out the seventeenth trip.
By 1935 Mexican Nationals and Mexican Americans on
relief were, nonetheless, less responsive to the Bureau of
County Welfare's invitation to leave Southern California.
Their lack of interest was chiefly attributed to the
federal relief programs permitted under the New Deal
program.

In essence, the New Deal program allowed for a

higher relief allotment to the County of Los Angeles, which
greatly reduced the financial burden on the Bureau of
Welfare.

Moreover, because of the federal program, major

construction projects like new roads, bridges, viaducts,
and tunnels directed by the Civil Works Administration and
Works Progress Administration were undertaken by the county
as well--such projects put thousands of people who were on
relief to work.

Although projects under the former and

latter administrations gave preference to Americans for
employment,

the "prospect of employment on them" was a

major reason why Mexican Nationals, as well as Mexican

59 rbid., p. 112 •
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America-~s, shunned repatriation from Los Angeles by the

I= the end, surveys were conducted to see just how
much t~e county had actually saved and accrued by
repat=~ating Mexicans on relief.

Rex Thomson, who had been

made t2e new Superintendent of Charities, revealed that in
one s~ch survey during early 1935 approximately 3,317
relief cases were removed from the welfare roles through
the co~nty-sponsored repatriation programs.

In a survey,

conducted during March and April, 1934, Thomson·had also
reported to John A. Ford, a member of the Board of
Supervisors, that
the cost per Mexican case aided averages $25.23 per
month. Applying this cost to the period these cases
have been removed from relief, shows that a total
saving has been effected amounting to $2,187,138 to
September 30, 1934.61
According to Abraham Hoffman, the latter figure was

Ij
"

debatable if based on the assumption that
the relief case would have continued through the
entire period of repatriation had the family not
returned to Mexico, that a case that did return was on
relief at the start of 1931, and that costs were
static.62

60 rbid., p. 113; Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos,
p. 157.·
61 eoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 169.
62 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 114.
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Hoffman concluded by suggesting that, realistically, the
financial saving to Los Angeles was around $500,000.

This

figure was also es~imated by Harry M. Baine, another member
on the County Board of Supervisors. 63
Such savings to the County of Los Angeles unquestionably did vary in different given reports.

For instance,

some mentioned that the county, indeed, saved substantial
amounts of money by removing Mexican relief cases through
repatriation, while others disclosed that many of these
same cases were only reopened by other Mexicans who took
the place of those who left.

Hence, the percentage of

these cases remained basically constant. 64

Notwith-

standing, Los Angeles County's repatriation programs were
unique as well as effective in solving, to some extent the
problem of swollen welfare rolls plaguing the "City of
Angels."

But most important, while Los Angeles was

executing its programs, other cities and counties across
the United States were also attempting to reduce their
relief load and other socioeconomic problems by repatriating Mexican Nationals and Mexican Americans during the
Great Depression.

63 Ibid.
64 rbid.
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Repatriation Across the United States
For the most part, the greatest number of Mexican
repatriates were from the states of Texas, California,
Illinois, Indiana, Arizona, and Colorado during the early
years of the depression.

One estimate, for example, holds

that from 1930 to 1932 over 200,000 Mexicans were repatriated from the above states· alone. 65

Commonly, the

transportation mainly used by these repatriates to Mexico
were rail lines and vehicles; however, in some instances,
returnees had no other choice but to walk there.

Large

border towns such as Nogales, El Paso, and Laredo experienced their share of returnees; smaller towns such as
Brownsville and Eagle Pass, Texas, and Douglas, Arizona,
attracted many repatriates as well.

Equally important,

major cities, mainly Chicago, Detroit, Denver, and, of
course, Los Angeles, including other cities, all served as
processing centers for hundreds of thousands of Mexican
repatriates. 66
Most notably, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois had a
substantial percentage of repatriates during the depression
because at least one-half of their Mexican population was
repatriated.

Part of the explanation for this percentage

65 Taylor, p. 45.
66 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 161; Hoffman,
Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 118.
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was based on the assumption that northern industrial states
were hit hardest by the economic depression.

As a result,

thousands of Mexicans employed in the meat-packing, automobile manufacturing, railroads, steel, and mining
industries, unfortunately,

lost their jobs.

In addition,

the Mexican population in these areas "had immigrated more
recently and thus were more likely to consider returning to
.
_,

~-.-.

Mexico than those in the Southwest. 1167

,,-,.

-, ..

Thousands of Mexican~ eventually returned to Mexico
from northern enclaves.

Such a movement was observed in

the city of Detroit because during the depths of the
depression, Detroit embarked on an extensive
repatriation program.

In many ways the reasons were

similar to those of Los Angeles.

Again, as in the

Los Angeles case, welfare officials spearheaded the
program in Detroit:

Detroit's Mexican Consul,

Ignacio Batiza, became actively involved in the repatriation program.

Moreover, Consul Batiza's initial efforts

to organize and establish a relief program for destitute
:Mexicans evolved as a program of repatriation for that
city1 thus, in 1932, Detroit's department of public welfare

67 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, pp. 151, 162-63.
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established a Mexican bureau to assist the city in repatriating Mexicans back to Mexico. 68
The role of the Mexican Bureau was mainly to convince
all Mexican relief applicants through interviews conducted
by social workers that their socioeconomic problems could
best be solved by repatriation.

Nevertheless, Detroit's

Mexican colony discovered that the case workers, as well as
•:i,"f.

·1:··'
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the relief efforts of the Mexican agency, were far from

<>\~...-~-.
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being benevolent to Mexican relief applicants:

The methods

of persuasion practiced by the bureau's case workers on
Mexican clients on numerous occasions included "threats of
deportation, stoppage of relief (wholly or in part, as,
e.g., in the matter of rent), or by means of trampling on
customary procedures. 1169
Norman D. Humphrey, who did some serious research on
Mexican repatriation from Michigan commented:
When knowledge of the actual functions of [the Mexican
Bureau] became widespread in the colony, resistance
appeared even to the point of refusals to go to the
agency • • • •
[Also] persons who were naturalized
citizens, and children who were born citizens, were
subjected to scrutinizing inquiry for purposes of

68 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, pp. 524-25; Mcwilliams,
North from Mexico, p. 184; Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican
Americans, p. 120.
69 Norman D. Humphrey, "Mexican Repatriation from
Michigan:
Pu.bl ic Assistance in Historical Perspective,"
Social Service Review 15 (September 1941): 507; Grebler,
Moore, and Guzman, p. 525.
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"repatriation." In one case the worker strongly
insisted that the possibility of continued dependence
was grounds for repatriation, despite the fact that
the head of the family had been naturalized.70
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In spite of the bureau's unethical procedures,

the

agency (assisted by Consul Batiza) and Detroit's Department
of Public Welfare did manage to repatriate some 1,500

;,.-l'

Mexicans from the state of Michigan by the end of 1932.
Abraham Hoffman stated that Consul Batiza had claimed that
as many as 40,000 Mexicans were repatriated from Michigan
;'.:-
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.:

in all.

This figure, however, was based on these

~

assumptions:

unemployment, lack of opportunity, and

pressure from welfare officials.

Notwithstanding, Mexican

repatriates from Detroit were transported to the border on
trains chartered by the Bureau.

(The train fare was $15.00

for each passenger, which included a meal as well.) 71
Another midwestern state with substantial repatriation
was Indiana.

Most of the repatriados were from the state's

two north~rn industrial cities, Gary and East Chicago.

In

both these industrial cities, a sizable Mexican colony
quickly developed during the 1920s.

Moreover, the majority

70 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, p. 525: Humphrey,
"Mexican Repatriation from Michigan," pp. 507,-509.
71 Grebler, Moore, and Guzman, p. 5251 Hoffman,
Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 1211 Humphrey, 0 The
Migration and Settlement of Detroit Mexicans," Economic
Geography 19 (October 1943}: 360.
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of Mexicans migrated to these cities to work in the steel
mills.

By the mid-twenties, for instance, East Chicago's

Inland Steel Co., employed some 2,526 Mexican workers, a
figure which constituted nearly 35 percent of its labor
unit.

Mexicans were, also, employed on local railroads in

the Gary and Chicago area, but the unit percentage was much
smaller than the former.

Most importantly,

the 1930 census

reported that approximately 9,007 Mexican-born immigrants
had settled in Lake County, Indiana, with most of them
living in Gary and east Chicago. 72
-:•.~~-
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Consequently, when the

economic depression struck the country, the hostile attitudes of Indiana's native residents toward outsiders served

?--' -~

as a catalyst for the repatriation movement from the two
northern cities.
Repatriation from Gary, Indiana, underwent two
distinct phases--one voluntary1 the other, involuntary.
The first phase lasted from 1931 to May 1932.

During this

period many Mexicans for good reasons left Gary to Mexico
on their own volition. 73

One of the major reasons for

self-repatriation occurred

. 72 Neil Betten and Raymond A. Mohl, "From
Discrimination to Repatriation:
Mexican Life in Gary,
Indiana, During the Great Depression, 11 in The Chicano, ed.
Norris Hundley, Jr. (Santa Barbara, CA:
Clio Press, 1975),
p. 125.
73 Ibid., p. 134.
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when the Mexican government invited its nationals to
return, implying that they would improve economically
by doing so, many immigrants readily took this avenue
of escape from the destitution brought on by the
temporary collapse of the American economy.74
This reason alone resulted with the first group of
repatriates leaving Gary in trucks, automobiles, and, in
some cases, by foot during the summer of 1931. 75
Shortly after the first repatriates left, Gary's
International Institute became- actively involved with the
city's repatriation process.

The Institute's involvement

was brought about by reports of hardships that repatriates
had experienced due to inadequate transportation while
attempting to reach Mexico.

In one report, the Institute

asserted that
many are returning in trucks, such a large number
going on one truck they have to stand, and only a few
days ago one of the Mexicans who left Gary in this way
was thrown from the truck and killed before the border
was reached.76
These hardships propelled the Institute to seek free transportation for repatriates from Gary's Council of Social
Agencies but their request was denied.
. r-

'.'

,_

The Institute,

nevertheless, was able to obtain passes, free of charge,
C

for voluntary repatriates on the National Railroad of

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 135.
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Mexico with assistance from Chicago's Mexican Consul,
Rafael Aveleyra.

It should be noted, also, that many

Mexicans from Gary had applied for subsidized voluntary
removal during early 1931 from the Immigration Office.
However, according to the files of the International
Institute,

the Immigration Office by June 1951 still had

not received any appropria-tion in order to ful f i 11 these
requests. 77
Consequently, the activities of the International
Institute were questioned by its major office,

the YWCA

Department of Immigration and Foreign Communities.
Evidently, the national office was alarmed with its
agency's involvement in repatriation, particularly the
complaints of the Institute's executive secretary, Isabel
Rogers,

to the Immigration office regarding appropriation

funds for voluntary repatriates.

In response to the

Institute's activities, Aghavine Yegenian, a representative
of the YWCA's national board wrote to Rogers.

Yegenian

stated that "Our experience from other places had been that
immigration authorities are only too eager to sent [sic]
al 1 eligible applicants and order their removal. 117 8
also mentioned that

77 Ibid.
7 8 rbid.

She
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in some places it had been reported to us that
Mexicans have been forced against their will to go
when they have applied for relief to city departments
of public welfare.79
Rogers' reply back to Yegenian was that "we know of no
instance here that the Mexicans • • • have been forced
against their will to go when they have applied for public
relief. 1180
However, by early 1932, Gary 1 s public relief policy
deteriorated, leading to an involuntary policy.

During

this year, a coalition of groups, which included businessmen, nativists, and township trustee officials, began
promoting forced repatriation.

The motives of these groups,

as described by historians Neil Betten and Raymond Mohl,
were "mixed and sometimes conflicting. 1181

Simultaneously,

group members felt certain that Mexican repatriation would
eliminate costly relief charges to the city, a rationale
which had been first presented to them by "a local branch
of the American Legion, original sponsors of publicly
financed Mexican repatriation in northwest Indiana." 82

79 rbid.
SOibid.

81 Ibid.
82 rbid., pp. 135-26.
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The local press, likewise, supported the financial benefits
of this rationale by publishing editorials connected with
the first repatriation trips and those thereafter sponsored
by the local coalition groups. 83
Largely,

the first publicly financed trips were made

possible by individual contributions, settlement houses,
and private fund-raising events.

For example, an event

sponsored by repatriation advocates was a stag party which
featured gambling and other attractions; providing the
facilities for the happening were the Knights of Columbus.
I

Again, the local press supported the cause.

The Gary Post-

Tribune, for example, implied that
housewives and others who might object to all the men
in town devoting a part of this night to community
uplift will be urged to make the sacrifice as a civic
and patriotic duty.84
In the end, funds were raised to repatriate Mexican women
and children by trains and men by truck.

Average

transportation cost per family to the border was estimated
at $37.50.

This sum, when compared to the annual relief

cost of $336 for _one family only, resulted in a savings of

83 rbid., p. 136; Gary Post-Tribune {Gary,
January and 4 February 1932.

Indiana),- 14

84 Betten and Mohl, p. 136; Gary Post-Tribune {Gary,
Indiana}, 5 and 27 February, and 16 March 1932.
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nearly $300 a year for the township, the Post-Tribune
suggested. 85
By the end of March 1932, the publicly financed
repatriation program ended due to exhausted funds.
two months later,

Still,

the township elite devised a more

sophisticated plan for raising funds to get rid of
destitute Mexicans from Gary.

This plan called for local

business interests to provide repatriation funds to the
near-bankrupt public assistance office, which Calumet
•

~

township trustee Mary Grace Wells headed.

r
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~

In turn,

business interests who contributed repatriation funds would
be reimbursed with scrip, which they could use 1 a ter to pay
their local taxes.

Therefore, this plan not only gave

local interests some obvious tax advantages, but it also
assisted Wells with repatriation efforts.

As she pointedly

stated, "It will mean a great saving to the township. 1186
Township officials, indeed, 'approved the repatriation
plan.

The first response of the Lake County commissioners

was to authorize "the removal of every Mexican family
receiving public assistance. 1187

85 Betten and Mohl, p. 136.
8Gibid., pp. 136-37.
87 Ibid., p. 137.

In addition,

they agreed
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to issue county scrip--bearing 6 percent which could be
used for paying taxes--to business interests who contributed funds for repatriation purposes.

After officials put

their plan into action, it resulted with several trainloads
of voluntary repatriates leaving Gary by mid-1932.

Similar

to practices in Los Angeles, each train was accompanied by
a county representative to the border.

Not all repa-

triates, however, were county cases because some left Gary
by their own means.

"The International Institute reported

that some returned by car after gasoline money ·was raised,
others in a freight car,

and some hitchhiked. 1188

Some

Mexicans who worked in the steel mil 1 s were al lowed to work
extra days in order to pay for their transportation cost to
Mexico.

-

In 1932, Chairman Walter J. Riley of the Lake

County Relief Committee reported that under the plan
approximately 3,300 Mexicans were repatriated, out of which
half had their trip financed by local government, whereas
f

the remainder returned on their own or through aid provided
by private relief agencies. 89
After May 1932, the second phase--forced repatriation-became pronounced in Gary.

The township trustee's office,

which was now fully in charge of the repatriation program,

88 Ibid., p. 137.
89 rbid.
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directed its full attention toward removing from Gary,
Mexicans who were reluctant to leave.

Immediately, the

trustee's office began applying repressive measures against
reluctant Mexicans.
to return to Mexico.

These measures undoubtedly forced many
After a few days, the International

Institute noted that the measures took effect.

Over a

hundred Mexicans left Gary and in some cases very unwillingly.

It also reported a personal account of a Mexican

American girl's reaction to her forced removal:
This is my country but after the way we have been
treated I hope never to see it again. • •
As 1 ong
as my father was working and spending his money in
Gary stores, paying taxes, and supporting us, it was
all right, but now we have found we can't get justice
here.90
In addition, the Gary Institute received numerous
complaints from distraught Mexican families.

Many of them

informed the Institute that their welfare payments were
canceled because they had refused to participate in the
trustee's repatriation program. 91
By January 1933, the trustee's repatriation-policies
underwent some changes, which were basically brought about
by Mexicans protesting to county officials about one
investigator's refusal to-issue aid to unwilling repatriates.

Although tbis action resulted in his resignation,

9 0rbid., p. 139.
91 rbi'd., pp. 138 - 39 •
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"it seemed discrimination had ended, since the township
office reinstated several Mexican families previously
stricken from relief rolls. 1192

Incidents such as harassment

of unemployed Mexicans by township trustees, nevertheless,
continued thereafter.

The Institute, for instance,

reported that a welfare investigator had demanded that a
Mexican relief applicant "surrender his 'first papers'

(for

citizenship) when he refused to return to Mexico," even
though he had

II

lived in the United States many years and

had married an American woman. 1193
su·ch incidents of harassment and discrimination
against remaining Mexicans in Gary, as well as throughout
the state of Indiana, became part of the norm by the second
phase.

Moreover, this standard increased the deplorable

socioeconomic conditions of Mexicans and their families in
that city and state.

They were denied jobs on state and

federal work projects.

Also, most Mexican Americans were

treated by Anglo residents of Indiana as second class
citizens; consequently, this treatment only added to their
troublesome hard times.

All and all, over 3,000 Mexicans

were repatriated from East Chicago and Gary,
during the economic depression.

92 Ibid., p. 139.
93 rbid.

Indiana,

Other northern enclaves
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added to this figure, too.

St. Paul, Minnesota, had over

400, and the state of Ohio repatriated approximately 300
Mexicans from Lucas County.

In essence, relief officials

in all northern industrial states mentioned had virtually
the same reasons and method of removal as those used by
- ·-.:;
;_,~~.: "·
~•,·

officials in the state of California. 94
Besides the southwestern and northern states discussed, Arizona was the only state which did not develop an

~. r::r.:

?,i~t' ('.,.,.,,

-;~~

organized repatriation program.

___..,.-

-~:;~

Howeve+, the stream of

Mexican migration through the state via its border stations

·i;,

.;;~

J:

resulted in a significant nurober of repatriates during the

·~;~

Mexican repatriates departed from Arizona between 1930 and

1930s.

Paul Taylor reported that approximately 18,520

-•;.i.1;

~~-

1932.

.~:{~-;-- .
z-.1j~.::

:

Many of them had left that state from the Salt River

Valley, a farming region where a sizable Mexican population

~~;,

developed in 1930.

In fact, by 1930, Arizona's Mexican

population reached over 114,000.
·-..£,

~
,,1},

Many of them found

employment in the cotton fields of the Salt River Valley,
while most found work in the state's agriculture, mining,
and railroad industries. 95
On the whole, over 500,000 Mexicans were reported to

94 Ibid., p. 140: Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans,
p. 120.
95 Taylor, p. 45: Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans,
pp. 122-123.

175
have left the United States between 1929 and 1935,
according to figures supplied by the Department of Labor
and statistics submitted to the State Department.

Still,

this total as compared to the "overall totals for
repatriates" documented and reported by the Mexican
Migration Service is viewed by many historians and others
to be less accurate.

It appears that

the U.S. Department of Labor figures for Mexicans,
both repatriated and deported, are at considerable
variance from those compiled by the Mexican Migration
Service of all Mexicans return~ng to Mexico. The
Labor Department files [also] do not include the many
numbers who were repatriated of their own volition.96
In addition,

the State Department figures only included

those Mexican repatriates who were assisted back to
Mexico by different government agencies.

On the other

hand, the Mexican government commonly recorded all persons
entering Mexico through its border stations, regardless of
their status at the time of entry. 97
For the same period indicated above, the Mexican
Migration Service reported that a total of 438,403 Mexicans
had returned to Mexico. 98

Though this figure is below the

American total, it was generally agreed to be a more accurate and more reliable calculation.

Other inconsistencies

96 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 125-26·.
97 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 162.
98 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 174-75.
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between American and Mexican repatriation figures can be
found in totals for returnees during 1932 to 1933 cited by
the Labor Department and Mexican Migration Service.

The

Labor Department, for example, during the fiscal year, July
1932 to June 1933,

reported that "7,750 Mexicans were

deported, while it effected the voluntary departure of
10,347 Mexicans." 99

On the other hand, for this same period,

the Mexican Migration Service counted 53,767 returnees.
Further, the Labor Department figures for the following
fiscal year, July 1933 to June 1934, totaled 8,910 Mexican
repatriates, but according to reports of Mexican officials,
for the same period, approximately 24,228 repatriados had
returned to Mexico.lOO
In spite of the differences between American and
Mexican overall totals for repatriates, the truth of the
matter is that a total of about half a million people
returned, either voluntarily or coercively, to Mexico from
the United States during the Great Depression.

Although

their departure was viewed by the majority of Americans as
a positive move in eliminating some of America's social and
economic problems plaguing her cities and counties,

the

hundreds of thousands of Mexican lives uprooted from the

99 rbid., p. 125.
l00ibid.
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country ultimately posed a serious dilemma for the
government and people south of the Rio Grande.

Mexico's

role in welcoming its returnees was, in many respects,
benevolent in nature.

But this lofty approach, as evidence

points out, unfortunately could not provide the basic
social and economic needs for the lives of the thousands of
Mexican repatriado"s from the United States.

CHAPTER FIVE
Mexico's Role and the Reoatriados
The role of the Mexican government during the
depression in encouraging Mexicans to leave the United
States, as well as aiding them back to Mexico, should not
be underestimated.

Thro~ghout the 1930s Mexico's repa-

triation policy was clearly aimed at convincing Mexicans in
the United States that a better life awaited them in
Mexico.

Initially, this policy was only rhetoric; however,

it soon was implemented.

The Mexican

overnrnent's promises

of emp],._o¥me-rrt;---c-o1.ottiza tion projects, and land offering,
,,.,..,,,,..,,.,,.--✓

.
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indeed, irif_~_ed-lll<mY ~~ l§_a v~ ~e zi ca _ '3.I:~,
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Still, most returned because they simply

preferred, for good reasons, Mexico to the United States
during the economic hard times.

Once back in Mexico, the

majority of repatriados realized that the chances of
creating a better life for themselves and their families
were few, if any.

Yet, in the end, the Mexican repatri-

ation policy was "successful in some respects while a
failure in others. 111

1 Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the
Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974}, p. 135.
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Mexico's decision to become actively involved with the
plight of the repatriados was due to the serious socioeconomic problems, which the thousands of returnees were
creating for that country and its people.

Such problems as

rampant unemployment and an already large labor surplus were
critical key factors for its involvement.

Other important

reasons contributing to Mexico's entanglement were the added
demands repatriates had on relatives and friends.

In

addition, Mexican relief agencies, as a result of limited
financial resources, could not adequately care for the
thousands of homeless, hungry, and penniless repatriates.
Moreover, reports of abuse and mistreatment of Mexican
Nationals in the United States contributed to Mexico's
involvement as well.

Thus, the repatriados' destitution

ultimately challenged the Mexican government to provide
some positive measures to help them, as well as solve its
own domestic dilemma. 2
The Mexican Nation's first earnest measure toward
solving the repatriation problem was the establishment of
the National Repatriation Committee.

Still, nearly two

years before this committee had been actually established,
Mexico's government adopted some key policies which were

2 Hoffman, 0 The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals from
the United States During the Great Depression" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1970), p. 135.
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chiefly centered on partially easing the financial burden
and providing transportation for repatriates.

For example,

one policy allowed Mexicans duty-free admittance of
material possessions.

In another instance, fees ordinarily

charged by local consuls for processing legal documents of
entrants were rescinded.

In another case, free transpor-

tation from the border to the interior of Mexico was
provided.

This assistance was provided by the government

to decrease the congestion in border towns, which resulted
from the thousands of repatriates seeking relief from
·I

townspeople, mainly in Ciudad Juarez and Nogales.

These

policies, including others, did serve as a partial solution
for some of the problems associated with the repatriados
during the early 1930s.

However, some completely failed to

work or did not work out as planned. 3
During the early 1930s, several annual conferences
were also held by the Mexican Migration Service of the
Ministry of Interior to discuss the larger problems and
propose resolutions regarding the repatriados to the
Mexican government.

The first conference, in 1930, focused

on the migration problems resulting from the repatriates.
The second one, in 1931, called its attention to the

3 Ibid., pp. 197-98; New York Times, 13 November 1931;
Edna E. Kelley, "The Mexicans Go Home," Southwest Review 17
(April 1932}: 303-4; Excelsior (Mexico, D.F.}, 26 April
1932.
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seriousness of the repatriation problem and transportation
recommendations for repatriates.

In 1932, the third

meeting proposed the establishment of a colonization commission to institute agricultural colonies for the Mexican
repatriates~ a tax on private property in an effort to
raise funds for these colonies was proposed as well. 4

Most

importantly, during the third conference, the recommendation of the colonization commission inspired one
Mexican official, Andres Landa y Pina, to conceive the idea
of a Repatriation Committee to handle the grave circumstances surrounding the thousands of repatriados. 5
Landa y Pina, Chief of the Migration Service, wholeheartedly believed that an organized Repatriation Committee
could provide for the needs to solve the inherent problems
of the Mexican returnees and that such a committee, in
part, could become a governmental operation.

However, the

involvement of private and public organizations became
essential for its success, too.

Obviously, after pursuing

his idea through the proper channels, Landa y Pina finally
witnessed the launching of the Repatriation Committee on
November 23, 1932, during a meeting in which he presided.
The official name given to this organization at the meeting

4 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 199.
5 Ibid.
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was the National Repatriation Committee.

Members included

Alfredo Levy of the National Chamber of Commerce, Red Cross
representatives, delegates from both the Department of
Public Health and the Ministry of the Interior, and, of
course, Landa y Pina.

Included as a member of the

Repatriation Committee was Jose Gonzales Soto, a wealthy
Spanish citizen who invested his time and money in creating
this committee, and who had considerable investments in the
Mexican Nation. 6
One of the primary goals of the National Repatriation
Committee was a subscription campaign to raise 500,000
pesos to help with its operation costs.

Gonzales Soto had

been among the first pledgers: he contributed 1,000 pesos
to meet the committee's goal.
followed.

Other contributions soon

Moreover, only six weeks after the campaign was

embarked, approximately 86,000 pesos were collected.
Adding to this amount was a contribution of 5,000 pesos
donated from Mexico's President Abelardo Rodriquez.

Other

donations totaling some 17,000 pesos were contributed from
government workers and officials also.

Special programs,

such as a bullfight, resulted in an additional 25,000 pesos
towards the set goal.

Mexican radio stations, particularly

XEW and XEB, donated air time for campaign pledges.

6 rbid., p. 200.

The
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campaign and the National Repatriation Committee,
unquestionably, was enthusiastically received by the
Mexican people, the contributions serving as an indicator
of this popularity.

Even though the committee served as

evidence of an ostentatious display, nevertheless, it
failed to define its mission and goals. 7
After weeks of discussions as to which goals seemed
feasible, the National Committee reached a concrete
decision to meet its mission.

The committee decided that

the campaign funds collected thus far were to be used to
establish communal agricultural colonies for repatriates and
their families.

Anthropologist Manuel Gamio maintains that

there were three major reasons why the committee proposed
this decision.

First, unless the skills acquired by

repatriates in the United States were properly put to use
in centralized locales (thus preventing them from scattering across Mexico), such skills would be lost to
Mexico's economy.

Second, sending repatriates to colonies

far into the interior of Mexico would make it more difficult or less likely for them to return to the United
States.

Thirdly, the repatriates' removal from the general

7 rbid., pp. 200-201: El Universal (Mexico, D. F.), 24
November 1932.
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masses would decrease the job competition with other
Mexicans. 8
Although the Repatriation Committee viewed its
decision as a positive measure toward alleviating some of
the problems surrounding the repatriates, their overall
plans did encounter some negative feedback by repatriates.
For example, a group of repatriates in the Federal District
were dissatisfied with the im~~ementation of the committee's proposal to aid repatriates.

Basically, the

repatriate group was informed by the committee that
no money would be directly distributed to repatriates,
but instead would be channeled to the proposed
colonies with the double goal of providing work for
repatriates and expansion of Mexican agriculture.9
Stemming from this proposal, the group formed a "Union of
<

Mexican Repatriates," urging that the government rescind
its policy of welcoming further repatriates until the
repatriates' problems at home were solved.

Meanwhile, the

committee responded to the group's opposition.

It issued

a statement to the press emphasizing that Mexico's repatriatLon problem was not simply a give or take situation. 10

8 Hoffman,

"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"

pp. 202-3.
9 rbid., p. 210.
lOibid., pp. 201-2; El Universal (Mexico, D.F.),
9 February 1932.
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Notwithstanding, by early February 1933, the National
Repatriation Committee was deeply involved with the first
phase of developing its proposed colonies.

By now, a

prospective site for the development of several colonies
had been chosen and was located in the west coast region
of Mexico.

Abraham Hoffman suggested that this site,

although considered a hazardous one because of its tropical
I

nature, was capable of being transformed into fertile lands
for agricultural use.

Excited by the possibility of s-uch

development, a team of inspectors and surveyors, composed
of committee members and engineers from three ministries,
set out to the state of Guerrero in mid-February to determine the suitability of the chosen region for colonization.
In the meantime, 500 repatriates were granted work permits
for San Luis Potosi by the Repatriation Committee.

It also

made arrangements to have them transported on train to that
state.

Lastly, the committee also agreed to pay each of

these repatriates a wage of one peso per working day. 11
Repatriation Colonies
Nearly two months after the special party left for the
state of Guerrero, two colonies were established and others
were being planned.

The first colony, designated Colony

Number 1, was located at El Coloso, Guerrero, where nearly

11 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 139.

twenty repatriates from Detroit, Michigan, occupied the
site.

The second, designated Colony Number 2, was

organized at Pinotepa Nacional, Oaxaca.

The first occu-

pation in this location were 400 repatriates from Mexico,
D.F., who were transported by train from there to Oaxaca on
April 19, 1933.

By the end of April, another group--

consisting of several hundred repatriates and their
families from the United States--arrived at the Pinotepa
colony.

With reference to these two colonies, the Pinotepa

colony was favored by officials to be more successful
because of its fertile lands, adequate water supply, and
small population.12
Furthermore, Anastasio Garcia Toledo, the governor of
Oaxaca, was very cooperative in aiding the colonists and
the National Repatriation Committee.

Repatriates, for

instance, were offered land with a clear deed by the
governor.

Toledo, also, declared

that residents of Oaxaca were willing to donate or
loan without charge • • • live-stock and draft animals
to aid the repatriates while the first crops were
being grown.13
The committee also issued out parcels of land to repatriates, which had houses built from palm trees.

In addition,

part of the committee's funds, which had increased to about

12 rbid., p. 140.
13 Ibid.
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154,062 pesos by early March 1933, was used to purchase
additional land for repatriates.

Sections of this land

were to be sold by the committee to "repatriates on 'easy,
long time terms,' ••• with the colonists paying back the
loans in crops. 1114

Likewise,

repatriados were assisted

with food, tools, farm equipment, and miscellaneous
items. 15
Despite the cooperation and enthusiasm surrounding the
colonization projects, especially Pinotepa, repatriates
underwent much hardship shortly after arriving at their
respective colony.

Colonists at Pinotepa, for example,

were excluded from policy-making decisions by those in
charge of the local governing board.

Also, repatriados

became very bitter when they learned that their raised
crops were to be "fed to farm animals."
troubles affected the repatriados.

Still,

other

For example, needed

supplies already ordered failed to reach the colony--adding
to the colonists' despair.

Although food rations were

sparingly distributed to repatriates by the local administrators, administrators would harshly discipline colonists
who protested.

Abraham Hoffman cited that "Armed men

accompanied the directors as they made their rounds of the
colony."

He also added that

0

much of the abuse seemed to

14 Ibid.
15 rbid.; El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 16 March 1933.
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have arisen after the resignation of Landa y Pina in
Noverr.ber. 1116
Consequently, the harsh circumstances resulted with
hundreds of repatriados leaving the Pinotepa colony and two
dozen from the El Coloso colony from late 1933 to early
1934.

It was estimated that the Pinotepa site had as many

as five to seven hundred repatriates from April to May
1933.

By February 1934, however, a total of eight

colonists remained at the colony--under the dictatorship of
fifteen officials.
Many of the repatriados who left the Pinotepa colony
departed in a body, making the journey between the
Pinotepa Nacional area and Acapulco in twenty-three
days, on foot, with great hardship.17
During the journey, many of the former colonists decided to
stay in Acapulco, where some residents assisted them~ but
they were eventually ordered to leave by the municipal
i

'

authorities.

Lazaro Cardenas, who was then running as a

presidential candidate, just happened to be present in
Acapulco when local authorities gave their order.

Learning

of the colonists' fate, he generously paid {with his own
money) their transportation expenses back to Mexico City. 18

16 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 140.
17 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 205.
lSibid., pp. 205-6.
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Fortunately, many repatriados survived their ordeal of
the colonization projects.

On the other hand, some colo-

nists were less fortunate.

At Pinotepa, sixty colonists

had sickened and died as a result of the tropical climate.
Others became gravely ill from various diseases.

Insects

such as jejens (small black flies), nihuas (jigger fleas),
pinolillo (similar.to a microbe), and other parasites contributed to the deplorabie living conditions and ill health
of repatriates located ·in the Pinotepa Nacional area.
Ironically, the area considered ideal for colonization by
Mexican officials was established in the same area where
political prisoners were once sent by the Porfirio Diaz
regirne. 19
After much mismanagement and controversy, the National
Repatriation Committee officially ended by presidential
decree on June 14, 1934.
nearly fifteen months.

In all, the committee existed for
During this period, the "Committee's

support went from national praise to ignominious
criticism. 1120

Most importantly, at the time of its· formal

dissolution, President Rodriguez decreed that the Ministry
:-.!.¾~ ..

~~:
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of Agriculture and Development would assume the Committee's
total responsibilities and resources.

.,~ __-:;.~

19 Ibid., pp. 206-7.
2 0ibid., p. 207.
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Ministry was the Office of Rural Population, National
Lands, and Colonization, which was set up to administer the
funds raised in the campaign and distributed it among
reoatriados who participated in the colonization
projects. 21
However, repatriates did not receive any compensation
for their involvement in the colony projects.

In fact, the

question of the campaign funds was not resolved until March
1935.

Still, even months prior to the date that the

National Repatriation Committee was officially dissolved,
repatriates complained to the committee about its handling
of the funds.

Eventually, the committee disclosed its

records of expenditures and the balance of the funds
raised.

Though the committee failed to reach the goal of

500,000 pesos, a total of 318,221.65 pesos were raised.
Out of this total, 202,777.48 pesos went for expenditures,
which included "transportation, food, medical aid,
clothing, household items, tools, machinery, and set-up
costs for the two colonies."

Another 14,008.84 pesos were

used for the committee's general expenses.

Thus the total

balance left was 101,407.09 pesos, which were deposited in
the Bank of Mexico.22

21 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 142.
22 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 207.
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In brief, the colonization projects failed to
accomplish the task set up by the committee members.
Instead, a small number of colonists were part of an
experiment, which was simply destined to fall short • . From
the start, the experiment did not have a concrete plan: it
was only, as Abraham Hoffman writes, a "semi-altruistj..c
intention. 1123

Yet, at the end of the colonization experiment

a positive change occurred: it changed the Mexican government's repatriation policy to one of greater commitment to
assist and care for the needs of the repatriados.

This

commitment, for the most part, included the creation of a
new repatriation board.

Its ultimate goal was to ferret

out answers for the repatriates' problems both home and
abroad. 24
On July 26, 1934, over one month after the National
.;.-

Repatriation Committee had been dissolved, President
Rodriguez decreed the new board.

Its official title was

the National Repatriation Board.

Rodriguez' administration

decision to create the board had been chiefly influenced by
Rex Thomson, a Los Angeles County official, who clai~ed
that'nearly 50,000 Mexicans in Southern California desired
repatriation.

Thomson's statement was issued during his

23Ibid., p. 208.

24 rbid., pp. 208-9.
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visit to Mexico, D.F. in May 1934.

He also stated that

besides California, large numbers of Mexicans in other
parts of the United States were potential repatriates.
These statements, including his visit, received wide
coverage in Mexico's newspapers.

In addition, his confer-

ences with prominent Mexican officials, such as Francisco
S. Elias, Secretary of Mexico's Department of Agriculture
and Public Works, as well as Manuel Gamio, who also worked

l
j

for the same department, helped expedite the Mexican
government's responsibility to the new board and the
repatriation issue.25
The National Repatriation Board, headed by Secretary
Elias, consisted of representatives from six ministries.
Also, the ministries of Foreign Relations, National
Economy, Interior, Public Health, and Labor were included.
A representative from the National Bank of Agricultural
Credit belonged to the board as well.

In essence, the

board's purpose was to "coordinate movement, assistance,
and settlement of the anticipated resurgence of repatriation, which h--ad beeri declining ever since the November
1931 peak. 1126

Although the scope of the board largely

25 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 109-12,
143; Excelsior 5 May 1934, and El Nacional, 8 May and 21
August 1934 (Mexico, D.F.).
26 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 143-44.
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centered on the repatriation of Mexicans from Los Angeles,
California, as often suggested by the board, it was not
limited by any means to other areas in Mexico or the United
States. 27
For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Development was specifically assigned the responsibility of
assisting and relocating the remaining repatriados from the
El Coloso and Pinotepa colonies.

Under its plan, the

colonists were removed from El Coloso and Pinotepa and then
transported to San Luis Potosi.

Once in San Luis Potosi,

provisions and tools were given to the relocated repatriates, where it was believed by the Ministry and the board
that better opportunities to use them existed.

The plan

allowed other repatriates to participate too, such as those
from the United States.

Ultimately, the Ministry's plan

called for placing needy repatriates in its agricultural
programs and irrigation projects in at least three organized ventures.

Others would follow, if the proposed new

colonies were a success. 28

27 Ibid., p. 143.
28 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 210: El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 26 July 1934.
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The plans of the National Repatriation Board to successfully establish its colonies never became a reality. 29
In addition,

the new board's efforts to create meaningful

programs for the repatriados met the same fate.

However,

because the new board failed to meets its purpose,
President-elect Lazaro Cardenas, who had shown a great
amount of interest with the plight of the repatriados
during his campaign for office,
repatriation program.

launched his own Mexican

This program, which emphasized

nationalism, would be directly aimed at attracting Mexicans
in the United States back to their hornelana. 30
The Mexican Repatriation Program
The Ca-rdenas administration was the first one in
Mexico during the Great Depression to initiate a repatriation program for Mexicans abroad.

The previous Mexican

administration, nonetheless, did make earnest attempts.
Mexicans in the United States, however, were reluctant to
leave and when American agencies proved charitable in
assisting them back to Mexico, it only complicated such
efforts.

Also, American newspapers had the tendency to

overplay Mexico's offers of land and assistance as

29 Hoffman,
p. 211.

"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"

3 0rbid., p. 225.
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absolute; however, it was not long before Mexicans in the
United States understood that such offerings were not guaranteed.

Still, there were cases when the Mexican govern-

ment would aid stranded Mexicans abroad, because
"neither the United States government nor American businesses would accept the responsibility of taking care of
them. 1131

Notwithstanding, President Cardenas' adminis-

tration was highly concerned in looking out for the welfare
and insuring the rights of Mexicans in the United States. 32
Thus, in October 1937, the first repatriaiion plan of
Cardenas' administration had been announced by the Mexican
Autonomous Department of Publicity and Propaganda (DAPP).
DAPP reported that under the first plan, the government's
intention was to repatriate its Nationals back to Mexico
before permitting non-citizens to immigrate in the country.
However, Cardenas made an exception to the non-citizen
policy by offering refugees of the Spanish Civil War asylum
to Mexico.

This ruling, nonetheless, caused some oppo-

sition to Cardenas' administration by Sinarquistas, rnewbers

31 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 152.
32 Hoffrnan,
pp. 225-26.

"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
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of a Mexican reactionary sociopolitical movement. 33
These Sinarquistas, for the most part, wholeheartedly
helieved that only Mexican repatriates, not foreigners,
should be entitled to any lands or assistance that the
Mexican government had to offer. 34
Notwithstanding, at the same time the government's
plan had been officially disclosed by DAPP, the plan
received its share of publicity, particularly by Mexico
City's two leading newspapers, the Excelsior and El
Universal.

Yet, any mention of a concrete plan to imple-

ment the proposal was not offered in the publicity or by
the government.

Abraham Hoffman suggested that the reason

for this omission was due to the proposal being stili at an
ineffectual stage at the time the Mexican government
announced its repatriation plan.

Interestingly, even

months after the proposal was published, "one Mexican
consul denied any knowledge of an active repatriation
program. 1135

Even though no funds had been provided to

33 Matt s. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, Dictionary of
Mexican American History (Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1981): John R. Chavez, The Lost Land: The Chicano Image of
the Southwest (New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press,
1984), p. 119.

34 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 152.
35 Hoffman, "The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals,"
p. 227: Excelsior and El Universal, 22 October 1937, both
of Mexico, D.F.
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transport repatriates, nevertheless, Mexico's consul
general announced that his government would pay to move
repatriates once they arrived in Mexico, with the condition
that they would have to make it to the Mexican border on
their own. 36
Despite the idiosyncrasies of Cardenas' plan, efforts
to lay the groundwork for·a proposed repatriation program
were continued by DAPP and Mexican officials during 1938.
Some officials, for instance, even went to the United
States to gather pertinent information on the working
conditions of Mexicans residing in that country, particularly in the states of California and Texas.

Border states

were especially scrutinized by Mexican officials.

For

example, during one such visit of the border states in
November 1938, the Minister of Interior, Ignacio Garcia
Tellez, stated that it was his belief that only destitute
Mexicans should be the target of the Mexican repatriation
program and that prosperous Mexicans in the United States
should "remain and foster links of friendship between the
two countries. 1137
As 1938 came to an end, a conference on population was
held in Mexico City to examine the problems of

36 Hoffman,
p. 227.
37 Ibid.

"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals, 11
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repatriation.

At the conference, a proposal was presented

which called for the postponement of a large-scale
repatriation program.

It stressed that "since Mexicans

were being returned to Mexico every day, either by deportation or repatriation, talks of programs and plans for
additional numbers was unrealistic. 1138

Other arguments

against organized repatriation or for the postponement of
such a program were presented as well during the
conference.

Regardless, Mexican cabinet officers sought

out questions and answers surrounding the repatriation
issue.

In the end, Cardenas' administration in spring of

1939 announced that a colony, designated

11

18 de Marzo,

would be established near Matamoros, Tamaulipas.

11

Thus this

became the first implementation of Mexico's repatriation
program. 39
Before the "18 de Marzo" colony was actually
established, Under Secretary Ramon Beteta was sent by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a tour through the southwestern cities in the United States.

The purpose of

Beteta's trip was to visit Mexican barrios or neighborhoods, from Texas to California, and inform Mexicans and
Mexican Americans alike of the proposed repatriation

38 Ibid., p. 228.
39 Ibid.
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program of his government.

The main points of the program

that Beteta intended to discuss with the two groups of
people were the new colony at Matamoros, the Mexican
government's offers of lands for colonization and cultivation in Sinaloa and Baja California, and the government's
willingness to pay transportation expenses for those who
wished to undergo repatriation from the United States.
Hence, on April 5, 1939, Beteta left Mexico for his journey
north of the border. 40
Accompanying Beteta on his trip to the United States
were Mexican consular officers.

Their first stop in the

states around mid-April was Texas, where Beteta gave
speeches, which were said to be overly generous, to Mexican
Nationals and Mexican Americans.

He spoke about how trans-

portation expenses for repatriates would be paid by the
Mexican government and the options repatriates had in
choosing between twenty irrigated acres or fifty unirrigated acres of land supposedly available at the new
colonization projects located in Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, or
Baja California.

While in Texas, Beteta and his entourage

visited such cities as San Antonio and Corpus Christi,
inGluding towns from McAllen to Brownsville by way of the
Rio Grande Valley and other places with a large Mexican

4 0ibid.
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population.

Most important, his offerings in these areas

were not only made to Mexicans in genera 1, but, in some
instances, he extended them to Americans who were not of
Mexican ancestry. 41
While Beteta continued his efforts to recruit Mexicans
in the United States for the Mexican repatriation program,
officials back in Mexico were debating if Beteta's trip
would have favorable results.

The Ministry of the

Interior, for example, expressed that the conditions in the
~..rnerican southwestern states were not so bad that Mexicans
would leave the area in order to take advantage of the
offerings per se under the Mexican program.

Even Beteta

during his trip recognized that many Mexicans were hesitant
about leaving America, fearing that once across the border
they would lose their status as legal residents of the
United States.

Mexicans who seemed most reluctant to

return back to Mexico were businessmen and property owners;
Mexican Americans were also reported to have shunned the
idea of repatriation for fear of losing their American
citizenship and other personal reasons.

Nonetheless,

Mexican officials continued to argue for or against the
the Mexican repatriation program during the Under
Secretary's visit abroad; however, President Cardenas,

41 El Continental (El Paso), 13 April 1939; Hoffman,
Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 155.
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speaking on the repatriation issue to DAPP during April
1939, ended much of of these debates by stating that he
wholeheartedly believed that "any temporary inconveniences
caused by an influx of destitute repatriates would be more
than balanced by an 'increase of the economic potential of
the country. 11142
Finally,

President Cardenas and Under Secretary Beteta

met to discuss the devel-opments of Beteta 's visit in the
United States.

Their meeting which was held on May 20,

1939, on the presidential train near Ciudad Juarez, lasted
approximately two hours.

Moreover, after this meeting,

Beteta accompanied Cardenas on the president's train for a
visit to the west coast states of Mexico.

Mexico City's

press gave wide coverage of Beteta's meeting with the
Mexican president, including the accomplishments of his
trip north of the border. 43
After meeting with President Cardenas, Beteta returned
to the United States and continued to visit through the
barrios of cities in the Southwest.

During this trip,

Beteta met with California Governor Culbert L. Olson at the
governor's home in Los Angeles on July 19, 1939 in order to
discuss Mexican problems in the United States, the living

42 El Universal (Mexico, D.F.), 15 April 1939~ Hoffman,
"The Repatriation of Mexican Nationals," p. 231.
43 Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 156.
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conditions of Mexicans in California, and Mexico's repatriation program.
meeting.

Controversy, however, stemmed during this

Consequently, Beteta became a political target of

the State Department for al 1 egedly commenting on a "bil 1
pending in the California Legislature that would bar aliens
from state relief rolls. 1144

Beteta's alleged comments were

carefully investigated by the State Department, which
further attempted to criticiz..e-Beteta's words in the same
manner as "U.S. Embassy officials in Mexico had on occasion
been criticized for making observations concerning Mexican
legislation affecting American interests. 1145
standing,

Notwith-

the whole matter was later dropped after Governor

Olson reported the content of the meeting.

Thereafter, the

State Department decided that "Beteta had not interfered in
American internal political matters. 1146
After the incident with the State Department, Beteta
resumed his journey through the American Southwest.

Even

though he visited a number of other cities in the Southwest
and energetically spoke to Mexican audiences, nevertheless,
the enthusiasm surrounding the Mexican repatriation plan
had expeditiously subsided by late 1939.

By this time,

. 44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 rbid., pp. 156-57; Times and Herald-Express, 20 July
1939, both of Los Angeles.
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repatriation from the United States was definitely on the
wane. 47
The Mexican government, however, did succeed in
recruiting a substantial number of Mexicans to participate
in its repatriation program.

Several hundred families

established their homes in the area of Matamoros.

It was

reported that approximately one hundred families, who
partook irr the special colonies, voluntarily repatriated
from the San Antonio region just in May 1939 alone.

Like

San Antonio, other cities and towns in the Southwest had
their share of Mexicans who elected to return to Mexico and
participated in her repatriation program.

The Mexican

government, nevertheless, anticipated that thousands of
Mexican families would participate in its program.

The

evidence available, however, clearly indicated that no such
numbers ever materialized. 48
The Mexican Nation had provided forty million pesos
to carry out its repatriation program--with other
appropriations promised if needed to bring Mexicans home.
But because

47 Ibid., p. 157, "Mexican Exodus," Newsweek,
1939,, p. 11.

31 July

48 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos: A History of
Mexican Americans (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1972}, p. 163:
Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans, pp. 155-57.
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Mexico had always been a poor nation and was also a
victim of the depression; as a result of her economic
conditions she was unable to develop an effective and
viable repatriation program.49
Most important, the Mexican government expressed a positive
concern for the plight of the repatriados during the Great
Depression, but only 5 percent of the returnees tooK part
in the special colonies.

Four such colonies were actually

developed, one each in the following states:

Guerrero,

Michoacan, Oaxaca, and Chiapas. 50

49 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 164; Hoffman,
Unwanted Mexican Americans, p. 155.
50 Meier and Rivera, The Chicanos, p. 163.
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CHAPTER SIX

~
Mexican American repatriation during the Great

--------------------

Depression was indeE;_Q__a __ natio_nal phenomenon, which resulted

---------

---

~--

-----------

in over 500,000 human_?~ln~~__ who!. :f2r th_~_giost par_t_,_~e
c o~c iye_J,y __!:_~PAJ:_]'."~i at ed u:OID...-t.h-e-Y-:s.4--ted__ _s_t, a_t e_~...•
"'-..

Un~ -

tionably, ME:x~':~I]._§. _c,tDJLM&~±:-can-·Jmlericans who under.went this
repatriation
process consider
it as one of .the
most
tragic
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,,, __ ------ -- .
--~ - -~---.<..-__,,,,___ -~ --_,
-'
c~~lr-ljye.A.

Additionally, Mexican Americans

in particular who are aware that such a mass number of
individuals were repatriated from and by the American
nation perceive this action as part of the darker side in
American history.

Generally,
________,,,, many of these Americans,

_______

____,,___ cannot believe~..e
----,-however, simply
United States, a
~

--

great na U.o_n wi_th-h.-i-g.h-.p-r-i.nci-p.J.-es.,~c-ould have coercively
_,,.,.,,,,.·

rep~~un<:1-:r;eds_Q~of people--which also
include~..Amer--i-~aR-C-~~en.s.::.::._from the country.~

,-----

Here in the United States, Hispanic scholars are
largely the first ones to question that such an event has
been persistently ignored in American history books, even
though Mexican American repatriation during the years of
depression was without question an epic saga in the history
of the Western Hemisphere.

Despite this omission,
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fortunately some Anglo and Hispanic historians presently
are among the scholars, who, like their predecessors, are
contributing studies in the area of Mexican repatriation.
Hopefully, when enough studies have been completed, which
are warranted by the importance of this subject, such
studies will be included in part into the traditional
history of the United States.

Meanwhile, such a neglect is

undoubtedly a major error in truly understanding the
history of the Americas.
Notwithstanding, Mexican Nationals and Mexican
,..._______.

Ame7 .. ns who experienced or remember repatriation ~ing
the G~eat Depression are probably the only persons who
truly understan~ the social and econ~ic imp.l...ica-QQ.ns it
had in their own lives.

Unfortunately, there is not enough

empirical data at the present to better comprehend,
synthesize, and investigate the Mexican experience of
repatriation at the vernacular level.

Yet, it is safe to

--------------•--=-----·--------______,.
------------- -

speculate that the.....§Q£~oeconomic hardship Mexican repatri-

,,,---- -

.

ates sustained as a result of repatriation was a costly and

~--e-:a-e.

-

MoJ:emr.er, othe.r-anaJ o_gies such as humili-

--~:£:.;;;!",:"-~:CC...-----------~----

-------

ation, anguish, and despair can also be used to earnestly
..-

.(

e 7 - 1 2 r E ? S . ~ ~ o n ordeal in which the_~-=--~~ple
be_£.ame_12.art of.

The experience of despair, especially true

for Mexican Americans, contained evidence that points out
that many of them, after being repatriated from the United
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States and then being displaced in Mexico, held a firm

--

------.,-

~--- -

conviction that Mexico was . .,_the
Arn~~ica,
their
----- ___foreign
,. ,.,. .,.-, -~·.--,.~~~. . ~-land;
-------.--~->-·
,. _,
~

homeland; knowing that they were not wanted in either
country.

Obviously many questions surrounding the circumstances
of Mexican American repatriation during the Great
Depression, as well as after, have yet to be answered.
Still, some of the funda~ental questions with their
respective answers do presently exist on the subject.
Commonly, facts such as the prov:ocation, provis.ions for
funding, methodology, and administrators used for this mass
movement have been investigated and ascertained by various
writers.

Their efforts no doubt have provided an

invaluable insight in the area of repatriation.

Mexican

repatriation, nonetheless, is a relatively unexplored
historical and sociological topic which definitely still
awaits further investigation.
Of course, other studies about Mexican American
repatriation will inevitably result with new developments.
Legal and ethical questions, for the most part, on the
repatriados' role before and after their removal from the
United States could well be the major focus of these
studies, since little has been writteri in the area.
Studies of this kind could also set forth new and further

I

I

evidence that thousands of these returnees were removed

I
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unlawfully from the country--particularly in the case of
Mexican Americans.

In the end, possibly some Mexican

Americans who underwent repatriation,against their own
volition during the years of ihe Great Depression will be
legally entitled to some sort of compensation by the United
States ~overnment for the punitive damage-:r:.epatriation has
caused them.

Moreover, if repatriation studies can be used

to prove that their removal was unconstitutional, then the
Mexican American repatriation phenomenon will rightfully
take its place among the written pages in books about the
history of the United States and the Americas.

I
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APPENDIX A
REPATRIATION SHIPMENTS AND COST FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Welfare
Cases

Single
Persons

Families

$15,959

257

29

228

1,350

8-17-31

11,642

155

6

149

899

10-29-31

14,033

202

13

189

1,059

1-12-32

18,483

263

36

227

1,267

3-8-32

18,783

291

62

229

1,295

4-29-32

12,753

208

53

155

875

7-7-32

16,989

379

162

217

1,063

8-18-32

13,125

280

135

147

845

10-6-32

11,879

232

72

160

758

12-8-32

14,380

260

87

173

932

2-8-33

8,687

150

41

109

546

4-14-33

13,575

226

49

177

914

8-3-33

7,105

122

40

82

453

12-12-22

5,182

120

49

71

412

4-15-34

11,926

172

47

125

664

$194,501

3,317

879

2,438

13,332

Date of
Departure

3-23-31
4-24-32

Total

Source:

Total Cost
&

Individuals

Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great
Depression: Repatriation Pressures 1929-1939 {'fucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1974), pp. 172-73.

APPENDIX B
TOTAL REPATRIATION BY MONTHS, 1929-1937

1929

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

Jan.

6,868

3,782

6,508

9,115

3,005

1,786

1,339

1,138

467

Feb.

4,465

3,472

6,145

6,308

3,108

1,607

1,014

1,138

515

March

4,382

3,.391

9,400

5,931

2,979

1,502

1,241

1,036

558

April

4;333

3,830

10,439

5,987

4,817

2,213

1,275

843

535

May

5,592

3,674

7,201

8,327

2,946

1,489

1,232

981

383

June

9,768

5,174

9,639

7,614

2,741

1,653

1,271

946

552

July

7,101

5,788

8,954

8,018

1,851

1,776

1,266

1,129

714

Aug.

6,285

5,775

14,748

6,071

2,333

1,577

1,369

782

687

Sept.

6,991

7,134

13,826

3,777

1,721

2,320

1,325

926

653

O::t.

7,809

8,648

16,448

5,128

2,283

2,976

1,347

895

783

tbv.

7,850

9,560

20,756

5,460

2,554

2,967

1,413

826

1,026

Dec.

7,975

9,899

14,455

5,717

3,236

2,077

1,276

959

1,159

'Ibtal

79,419

70,127

128,519

77,453

33,574

23,943

15,368

11,599

8,037

Source:

Abraham Hoffiran, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great De ression:
1929-1939 (Tucson: University o Arizona Press,
, pp.
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